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The article explores the topic of Gelassenheit (releasement) in Heidegger, through the lens of the ambiguous role of Christian mysticism in general and Eckhart in particular in and for his thinking. In an analysis of how mysticism appears in his early lectures on religion, it explains why he is critical of this concept and of how it is commonly understood. It also gives reasons for why we too should be cautious in using it to describe his position in his later writings where he explicitly reconnects to themes and concepts from Eckhart. The text provides a critical rehearsal of Eckhart’s understanding of both “Abgeschiedenheit” (detachment) and “Gelassenheit” and how Heidegger relates to it both in his early lectures and in his later essays. Ultimately it outlines a phenomenological understanding of what is commonly referred to as a “mystical” comportment more along the lines of a heightened openness and awareness, in Heidegger’s words as a “releasement toward things and an openness to the secret”. Thus, instead of seeing Heidegger’s later writings as a sort of crypto-mysticism, the text seeks to show how his critical appropriation of Eckhart explicitly points beyond a standard dichotomy between the rational and the mystical, in an effort to develop a comportment of thinking than can respond to the demand of modern technological predicament.

Taking my cue from the richly dramatic character of the Platonic dialogues and how that dramatic character informs the thought therein, I attempt a reading of Heidegger's dialogue on a country path that takes similar account of the dramatic themes of that dialogue. Accordingly, I address such themes as the fact that the characters of the dialogue are not given personal names, the fact that it is and must be a dialogue that occurs on a country path, and the strange interactions of the three characters. The paper culminates in a discussion of the role of \"night,\" which, I argue, functions as our guiding image of Ereignis.

Heidegger has notoriously named the essence of the technological worldthe Gestell (framework, enframing). Here, we reveal that yet another term,Gestellnis, figures in some of his writings from the 1970s. According toHeidegger, as the essence of the Gestell, Gestellnis shows a way toward thefore-garden of Ereignis (appropriating event). In opposing the Gestell modeof comportment toward beings, Heidegger glimpses the promise of the other thinking, which seems to be useless from the perspective of traditional metaphysical thinking. In characterizing this mode of thinking, he resorts to Zhuangzi's parables of uselessness (wuyong Jàïïi). One way of stepping out of the Gestell is to make central the comportment toward beings as embodied in non-Metaphysical art. Heidegger designates this as das andere Denken (the other thinking). In charting this course, Heidegger turns toward ancient Asian traditions insofar as they remain uncontaminated by current planetaryinterstellar world conditions, which for him epitomize the absence of thedichotomy of appearance and essence. From Heidegger's standpoint, before the Western tradition gains maturity through its own self-transformation,the allegedly inevitable event of East-West dialogue can only be anticipated.However, at the ontic level East Asian sources have undeniably played a role in his search for ways out of the Gestell.

Modernity and modernization have often been associated with an increase in mobility and, therefore, an emphasis on space rather than place. Yet there has also been a distinct tradition within modern intellectual history that wants to disengage the self from the maelstrom of constant movement and cultural change. Hence modernity cannot be fully comprehended without attention to this self-imposed lack of mobility that cuts across the realms of philosophy, cultural criticism, political and social thought, religion, and the fine arts. In this essay I focus on two core modern thinkers, Henry David Thoreau and Martin Heidegger, who represent different aspects of what may be called a modern culture of immobility, rather than the staggering mobility and acceleration observed by critics such Paul Virilio, Zygmunt Baumann, or Stephen Greenblatt. What is more, both Thoreau's and Heidegger's emphasis on rootedness and their close attention to particular places and regions reveal a far-reaching modern politics of place whose poststructuralist reverberations inform the 'topoanalysis' of Foucault, Deleuze, and Michel Serres.

