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Scientific misconceptions are ubiquitous, and in our era of near-instant information exchange, this can be problematic for both public health and the public understanding of scientific topics. Refutation text is one instructional tool for addressing misconceptions and is simple to implement at little cost. We conducted a random-effects meta-analysis to examine the effectiveness of the refutation text structure on learning. Analysis of 44 independent comparisons ( n  = 3,869) showed that refutation text is associated with a positive, moderate effect ( g  = 0.41, p  < .001) compared to other learning conditions. This effect was consistent and robust across a wide variety of contexts. Our results support the implementation of refutation text to help facilitate scientific understanding in many fields.

Psychological misconceptions present problems for psychology students as well as for laypersons, experts, and others who need to think critically about psychological information. Recent progress in measuring psychological misconceptions has led to fresh understandings of how people with better critical thinking skills and dispositions are less prone to misconceptions and how people who adopt a more intuitive approach to thinking are more prone to them, as predicted by dual process models of cognition. Recent studies also suggest that people who endorse more misconceptions show more impaired metacognition by failing to accurately monitor what they know. These new findings help to explain why refutational approaches, which explicitly activate misconceptions and debunk them with contrary evidence, often reduce misconception endorsement. Nevertheless, they may not readily explain why some efforts to eliminate misconceptions backfire or are otherwise ineffective, highlighting the need for more research on misconception content and individual differences in cognition, personality, and attitudes that predict misconception endorsement.

Conceptual advances are critical to the vitality of the marketing discipline, yet recent writings suggest that conceptual advancement in the field is slowing. The author addresses this issue by developing a framework for thinking about conceptualization in marketing. A definition of conceptualization is followed by a typology of types of conceptual contributions. The types of conceptual contributions, their similarities and differences, and their importance to the field are described. Thinking skills linked to various types of conceptual contributions are also described, as are the use of tools that can facilitate these skills. The article concludes with a set of recommendations for advancing conceptualization in our field in the years to come.

In the present study, we employed the three-pronged approach to determine the actual cognitive processes theorized in knowledge revision. First, the Knowledge Revision Components (KReC) framework was identified as the guiding theory. Second, think-aloud analysis highlighted at which points in refutation texts readers detected discrepancies between their incorrect, commonsense beliefs and the correct beliefs, and the exact processes with which they dealt with these discrepancies—successfully or unsuccessfully, as indicated by posttest scores. Third, corroborating reading-time data and posttest data demonstrated that the structure of the refutation texts facilitated the coactivation and integration of the explanation with the commonsense belief, resulting in knowledge revision. Finally, an analysis directly connected the processes identified during think-aloud to sentence reading times. These findings systematically identify the cognitive processes theorized during knowledge revision and, in doing so, provide evidence for the conditions for revision outlined in the KReC framework.

Corrections to readers’ misconceptions should result in higher belief when information sources are of high credibility. However, evaluations of credibility may be malleable, and we do not yet fully understand how changes to a source’s credibility influence readers’ credibility evaluations and knowledge revision outcomes. Thus, in two experiments, we examined how updating a source’s credibility (Experiment 1 : initially neutra l sources later updated to be high-, low-, or neutral-credibility sources; Experiment 2 : initially high- or low- credibility sources later updated to be low- or high-credibility sources) influenced knowledge revision and source credibility evaluations after readers engaged with refutation and non-refutation texts. Results showed that readers revised their credibility judgments from neutral-, high-, and low-credibility initial evaluations, indicating that source judgments are malleable rather than fixed. In addition, refutations from sources that are later revealed to be of high credibility can facilitate revision of both knowledge and initial source credibility evaluations.

