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This paper explores how consumers perceive retailer ethics. Based on a review of the marketing and consumer research literature, we conceptualize consumer perceptions of the ethics of retailers (CPER) as a multidimensional construct and propose that its effects on consumer purchase behavior and word-of-mouth communication are more salient when consumers have strong rather than weak ethical beliefs. The model was validated using a random sample of 399 respondents in a collectivist society. The results of structural equation modeling confirmed that CPER is a second-order construct comprising product fairness, price fairness, non-deception, fair trade, and green products. CPER positively predicted consumer purchase behavior and word-of-mouth communication. Moreover, ethical beliefs moderated the positive relationship between CPER and the word-of-mouth communication of consumers with strong ethical beliefs but did not moderate the relationship between CPER and purchase behavior. The implications of the findings are discussed.

We study the problem of information sharing in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer. Our analysis shows that the retailer's incentive to share information strongly depends on nonlinear production cost, competition intensity, and whether the retailer can offer a contract to charge a payment for the information. Without information contracting, the retailer has an incentive to share information for free when production economy is large but has no incentive to do so when there is production diseconomy. With information contracting, the retailer has an incentive to share information when either production diseconomy/economy is large or competition is intense. We characterize the conditions under which the retailer shares information with none, one, or both of the manufacturers. We also show that the retailer prefers to sell information sequentially rather than concurrently to the manufacturers, whereas the manufacturers' preferences are reversed.

NFTs, or non-fungible tokens, have become increasingly popular in the last several years. Retailers, consumer brands, and service providers have responded to rising consumer demand for NFTs by launching their own NFT initiatives; firms launch functional, collectible, and platform NFT offerings to directly engage their customer base. This research uses the event study method to explore the effect of firms’ NFT announcements on their stock returns. We identify, refine, and prepare a sample of 135 NFT announcements made by publicly traded companies in the U.S. for examination and develop hypotheses for empirical testing. Our findings advance the nascent literature on retailing and NFTs and have practical implications for marketing managers by unveiling investors' perceptions of NFT offerings. Since NFTs are becoming increasingly adopted by individuals, organizations, and institutions, this research is timely, relevant, and essential for academic and managerial thought.

Many retailers have recently started to offer customers the option to buy online and pick up in store (BOPS). We study the impact of the BOPS initiative on store operations. We build a stylized model where a retailer operates both online and offline channels. Customers strategically make channel choices. The BOPS option affects customer choice in two ways: by providing real-time information about inventory availability and by reducing the hassle cost of shopping. We obtain three findings. First, not all products are well suited for in-store pickup; specifically, it may not be profitable to implement BOPS on products that sell well in stores. Second, BOPS enables retailers to reach new customers, but for existing customers, the shift from online fulfillment to store fulfillment may decrease profit margins when the latter is less cost effective. Finally, in a decentralized retail system where store and online channels are managed separately, BOPS revenue can be shared across channels to alleviate incentive conflicts; it is rarely efficient to allocate all the revenue to a single channel. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management .

In recent years, online retailers (also called e-tailers) have started allowing manufacturers direct access to their customers while charging a fee for providing this access, a format commonly referred to as agency selling. In this paper, we use a stylized theoretical model to answer a key question that e-tailers are facing: When should they use an agency selling format instead of using the more conventional reselling format? We find that agency selling is more efficient than reselling and leads to lower retail prices; however, the e-tailers end up giving control over retail prices to the manufacturer. Therefore, the reaction by the manufacturer, who makes electronic channel pricing decisions based on their impact on demand in the traditional channel (brick-and-mortar retailing), is an important factor for e-tailers to consider. We find that when sales in the electronic channel lead to a negative effect on demand in the traditional channel, e-tailers prefer agency selling, whereas when sales in the electronic channel lead to substantial stimulation of demand in the traditional channel, e-tailers prefer reselling. This preference is mediated by competition between e-tailers—as competition between them increases, e-tailers prefer to use agency selling. We also find that when e-tailers benefit from positive externalities from the sales of the focal product (such as additional profits from sales of associated products), retail prices may be lower under reselling than under agency selling, and the e-tailers prefer reselling under some conditions for which they would prefer agency selling without the positive externalities. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.