Heidegger's critique of metaphysics is central to his attempt to re-instantiate the question of being. This paper examines Heidegger's critique of metaphysics by looking at the relationship between metaphysics and thought. This entails an identification of the intimate relationship Heidegger maintains exists between philosophy and metaphysics, an analysis of Heidegger's critique of this association, and a discussion of his proposal that philosophy has been so damaged by its association with metaphysics that it must be replaced with meditative thinking. It is not quite clear, however, how the overcoming of metaphysical thinking is to occur especially given Heidegger's insistence that relying on human will to effect an alteration in thinking simply re-instantiates the metaphysical perspective to be overcome. While several critics have argued Heidegger has no solution to this issue, instead holding that thought must simply be open to being's 'self'-transformation if and when it occurs, I turn to Heidegger's notion of trace and a number of scattered comments on the relationship between meditative thinking and willing as non-willing to show Heidegger: (a) was aware of this issue; and (b) tried to resolve it by recognising a reconceptualised notion of willing not based on or emanating from the aggressive willing of metaphysics.

Abstract Although the concept of \"groundedness/autochthony\" (Bodenständigkeit) in Heidegger's writings receives far less scholarly attention than, for example, that of \"releasement\" (Gelassenheit), a careful examination of the famous \"Gelassenheit\" speech of 1955 demonstrates that, in fact, Bodenständigkeit is the core concept around which everything else turns. Moreover, in the \"Gelassenheit\" speech and the writings on Hebel that follow, Heidegger understands Bodenständigkeit to be, fundamentally, something made possible by language in its particularities of tradition and locale. Thus, there is an intriguing continuity of meaning between that concept and the concept as it was used phenomenologically in his writings from the summer 1924 course up to Sein und Zeit.

Abstract The broad concern of this article is to contribute to discussions within hermeneutical philosophy that address the question of life as a form of correlation. More specifically, its purpose is to shed light on the character of life as correlation with reference to a basic aspect of this correlation: our living relation to things. To this end, the author focuses, first, on the later Heidegger's suggestion that our proper relation to things takes shape as an enactment guided by the releasement or letting-be (Gelassenheit) of things in their independence; and, second, on Günter Figal's recent claim that this enactment, in turn, depends on our referential relation to the exteriority or objectivity of things. The author concludes that our living relation with things may be understood best in terms of the movement or mutual interplay of these two conditions.

In other words, ideology critiques must consist of two stages, of two complementary procedures: -one is discursive, the \"symptomal reading\" of the ideological text [. . .] demonstrating how a given ideological field is a result of a montage of heterogeneous \"floating signifiers,\" of their totalization through the intervention of certain \"nodal points\"; -the other aims at extracting the kernel of enjoyment, at articulating the way in which [. . .] an ideology implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy. Against the narratives of the Ge-stell, the administered society, Being and sovereign biopolitics that seem to accept in advance that some inherent crisis logic of capital has managed to subsume class struggle under itself, thus leaving open only appeals to some exceptional messianic (or quasi-miraculous) position located beyond or outside the \"ultimate One-All, an onto-theological totality\"12 of society, Zizek's dialectical-materialist insight into the fragility and \"non-being\" of (socioeconomic) being itself can claim not only that the social body is always already fractured by political potentials along the fault lines of antagonisms, but also that \"complications arising from the intricate texture of concrete situations and/or from the unanticipated results of 'subjective' interventions always derail the straight course of things\" [105].

This chapter indicates some of the resonances between Martin Heidegger and Eastern traditions. It addresses two related questions. First, can Heidegger's conception of thinking as a form of attention to being, illuminate pedagogy?; and second, to what extent will an appreciation of the parallels between Heidegger and Eastern philosophy help us understand this form of attention to being? These questions refer to a knotted bundle of related questions and ideas reflecting the fact that Heidegger's conception of thinking is intimately bound up with his attempts to overcome the Western metaphysical tradition. The chapter shows that this overcoming entails a cautious, even reticent, encounter with Eastern thought. The argument then examines Heidegger's way of writing and teaching, both of which illustrate his view of thinking, which has implications for the nature of pedagogy.

To ask whether we should use Prozac or other technologies as “enhancement” is perhaps to ask the wrong question, one that belongs to a life of what Heidegger discerned as technological ordering (die Technik). We might better ask a question belonging to a life of receptivity (Gelassenheit): Can or should we—some of us—live differently than we do?