A pseudorandom generator Gn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is hard for a propositional proof system P if (roughly speaking) P cannot efficiently prove the statement Gn(x1,...,xn) ≠ b for any string b ∈ {0, 1}m. We present a function $(m\\geq 2^{n^{\\Omega (1)}})$ generator which is hard for Res(ε log n); here Res(k) is the propositional proof system that extends Resolution by allowing k-DNFs instead of clauses. As a direct consequence of this result, we show that whenever t ≥ n2, every Res(ε log t) proof of the principle ¬Circuitt(fn) (asserting that the circuit size of a Boolean function fn in n variables is greater than t) must have size exp(tΩ(1)). In particular, Res(log log N) (N ∼ 2n is the overall number of propositional variables) does not possess efficient proofs of NP ⊈ P/poly. Similar results hold also for the system PCR (the natural common extension of Polynomial Calculus and Resolution) when the characteristic of the ground field is different from 2. As a byproduct, we also improve on the small restriction switching lemma due to Segerlind, Buss and Impagliazzo by removing a square root from the final bound. This in particular implies that the (moderately) weak pigeonhole principle $PHP^{2n}_n$ is hard for Res(ε log n/log log n).

Hybrid deduction–refutation systems are deductive systems intended to derive both valid and non-valid, i.e., semantically refutable, formulae of a given logical system, by employing together separate derivability operators for each of these and combining ‘hybrid derivation rules’ that involve both deduction and refutation. The goal of this paper is to develop a basic theory and ‘meta-proof’ theory of hybrid deduction–refutation systems. I then illustrate the concept on a hybrid derivation system of natural deduction for classical propositional logic, for which I show soundness and completeness for both deductions and refutations.

The experimental test of scientific laws has two essential characteristics: (a) the holism of predictious generation (the predictions are deduced from sets of laws and not from individual laws) and (b) the theoretical weight of measurements (the measurements are based on laws). The former aspect brings about \"Duhem's problem\": if a prediction is refuted, it is necessary to decide which of its different premises must be modified. Point (b) above implies circularities in experimental test that can be extreme: the same laws may be part of the deduction of a prediction and, simultaneously, of the fundaments of the prediction that allows to verify it. The analysis of one of such cases, the Venturi effect, reveals that circularity does not protect the theories of experimentation and, furthermore, that its methodological effects reduce to reinforce holism, thus increasing \"Duhem's problem\".

Endorsement of educational psychological misconceptions among preservice teachers can be a threat for reaching educational goals. Therefore, it is of societal interest whether preservice teachers hold educational psychological misconceptions and, if they do, whether these misconceptions can be reduced through confrontation with empirical evidence. Prevalence and refutability of misconceptions were analyzed among N = 937 German preservice teachers who participated in an online survey. Results indicated a high prevalence of educational psychological misconceptions but also the possibility of a reduction through refutation-style texts. However, only few preservice teachers shifted their opinions from (rather) endorsing a misconception to (rather) not endorsing it after reading the text. We conclude that educational psychological misconceptions are common among German preservice teachers and that merely presenting empirical evidence is insufficient to effectively counteract misconceptions. Future research should deepen the understanding of why and wherefrom these misconceptions occur and develop efficient interventions to counteract misconceptions among preservice teachers. (übernommen).

The knowledge revision components framework (KReC) outlines the basic comprehension processes and text factors that can be accentuated to increase the potential for knowledge revision during reading. The goal of the present study was to explore source credibility as one such text factor. In Experiment 1 , we established the utility of a set of refutation texts in influencing knowledge revision. Participants read ten refutation and ten control texts. The participants had faster reading times and higher posttest scores for the refutation than for the control texts, providing evidence for knowledge revision. In Experiment 2 , we examined the influence of source credibility under normal reading conditions. Participants read 20 refutation texts, ten with high-credibility and ten with low-credibility sources. The reading times and posttest scores suggested that knowledge revision unfolded successfully, independent of credibility. Using the same texts, in Experiment 3 we examined the influence of direct instructions that made the credibility of the source of information more salient. When the credibility of the source was made salient, the revision process was disrupted in the low-credibility condition, as evidenced by slower reading times and lower posttest scores than in the high-credibility condition. The results add to our understanding of the factors that constrain knowledge revision during the reading of refutation texts, and are discussed in the context of the extant literature and KReC.