Retailer equity is becoming a very important factor in determining discriminatory competitive advantage under rapidly changing conditions of distribution. This study conceptualizes various retailer equity aspects considered in the retail industry and proposes a measurement scale for retailer equity based on empirical research. Our study aims to reveal how retailer equity sub-dimensions influence customer perception and evaluation of retailers. The primary objective of this research was to develop a measurement scale to facilitate assessments of consumer-based retailer equity. Resulting theoretical and managerial implications of this study are also discussed in detail.

We study the pricing and return policy decisions of an omnichannel retailer serving customers who differ in how they realize their uncertain valuation for a product—by inspecting in store before purchase or by purchasing online and possibly returning misfit products. Customers may return misfit products either to stores for a full refund or online as per the firm’s return policy. We model prices to be identical across channels, allow crosschannel returns, and endogenize customers’ purchase and return decisions, capturing typical features of an omnichannel setting. Our analysis helps explain why some omnichannel firms choose full refunds, whereas others charge a fee for online returns. We find that omnichannel firms with good salvage partners for online returns (e.g., Nordstrom) as well as those with more store-based customers (e.g., Macy’s) should offer full refunds. Similarly, firms are incentivized to offer full refunds for products that customers are more likely to inspect in store (e.g., Express for footwear). In contrast, firms with a significant store network and better in-store salvage opportunities (e.g., J.C. Penney) might be better off charging a fee for online returns in order to nudge customers to return in store. Finally, an omnichannel firm should be cautious both in making the return process more convenient and in improving accessibility to its stores, because these seemingly beneficial policies, if combined with a partial-refund policy, could undermine the firm’s overall profit. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management .

As an integrated part of a supply contract, trade credit has intrinsic connections with supply chain coordination and inventory management. Using a model that explicitly captures the interaction of firms’ operations decisions, financial constraints, and multiple financing channels (bank loans and trade credit), this paper attempts to better understand the risk-sharing role of trade credit—that is, how trade credit enhances supply chain efficiency by allowing the retailer to partially share the demand risk with the supplier. Within this role, in equilibrium, trade credit is an indispensable external source for inventory financing, even when the supplier is at a disadvantageous position in managing default relative to a bank. Specifically, the equilibrium trade credit contract is net terms when the retailer’s financial status is relatively strong. Accordingly, trade credit is the only external source that the retailer uses to finance inventory. By contrast, if the retailer’s cash level is low, the supplier offers two-part terms, inducing the retailer to finance inventory with a portfolio of trade credit and bank loans. Further, a deeper early-payment discount is offered when the supplier is relatively less efficient in recovering defaulted trade credit, or the retailer has stronger market power. Trade credit allows the supplier to take advantage of the retailer’s financial weakness, yet it may also benefit both parties when the retailer’s cash is reasonably high. Finally, using a sample of firm-level data on retailers, we empirically observe the inventory financing pattern that is consistent with what our model predicts. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

Omnichannel environments where customers shop online and offline at the same retailer are ubiquitous, and are deployed by online-first and traditional retailers alike. We focus on the relatively understudied domain of online-first retailers and the engagement of a key omnichannel tactic; specifically, introduction of showrooms (physical locations where customers can view and try products) in combination with online fulfillment that uses centralized inventory management. We ask whether, and if so, how, showrooms benefit the two most basic retail objectives: demand generation and operational efficiency. Using quasi-experimental data on showroom openings by WarbyParker.com , the leading and iconic online-first eyewear retailer, we find that showrooms: (1) increase demand overall and in the online channel as well; (2) generate operational spillovers to the other channels by attracting customers who, on average, have a higher cost-to-serve; (3) improve overall operational efficiency by increasing conversion in a sampling channel and by decreasing returns; and (4) amplify these demand and operational benefits in dealing with customers who have the most acute need for the firm’s products. Moreover, the effects we document strengthen with time as showrooms contribute not only to brand awareness but also to what we term channel awareness as well. We conclude by elaborating the underlying customer dynamics driving our findings and by offering implications for how online-first retailers might deploy omnichannel tactics. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.