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Individual earnings are higher in bigger cities. We consider three reasons: spatial sorting of initially more productive workers, static advantages from workers' current location, and learning by working in bigger cities. Using rich administrative data for Spain, we find that workers in bigger cities do not have higher initial unobserved ability as reflected in fixed effects. Instead, they obtain an immediate static premium and accumulate more valuable experience. The additional value of experience in bigger cities persists after leaving and is stronger for those with higher initial ability. This explains both the higher mean and greater dispersion of earnings in bigger cities.

We show that skill requirements in job vacancy postings differentially increased in MSAs that were hit hard by the Great Recession, relative to less hard-hit areas. These increases persist through at least the end of 2015 and are correlated with increases in capital investments, both at the MSA and firm levels. We also find that effects are most pronounced in routine-cognitive occupations, which exhibit relative wage growth as well. We argue that this evidence is consistent with the restructuring of production toward routine- biased technologies and the more-skilled workers that complement them, and that the Great Recession accelerated this process.

We use administrative records on the incomes of more than 40 million children and their parents to describe three features of intergenerational mobility in the United States. First, we characterize the joint distribution of parent and child income at the national level. The conditional expectation of child income given parent income is linear in percentile ranks. On average, a 10 percentile increase in parent income is associated with a 3.4 percentile increase in a child’s income. Second, intergenerational mobility varies substantially across areas within the United States. For example, the probability that a child reaches the top quintile of the national income distribution starting from a family in the bottom quintile is 4.4% in Charlotte but 12.9% in San Jose. Third, we explore the factors correlated with upward mobility. High mobility areas have (i) less residential segregation, (ii) less income inequality, (iii) better primary schools, (iv) greater social capital, and (v) greater family stability. Although our descriptive analysis does not identify the causal mechanisms that determine upward mobility, the publicly available statistics on intergenerational mobility developed here can facilitate research on such mechanisms.

We investigate the determinants of regional development using a newly constructed database of 1,569 subnational regions from 110 countries covering 74% of the world’s surface and 97% of its GDP. We combine the cross-regional analysis of geographic, institutional, cultural, and human capital determinants of regional development with an examination of productivity in several thousand establishments located in these regions. To organize the discussion, we present a new model of regional development that introduces into a standard migration framework elements of both the Lucas (1978) model of the allocation of talent between entrepreneurship and work, and the Lucas (1988) model of human capital externalities. The evidence points to the paramount importance of human capital in accounting for regional differences in development, but also suggests from model estimation and calibration that entrepreneurial inputs and possibly human capital externalities help understand the data.

This paper studies the contribution of both labor and non-labor income in the growth in income inequality in the United States and large European economies. The paper first shows that the capital to labor income ratio disproportionately increased among high-earnings individuals, further contributing to the growth in overall income inequality. That said, the magnitude of this effect is modest, and the predominant driver of the growth in income inequality in recent decades is the growth in labor earnings inequality. Far more important than the distinction between total income and labor income, is the way in which educational factors account for the growth in US labor and capital income inequality. Growing income gaps among different education groups as well as composition effects linked to a growing fraction of highly educated workers have been driving these effects, with a noticeable role of occupational and locational factors for women. Findings for large European economies indicate that inequality has been growing fast in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, though not in France. Capital income and education don't play as much as a role in these countries as in the United States.

We classify the empirical literature on the wage impact of immigration into three groups, where studies in the first two groups estimate different relative effects, and studies in the third group estimate the total effect of immigration on wages. We interpret the estimates obtained from the different approaches through the lens of the canonical model to demonstrate that they are not comparable. We then relax two key assumptions in this literature, allowing for inelastic and heterogeneous labor supply elasticities of natives and the \"downgrading\" of immigrants. “Downgrading” occurs when the position of immigrants in the labor market is systematically lower than the position of natives with the same observed education and experience levels. Downgrading means that immigrants receive lower returns to the same measured skills than natives when these skills are acquired in their country of origin. We show that heterogeneous labor supply elasticities, if ignored, may complicate the interpretation of wage estimates, and particularly the interpretation of relative wage effects. Moreover, downgrading may lead to biased estimates in those approaches that estimate relative effects of immigration, but not in approaches that estimate total effects. We conclude that empirical models that estimate total effects not only answer important policy questions, but are also more robust to alternative assumptions than models that estimate relative effects.

This paper examines the associations between social participation and individual life satisfaction among older adults. It specifically considers the diversity of the practices and social inequalities among this population. For analyses, we used a large survey of individuals of 65 years and older conducted in 2011 in Switzerland (N = 2,727). The first set of linear regression analyses examines Diener's Satisfaction with Life Scale and its association with various indicators of social participation. While the second set of logistic regression addresses the issue of social inequalities by evaluating the impacts of gender, age group, region and education on social participation indicators that are significantly associated with the satisfaction with life score. Our results stressed the importance of combining multiple forms of participation for life satisfaction and shows that some forms are particularly meaningful: in particular, the involvement in associations, visitation of family or visitation of friends/acquaintances and church attendance. When inequalities among older adults are considered, having rich and varied social participation, being involved in associations and maintaining private sociability with non-kin appear more elitist. While institutionalised and/or private sociability types of participation appear particularly significant for older adults’ life satisfaction, the most traditional integration forms – i.e. family and religions – are crucial for the more vulnerable. Implications for active ageing was equally discussed as well.

This paper explores the nature and the key empirical regularities of green employment in US local labor markets in 2006–2014. The main methodological novelty consists of a new measure of green employment based on the task content of occupations. Descriptive analysis reveals that green employment is pro-cyclical, highly skilled, commands a 4% wage premium and is geographically concentrated. Green employment dynamics positively correlates with local green subsidies within the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, local green knowledge, and resilience to the great recession. Finally, we find that one additional green job is associated with 4.2 (2.2 in the crisis period) new local jobs in non-tradable non-green activities.

While nominal wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers have increased since 1980, college graduates have experienced larger increases in cost of living because they have increasingly concentrated in cities with high cost of housing. Using a cityspecific CPI, I find that real wage differences between college and high school graduates have grown significantly less than nominal differences. Changes in the geographical location of different skill groups are to a significant degree driven by city-specific shifts in relative demand. I conclude that the increase in utility differences between skilled and unskilled workers since 1980 is smaller than previously thought based on nominal wage differences.

This paper investigates whether xenophobic attitudes, as measured by the regional share of votes for right-wing parties and xenophobic violence, affect migrants’ choices of where to live in Germany. We use a unique panel data set for the period 2004 to 2017 and apply fixed effects regression models and instrumental variable estimation to examine the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and immigration. Our results indicate that xenophobic attitudes tend to reduce regional labour immigration. However, evidence seems to be more robust for the support of right-wing parties than for xenophobic violence. Regarding heterogeneous effects across skill groups, the findings are ambiguous. While the immigration of skilled workers seems to be more sensitive to xenophobic violence, evidence is more robust for the share of right-wing votes in the case of low-skilled foreign workers. The strength of the adverse effect of anti-immigrant attitudes tends to increase with the local size of the coethnic community.