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"Reinhold, Karl Leonhard"
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Hölderlin’s and Novalis’ Philosophical Beginnings (1795)
Philosophers and literary scholars have notoriously struggled with the periodization of Hölderlin’s work, showing particular reluctance to situate it within Early Romanticism. But there can be no doubt that Hölderlin’s philosophical work resides within the context of an anti-foundationalist criticism, which students of Karl Leonhard Reinhold leveled at his programmatic deduction from a “highest principle” (oberster Grundsatz) in the early 1790s and intensified following Fichte’s lectures (1794/95) on the Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). Novalis belonged directly to the circle of Reinhold students, while Hölderlin gained access to it through Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, his friend from student days in Tübingen and “mentor” in Jena. Niethammer encouraged both Hölderlin and Novalis to contribute to his Philosophisches Journal, conceived as a forum for discussing the pros and cons of foundational philosophy (Grundsatzphilosophie). Novalis’ Fichte-Studies and Hölderlin’s philosophical fragments from 1795/96 can be read as drafts for such an essay. Both men developed similar critiques of Reinhold’s reformulated, subject-centered “highest principle”, the “principle of consciousness” (Satz des Bewusstseins). They argued that according to Reinhold, self-consciousness is a representation, i.e., a binary relationship that provides no explanation for the certainty of unity associated with self-consciousness. Both postulate a transcendent “ground of unity”, which would address this issue while remaining inaccessible to consciousness. My article demonstrates that both men failed to disentangle themselves from the snares of Reinhold’s model of representation, and both transferred the solution for the problem of self-consciousness onto the extra-philosophical medium of art.
Journal Article
Karl Leonhard Reinhold's transcendental psychology
The series Reinholdiana consists of monographs and collected volumes dealing with the philosophy of Karl Leonhard Reinhold. The influence that Reinhold had on contemporary understanding of Kant means that his work serves as a bridge between Kant and German idealism. The intention is to provide rapidly growing international interest in research on Reinhold with a high-profile academic publication platform.
eBook
The Usefulness of the Kantian Philosophy
The works of Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823) were a major factor in the development of post-Kantian philosophy, yet his exact contribution is still under discussion. This book investigates how Reinhold's background in Enlightenment influenced his reception of Kant?'s critical philosophy. From his pre-Kantian efforts up to the point where he began distancing himself from the master, Reinhold's own philosophical development takes center stage. This development, rather than critical philosophy, was the main ingredient of Reinhold's contribution to post-Kantian philosophy.
eBook
Kant and the historical turn : philosophy as critical interpretation
Immanuel Kant's work changed the course of modern philosophy; this book examines how. The book compares the philosophical system set out in Kant's Critiques with the work of the major philosophers before and after him (Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Jacobi, Reinhold, the early German Romantics, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx). A systematic introduction argues that complexities in the interpretation of Kant's system led to a new emphasis on history, subjectivity, and aesthetics. This emphasis defined a distinctive interpretive style of philosophizing that has become especially influential and fruitful once again in our own time. The individual chapters provide case studies in support of the thesis that late 18th-century reactions to Kant initiated an ‘historical turn’, after which historical and systematic considerations became joined in a way that fundamentally distinguishes philosophy from science and art, without falling back into mere historicism. In this way it is shown that philosophy's ‘historical turn’ is both similar to and unlike the turn to history undertaken by most other disciplines in this era. Part One argues that close attention to the historical context of Kant's philosophy is crucial to avoiding frequent misunderstandings that have arisen in comparing Kant with other major modern philosophers. Part Two contends that it was mainly the writing of Kant's first major interpreter that led to special philosophical emphasis on history in other major post-Kantian thinkers. Part Three argues that Hegel's system and its influence on post-Hegelians were determined largely by variations on Reinhold's historical turn. Part Four engages with major contemporary philosophers who have combined a study of particular themes in Kant and German Idealism with an appreciation for phenomena closely associated with the general notion of an historical turn in philosophy.
eBook
Karl Leonhard Reinhold y Edmund Husserl. Dos concepciones de la fenomenología /Karl Leonhard Reinhold y Edmund Husserl. Two Conceptions of the Phenomenology
A century before Husserl, in order to complete the system of Kantian philosophy, motivated by the ideals of the Enlightenment and its theological and religious questions, Reinhold designed the program to raise \"philosophy to a rigorous science.\" For this he developed a discipline whose aim is to access - reflexively - to the elementary principles of consciousness, the faculty of representation. This discipline must be validated phenomenologically. Although at first glance the phenomenology of Reinhold (even in its later 1802 version), has several aspects in common with that of Husserl, there are differences of principle. The comparison between these conceptions of phenomenology, the explicit expression of their convergences and differences, allows to clarify, first, in what sense a conception of 'phenomenon' restricted to the manifestation is too narrow; second, , what are the limits of a theory of self-consciousness based on reflection, according to an \"optical\" model. Thus, it is shown that, despite its limitations and weaknesses, the phenomenology of Reinhold keeps shedding lights on philosophical inquiry.
Journal Article
SALOMON MAIMON'S COMMENTARY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE GIVEN IN IMMANUEL KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
To aim to apply them beyond that scope would imply a return to a precriticai position, from which Kant openly removes himself in CPR.6 In view of this problem, we could consider that Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's classical statement: ^without this presupposition [of the thing in itself] I cannot enter into the system, but with this presupposition I cannot remain within it is totally justified.7 In other words, the pretension that would appear to be the basis of Kantian philosophy is a critical pretension, according to which the only cognoscible thing is that of which we have an immanent knowledge.8 For Kant, this immanent knowledge is always experiential, that is not purely intellectual, in finite beings.9 To state that something in itself is causally determining but !incognoscible, would require a level of acceptance that goes beyond the margins of Kantian criticism. According to habitual readings of his works, Kant on his part holds his position that understanding and sensibility are sources of knowledge that are mutually irreducible.
Journal Article
Soll man ihm das glauben?\ Zu Fichtes Auseinandersetzung mit dem Schulzeschen Skeptizismus in „Aenesidemus-Recension\
In dem Beitrag wird gezeigt, auf welche Weise Fichte in der Auseinandersetzung mit der skeptischen Herausforderung, die Schulzes Kritik der Reinholdschen Elementarphilosophie darstellte, versuchte, sein eigenes Programm der Wissenschaftslehre in seinen grundsätzlichen Prämissen zu profilieren.
Journal Article
Die Logik und der Grundsatz der Philosophie bei Reinhold und Fichte
In his famous clarification Kant claimed that philosophy of Fichte is „nothing more or less than mere logic\". In contrast with this interpretation Fichte from the beginning agreed with Kant and Reinhold on the fact that philosophy and logic are different from each other moreover the classical principles of logic can not be the principles of philosophy as well. However according to Fichte Reinhold did not succeed in explaining the relationship between philosophy and logic sufficiently. Hence Fichte proceeding from the detailed critique of Reinhold laid in Review of Aenesidemus gives a new concept for the principles of both logic and philosophy. Accordingly in Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge he building upon this idea chooses such principle of the logic (A = A) that possesses material validity and special content (I) to be the absolutely primordial axiom of the science of knowledge (I = I). As we have seen the differences from the logic conception of Kant and Reinhold we can conceive better the meaning of the sentence from Fichte: \"Everything to which the proposition 'A = A' is applicable, has reality, insofar as that proposition is applicable to it.\" - This is one of the sentences dragged away from the context could provoked Kant's ire reasonably.
Journal Article