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"Reductionism"
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Reasons in action : a reductionist account of intentional action
\"Ingmar Persson offers an original view of the processes of human action: deliberating on the basis of reasons for and against actions, making a decision about what to do, and from there implementing the decision in action in a way that makes the action intentional. Persson's analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, though how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts is also discussed. The interpretation of intentional action that is presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalyzed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficient for our acting for reasons is also sketched out.\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Subjects, Experiences, and the Passage of Time : a Neo-Parfittian Account
The A and B-theorists of time disagree over whether time passes in reality. The B-theorist denies it does, and so, despite its successes, stands at an intuitive disadvantage. The A-theorist on the other hand is able to argue that our experience of time provides evidence of its passage. This ‘argument from experience’ expresses what I take to be the main motivation behind the A-theory. My aim is to provide the B-theorist with a response. The general thrust is that the argument from experience rests upon a mistaken view about the self – namely, Non-Reductionism. If we instead assume a Reductionist view, it should be rejected. Derek Parfit argues that, given Reductionism, it can be an empty question whether persons persists through change. After defining and justifying Reductionism, I argue for a stronger claim: it is always an empty question whether persons – and their experiences – persist. That is to say, what we naturally describe as a single persisting person (or experience) could just as accurately be described as a series of distinct momentary persons (or experiences). This claim is defended, then put to work against the argument from experience. Firstly, I argue it follows from this claim that we could not have veridical experiences of temporal passage. So, even if we do experience time as passing, we couldn’t take this as evidence that time really does pass. Finally, I propose a cognitive error account of temporal experience whereby although we believe we experience time as passing, this belief is false. I argue that the intuition to the contrary should be regarded as a side effect of a faulty, Non-Reductionist conceptual scheme. If we were to assimilate a Reductionist conceptual scheme instead, it would be impossible to conceptualise an experience of passage. In other words, time would not seem to pass.
Dissertation
The Problem of Class Abstractionism
With renewed interest in Marxism, class is back on the intellectual agenda. But so too is the familiar charge of “class reductionism.” This charge conflates two distinct claims regarding what we term the structural and political primacy of class. Structural primacy refers to the determinant role of class in social explanation, whereas political primacy refers to its centrality in radical politics. Crossing these distinct claims, we identify four possible positions on the primacy of class. Here, we focus on the two that affirm the structural primacy of class. What we call “class abstractionism,” which presumes to derive the political primacy of class from an account of its structural primacy, ultimately relies on an abstract conception of class that effectively presupposes its political primacy. In contrast, a more adequate account of structural primacy—what we call “class dynamism”—requires us to abandon the presupposition of class’s necessary political primacy.
Journal Article
Complex systems approach for sports injuries: moving from risk factor identification to injury pattern recognition—narrative review and new concept
Injury prediction is one of the most challenging issues in sports and a key component for injury prevention. Sports injuries aetiology investigations have assumed a reductionist view in which a phenomenon has been simplified into units and analysed as the sum of its basic parts and causality has been seen in a linear and unidirectional way. This reductionist approach relies on correlation and regression analyses and, despite the vast effort to predict sports injuries, it has been limited in its ability to successfully identify predictive factors. The majority of human health conditions are complex. In this sense, the multifactorial complex nature of sports injuries arises not from the linear interaction between isolated and predictive factors, but from the complex interaction among a web of determinants. Thus, the aim of this conceptual paper was to propose a complex system model for sports injuries and to demonstrate how the implementation of complex system thinking may allow us to better address the complex nature of the sports injuries aetiology. According to this model, we should identify features that are hallmarks of complex systems, such as the pattern of relationships (interactions) among determinants, the regularities (profiles) that simultaneously characterise and constrain the phenomenon and the emerging pattern that arises from the complex web of determinants. In sports practice, this emerging pattern may be related to injury occurrence or adaptation. This novel view of preventive intervention relies on the identification of regularities or risk profile, moving from risk factors to risk pattern recognition.
Journal Article
En roue libre: anthropologie sentimentale du vélo
[...]with the lower limbs, we can carry out multiple activities, which are equally important for any human being to be able to self-fulfill in different ways. In this sense, with the edition of the aforementioned book, the French Anthropologist, David Le Breton, who for several years has also dedicated himself to the investigation of various themes related to the body and displacement, comes, for the first time, to show how biking is strictly linked to the human person and, in this sense, how this activity is important, in different ways, so that we can self-realize more fruitfully. [...]in the twelfth, entitled \"Velorution\" as an epilogue, the author defends and, at the same time, promotes the use of bicycles, highlighting the importance of educating people in this regard, as well as creating social conditions so that people can ride a bicycle more frequently. In this sense, mainly as a result of technological evolution, the author regrets that, currently, people are giving up this activity, thus giving priority to a rather sedentary lifestyle, also due to the constant use of the car in any circumstance. [...]I think that the work has been enriched because the author shows the advantages of the bicycle compared to the car, as well as the harm that the constant use of the car brings to us.
Journal Article
Implications for the Testimonial Reductionism/Anti-Reductionism Debate from Psychological Studies of Selective Trust: Scope and Limitations
The child objection is a major challenge for reductionism, which requires hearers to have positive reasons for testimonial justification. However, it has been pointed out that anti-reductionism, which requires only the absence of negative reasons, or defeaters, suffers from the same kind of problem. The child objection presupposes the empirical thesis that “children do not have the capacity to consider reasons,” but the plausibility of this assumption may be revealed by developmental psychology research on selective trust. This paper uses recent epistemological studies as a guide to narrow down the types of defeaters that children are required to consider, and then clarifies what kind of reasons various experiments can be said to test the ability to consider, and in what sense children who pass the test can be said to be “considering” reasons. In doing so, we clarify the scope and limits of the implications that selective trust studies can have for reductionism and anti-reductionism. We then suggest what future psychological research is desired from an epistemological interest to go beyond the current limitations.
Journal Article
MACHINE
Food, he remarked with good, if limiting, Gallic gusto, marks the epitome of the soul's physio-cultural makeup: \"What power there is in a meal! Years of observing (and struggling with) mental illness; long ministering within vineyards sorted by the mostly predictable forces of education, locale, family structure, social and commercial environments; picking my way through the thickets of attendant medical pressures; reading through the choreographed swill of cultural and academic logics displayed on screens and in journals and books, sinking in the quicksand of artistic \"Simon says\": all of these experiences have confirmed the often deterministic constraints that hem us in. \"Enlightened government,\" as it developed in the eighteenth century, with its combination of naive and often brutally uncontrolled coercions, was as much the invention of misguided Christians as it was the program of La Mettrie's atheism.
Journal Article
Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research
In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett's (1987) notion of real patterns, and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.
Journal Article
Applied phenomenology: why it is safe to ignore the epoché
The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl’s writings on phenomenological psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl’s ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology.
Journal Article