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Risk-based firearm laws are a firearm injury prevention strategy. However, evidence for their efficacy in reducing firearm injury is mixed. There is agreement that the magnitude of their effect depends on implementation and efficacy would improve with better implementation. Local context and processes are key to evaluating outcomes of these laws. To contribute to the evidence base we conducted a case study of Firearm Restraining Order (FRO) implementation in Lake County, Illinois. The details of Illinois FRO policy are, similar those of other locations with notable exceptions that in Illinois roommates are allowed to petition and medical care providers are not. The study examined data from court documents related to 42 FRO petitions filed between January 2021 and June 2024. Lake County is similar to other locations studied in terms of respondent demographics including age, race and gender. It differs in the distribution of types of incidents precipitating FROs. Lake County has a greater share of emergency FROs petitioned due to threats related to harm to others, while other locations studied typically have a higher burden of self-harm threat incidents triggering FRO initiation. The share of initiating incidents related to mass shooting threats is similar to that of other locations studied. In Lake County, IL most petitioners are law enforcement officers with few petitions made by others enabled by the law. This too is similar to that of other jurisdictions. Our study finds that in Lake County the EFRO petition process generally proceeds within established policy timelines and the majority of FRO cases resulted the issuance of plenary FROs. Two implementation areas identified for further investigation include the low level of intimate partner notification when an emergency FRO is petitioned and the volume of emergency FRO dismissals due to lack of petitioner appearance at plenary FRO hearings.

The effectiveness of protection orders (PO) from abuse vary by objective and subjective metrics, including victims’ perceptions and legal outcomes. It is unclear how defendants perceive PO violations and evaluate decisions to violate POs. This study examined how context, emotion regulation, and adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) were related to the decision to violate a PO. A general community sample (N = 300) recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk completed a demographics questionnaire, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS), ACEs Questionnaire, and a study-specific vignette and measure asking their projected likelihood of verbally/physically violating the PO. The context in each vignette was randomized to include control (providing information about the PO and ex-partner), custody (alluding to child custody disputes), or significant other conditions (introducing the complainant’s new partner). PO context was not significantly related to projected physical or verbal violations. DERS and ACEs were significantly associated with projected total and physical violations in all contexts. DERS scores were also associated with verbal violations. Certain violation types were related to endorsement of specific ACEs items: self-reported sexual abuse and household abuse were each associated with projected total and physical PO violations. Preliminary data suggest that emotion regulation and ACEs may be more noteworthy than the situation in which the PO was issued. Given the impact of ACEs on emotion dysregulation and offending behavior (e.g. domestic violence), research is needed on effective early interventions and to determine when/where POs may fail to prevent future harm.

C.A. No. 2023-0754-BWD Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware November 7, 2023 Key Takeaway: Stockholder complaints demanding inspection of books and records should be dismissed when the stockholder has already filed a plenary action challenging the same wrongdoing and defendant did not create an undo time pressure on plaintiff. In An v. Archblock, Inc., the holders of the majority of shares of Archblock acted with written consent to approve an agreement in which the company would relocate its domicile from Delaware to Switzerland.1 Former CEO and stockholder of Archblock, Daniel Jaiyong An (\"An\"), sent a letter to Archblock demanding books and records pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. When a shareholder files a plenary action asserting claims of mismanagement, the basis for a Section 220 action regarding the same transaction as been undermined. \"'[O]ncc a stockholder commences plenary litigation, discovery rules dictate what information relevant to its claims the stockholder may receive and when the stockholder may receive that information.

In the last six years, the courts of appeals have issued in the first instance a spate of procedurally unusual, politically charged preliminary injunctions. Like \"universal\" district court injunctions, these appellate injunctions-which this Note calls preliminary injunctions pending appeal (PIPAs) and appellate temporary restraining orders (appellate TROs)-are premised on shaky statutory authority. And like \"universal\" injunctions, PIPAs and appellate TROs accelerate and degrade judicial output. This Note describes their history, statutory basis, and practical effects. The courts of appeals lack clear statutory authority to issue these orders. The All Writs Act-which the courts of appeals generally rely on to issue these injunctions-only allows courts to issue ancillary orders that protect their jurisdiction. Yet PIPAs and appellate TROs often conclusively resolve time-sensitive disputes, thereby destroying jurisdiction. Furthermore, the All Writs Act precludes courts from issuing orders that enlarge their jurisdiction. But because the courts of appeals issue PIPAs and appellate TROs using the same standard as district courts-and typically without affording the district courts due deference-PIPAs and appellate TROs arguably expand the courts of appeals' jurisdiction, in further violation of the All Writs Act. Moreover, aside from lacking legal authorization, PIPAs and appellate TROs have created serious procedural and substantive problems for courts and litigants. These orders have yielded uncertainty about parties' legal obligations by enabling litigants to quickly ricochet cases through the district courts, courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court before any merits ruling. Furthermore, these orders have helped collapse preliminary relief into expedited merits relief by effectively abrogating the requirement that movants show a risk of concrete, irreparable harm. Finally, these orders risk exacerbating the perception that courts act politically, because these orders often lack reasoning, apply inconsistent legal standards, and encourage forum shopping. PIPAs and appellate TROs are premised on flimsy legal authority, and they pose significant threats to the quality and legitimacy of the federal courts' output-including for many of the reasons that the Supreme Court recently identified in Trump v. CASA. This Note therefore urges the Supreme Court to clarify that these appellate injunctions are unlawful. Without such guidance, PIPAs and appellate TROs will continue to unsettle the federal courts and fray the public's trust in the judiciary.

The criminal justice system is becoming automated At every stage, from policing to evidence to parole, machine learning and other computer systems guide outcomes. Widespread debates over the pros and cons of these technologies have overlooked a crucial issue: ownership. Developers often claim that details about how their tools work are trade secrets and refuse to disclose that information to criminal defendants or their attorneys. The introduction of intellectual property claims into the criminal justice system raises undertheorized tensions between life, liberty, and property interests. This Article offers the first wide-ranging account of trade secret evidence in criminal cases and develops a framework to address the problems that result. In sharp contrast to the general view among trial courts, legislatures, and scholars alike, this Article argues that trade secrets should not be privileged in criminal proceedings. A criminal trade secret privilege is ahistorical, harmful to defendants, and unnecessary to protect the interests of the secret holder. Meanwhile, compared to substantive trade secret law, the privilege overprotects intellectual property. Further, privileging trade secrets in criminal proceedings fails to serve the theoretical purposes behind either trade secret law or privilege law. The trade secret inquiry sheds new light on how evidence rules do, and should, function differently in civil and criminal cases.