Explore the vast range of titles available.

The aim of the study was to examine the effect of providing a financial incentive to authors of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) to obtain individual patient data (IPD). Parallel-group RCT with authors identified in the RCTs eligible for two systematic reviews. The authors were randomly allocated to the intervention (financial incentive with several contact approaches) or control group (using the same contact approaches). Studied outcomes are proportion of authors who provided IPD, time to obtain IPD, and completeness of IPD received. Of the 129 authors contacted, 37 authors suggested or contacted a person or funder providing relevant details or showed interest to collaborate, whereas 45 authors directed us to contact a person or funder, lacked resources or time, did not have ownership or approval to share the IPD, or claimed IPD was too old. None of the authors shared their IPD. We contacted 17 sponsors and received two complete IPD datasets from one sponsor. The time to obtain IPD was >1 year after a sponsor's positive response. Common barriers included study identification, data ownership, limited data access, and required IPD licenses. IPD sharing may depend on study characteristics, including funding type, study size, study risk of bias, and treatment effect, but not on providing a financial incentive.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives can be paid as a bonus (gain) or a penalty (loss). Diminishing marginal utility of wealth suggests that, starting from the same initial wealth, individuals dislike losses more than they like equivalent gains. This study reports the minimum financial gain or loss required to motivate primary care providers and clinical staff to try to increase their human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination rates. In 2022, we conducted a national U.S. survey through WebMD's Medscape Network of clinical staff working in primary care clinics that provided HPV vaccination to children ages 9 through 12 years (N = 2,527; response rate = 57%). We randomized respondents to one of two hypothetical HPV vaccine incentive designs: a bonus for reaching an unspecified target HPV vaccination rate and a penalty for failing to reach the unspecified target. The primary outcome is the self-reported smallest incentive amount (U.S. dollars) that would motivate participants to try and increase their HPV vaccination rates. We tested for differences across P4P designs using unadjusted responses and linear regressions adjusting for clinic and respondent characteristics. We also tested for heterogeneous responses by experience with incentizves, training, and rurality. The mean amount required to motivate effort was $2,155 in the gain P4P design and $1,185 in the loss P4P design (unadjusted difference =  $970 [p < 0.001], adjusted difference =  $967 [p < 0.001]). There were no heterogeneous effects by rurality or experience with incentives. Physicians reported the highest differences (in dollars) between gain and loss P4P designs. Stated preference data from primary care clinical staff suggests that effective P4P incentives could be half as large if designed as losses rather than gains.

The aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), a major pay-for-performance programme in the United Kingdom, on prescribing of long-acting reversible contraceptives (LARC) in primary care. Negative binomial interrupted time series analysis using practice level prescribing data from April 2007 to March 2012. The main outcome measure was the prescribing rate of long-acting reversible contraceptives (LARC), including hormonal and non hormonal intrauterine devices and systems (IUDs and IUSs), injectable contraceptives and hormonal implants. Prescribing rates of Long-Acting Reversible Contraception (LARC) were stable before the introduction of contraceptive targets to the QOF and increased afterwards by 4% annually (rate ratios  = 1.04, 95% CI = 1.03, 1.06). The increase in LARC prescribing was mainly driven by increases in injectables (increased by 6% annually), which was the most commonly prescribed LARC method. Of other types of LARC, the QOF indicator was associated with a step increase of 20% in implant prescribing (RR =  1.20, 95% CI =  1.09, 1.32). This change is equivalent to an additional 110 thousand women being prescribed with LARC had QOF points not been introduced. Pay for performance incentives for contraceptive counselling in primary care with women seeking contraceptive advice has increased uptake of LARC methods.

Financial incentives and audit/feedback are widely used in primary care to influence clinician behaviour and increase quality of care. While observational data suggest a decline in quality when these interventions are stopped, their removal has not been evaluated in a randomised controlled trial (RCT), to our knowledge. This trial aimed to determine whether chlamydia testing in general practice is sustained when financial incentives and/or audit/feedback are removed. We undertook a 2 × 2 factorial cluster RCT in 60 general practices in 4 Australian states targeting 49,525 patients aged 16-29 years for annual chlamydia testing. Clinics were recruited between July 2014 and September 2015 and were followed for up to 2 years or until 31 December 2016. Clinics were eligible if they were in the intervention group of a previous cluster RCT where general practitioners (GPs) received financial incentives (AU$5-AU$8) for each chlamydia test and quarterly audit/feedback reports of their chlamydia testing rates. Clinics were randomised into 1 of 4 groups: incentives removed but audit/feedback retained (group A), audit/feedback removed but incentives retained (group B), both removed (group C), or both retained (group D). The primary outcome was the annual chlamydia testing rate among 16- to 29-year-old patients, where the numerator was the number who had at least 1 chlamydia test within 12 months and the denominator was the number who had at least 1 consultation during the same 12 months. We undertook a factorial analysis in which we investigated the effects of removal versus retention of incentives (groups A + C versus groups B + D) and the effects of removal versus retention of audit/feedback (group B + C versus groups A + D) separately. Of 60 clinics, 59 were randomised and 55 (91.7%) provided data (group A: 15 clinics, 11,196 patients; group B: 14, 11,944; group C: 13, 11,566; group D: 13, 14,819). Annual testing decreased from 20.2% to 11.7% (difference -8.8%; 95% CI -10.5% to -7.0%) in clinics with incentives removed and decreased from 20.6% to 14.3% (difference -7.1%; 95% CI -9.6% to -4.7%) where incentives were retained. The adjusted absolute difference in treatment effect was -0.9% (95% CI -3.5% to 1.7%; p = 0.2267). Annual testing decreased from 21.0% to 11.6% (difference -9.5%; 95% CI -11.7% to -7.4%) in clinics where audit/feedback was removed and decreased from 19.9% to 14.5% (difference -6.4%; 95% CI -8.6% to -4.2%) where audit/feedback was retained. The adjusted absolute difference in treatment effect was -2.6% (95% CI -5.4% to -0.1%; p = 0.0336). Study limitations included an unexpected reduction in testing across all groups impacting statistical power, loss of 4 clinics after randomisation, and inclusion of rural clinics only. Audit/feedback is more effective than financial incentives of AU$5-AU$8 per chlamydia test at sustaining GP chlamydia testing practices over time in Australian general practice. Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12614000595617.

Objectives To investigate the effect of withdrawing incentives on recorded quality of care, in the context of the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay for performance scheme.Design Retrospective longitudinal study.Setting Data for 644 general practices, from 2004/05 to 2011/12, extracted from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink.Participants All patients registered with any of the practices over the study period—13 772 992 in total.Intervention Removal of financial incentives for aspects of care for patients with asthma, coronary heart disease, diabetes, stroke, and psychosis.Main outcome measures Performance on eight clinical quality indicators withdrawn from a national incentive scheme: influenza immunisation (asthma) and lithium treatment monitoring (psychosis), removed in April 2006; blood pressure monitoring (coronary heart disease, diabetes, stroke), cholesterol concentration monitoring (coronary heart disease, diabetes), and blood glucose monitoring (diabetes), removed in April 2011. Multilevel mixed effects multiple linear regression models were used to quantify the effect of incentive withdrawal.Results Mean levels of performance were generally stable after the removal of the incentives, in both the short and long term. For the two indicators removed in April 2006, levels in 2011/12 were very close to 2005/06 levels, although a small but statistically significant drop was estimated for influenza immunisation. For five of the six indicators withdrawn from April 2011, no significant effect on performance was seen following removal and differences between predicted and observed scores were small. Performance on related outcome indicators retained in the scheme (such as blood pressure control) was generally unaffected.Conclusions Following the removal of incentives, levels of performance across a range of clinical activities generally remained stable. This indicates that health benefits from incentive schemes can potentially be increased by periodically replacing existing indicators with new indicators relating to alternative aspects of care. However, all aspects of care investigated remained indirectly or partly incentivised in other indicators, and further work is needed to assess the generalisability of the findings when incentives are fully withdrawn.

Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards was the first conditional cash transfer, randomized controlled trial for low-income families in the United States. From 2007 to 2010, Family Rewards offered 2,377 New York City families cash transfers that were conditional upon their investments in education, preventive health care, and parental employment. Their health and other outcomes were compared to those of a control group of 2,372 families. The experiment led to a modest improvement in health insurance coverage and a large increase in the use of preventive dental care. It improved parents' perception of their own health and levels of hope, mainly through improvements in reported financial well-being. While the program's impacts on physical health were weaker, our study might not have captured effects on chronic disease risk that take longer to accrue. In the context of New York City's operating social-safety-net programs, conditional cash transfers may have led to positive, albeit modest, improvements in the health of poor families.

Pay-for-performance in health care holds promise as a policy lever to improve the quality and efficiency of care. Although the approach has become increasingly popular in developing countries in recent years, most policy designs do not permit the rigorous evaluation of its impact. Thus, evidence of its effect is limited. In collaboration with the government of Ningxia Province, a predominantly rural area in northwest China, we conducted a matched-pair cluster-randomized experiment between 2009 and 2012 to evaluate the effects of capitation with pay-for-performance on primary care providers' antibiotic prescribing practices, health spending, outpatient visit volume, and patient satisfaction. We found that the intervention led to a reduction of approximately 15 percent in antibiotic prescriptions and a small reduction in total spending per visit to village posts-essentially, community health clinics. We found no effect on other outcomes. Our results suggest that capitation with pay-for-performance can improve drug prescribing practices by reducing overprescribing and inappropriate prescribing. Our study also shows that rigorous evaluations of health system interventions are feasible when conducted in close collaboration with the government. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Multidrug-resistant bacterial diseases pose serious and growing threats to human health. While innovation is important to all areas of health research, it is uniquely important in antibiotics. Resistance destroys the fruit of prior research, making it necessary to constantly innovate to avoid falling back into a pre-antibiotic era. But investment is declining in antibiotics, driven by competition from older antibiotics, the cost and uncertainty of the development process, and limited reimbursement incentives. Good public health practices curb inappropriate antibiotic use, making return on investment challenging in payment systems based on sales volume. We assess the impact of recent initiatives to improve antibiotic innovation, reflecting experience with all sixty-seven new molecular entity antibiotics approved by the Food and Drug Administration since 1980. Our analysis incorporates data and insights derived from several multistakeholder initiatives under way involving governments and the private sector on both sides of the Atlantic. We propose three specific reforms that could revitalize innovations that protect public health, while promoting long-term sustainability: increased incentives for antibiotic research and development, surveillance, and stewardship; greater targeting of incentives to high-priority public health needs, including reimbursement that is delinked from volume of drug use; and enhanced global collaboration, including a global treaty.