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Recent functional studies suggest that noise sensitivity, a trait describing attitudes towards noise and predicting noise annoyance, is associated with altered processing in the central auditory system. In the present work, we examined whether noise sensitivity could be related to the structural anatomy of auditory and limbic brain areas. Anatomical MR brain images of 80 subjects were parcellated with FreeSurfer to measure grey matter volume, cortical thickness, cortical area and folding index of anatomical structures in the temporal lobe and insular cortex. The grey matter volume of amygdala and hippocampus was measured as well. According to our findings, noise sensitivity is associated with the grey matter volume in the selected structures. Among those, we propose and discuss particular areas, previously linked to auditory perceptual, emotional and interoceptive processing, in which larger grey matter volume seems to be related to higher noise sensitivity. •Noise sensitivity is related enlarged primary auditory areas in the left hemisphere.•The bilateral hippocampus and temporal pole are enlarged in noise sensitivity.•The volume of the right anterior insula is increased in noise sensitivity.•Noise sensitivity is related to the morphology of auditory-limbic brain areas.

The concept of narcissism has been much researched in psychoanalysis and especially in self psychology. One of the hallmarks of narcissism is altered emotion, including decreased affective resonance (e.g. empathy) with others, the neural underpinnings of which remain unclear. The aim of our exploratory study was to investigate the psychological and neural correlates of empathy in two groups of healthy subjects with high and low narcissistic personality trait. We hypothesized that high narcissistic subjects would show a differential activity pattern in regions such as the anterior insula that are typically associated with empathy. A sample of 34 non-clinical subjects was divided into high (n=11) and low (n=11) narcissistic groups according to the 66th and 33rd percentiles of their scores on the Narcissism Inventory (NI). Combining the psychological, behavioral and neuronal [i.e. functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)] measurements of empathy, we compared the high and low narcissistic groups of subjects. High narcissistic subjects showed higher scores on the Symptom Checklist-90 - Revised (SCL-90-R) and the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) when compared to low narcissistic subjects. High narcissistic subjects also showed significantly decreased deactivation during empathy, especially in the right anterior insula. Psychological and neuroimaging data indicate respectively higher degrees of alexithymia and lower deactivation during empathy in the insula in high narcissistic subjects. Taken together, our preliminary findings demonstrate, for the first time, psychological and neuronal correlates of narcissism in non-clinical subjects. This might stipulate both novel psychodynamic conceptualization and future psychological-neuronal investigation of narcissism.

Various studies demonstrate a special role of the right compared to the left anterior insula in mediating our self. However, the neural features of the right insula that allow for its special role remain unclear. Presupposing a spatiotemporal model of self—“Basis model of self-specificity” (BMSS)—we here address the following question: what spatial-topographic and temporal-dynamic features render neural activity in the right insula to be more suitable in mediating self-specificity than the left insula? First, applying fMRI, we demonstrate that the right insula (i) exhibits higher degrees of centrality in rest, and (ii) higher context-dependent functional connectivity in a self-specific task among regions of distinct layers of self (intero-, extero-proprioceptive, and mental). Second, using EEG in rest and task, we show that the right insula shows longer autocorrelation window (ACW) in its neural activity than both left insula and other regions of the different layers of self. Together, we demonstrate special topographic, i.e., high functional connectivity, and dynamic, i.e., long ACW, neural features of the right insula compared to both left insula and other regions of the distinct layers of self. This suits neural activity in the right insula ideally for high functional integration and temporal continuity as key features of the self including its intero-, extero-proprioceptive, and mental layers.

There are pronounced behavioural and neuroimaging parallels between cocaine abuse and narcissism. Although the observed commonalities are not specific to cocaine as opposed to other types of addiction, we argue that the relatively constrained molecular actions of cocaine and, more importantly, the covariance of narcissism-like behaviours with cocaine use build a strong case for taking the known effects of cocaine as a starting point for addressing the hitherto underinvestigated neurophysiology of narcissism. In this review, we discuss the potential relevance of cocaine abuse as a pharmacological model of narcissism. We outline previous research on the role of monoamines across several domains affected in narcissistic personality disorder and subclinical narcissism, namely, selected personality traits, social behaviour, emotional empathy and self-referential processing. We propose that dysregulation in dopamine signalling might underlie addiction-like features of narcissism and that altered serotonergic signalling may account for affective components of narcissism and, in particular, explain the differences between grandiose and vulnerable subtypes. In conclusion, we provide recommendations for future research.

Evaluating rewards for the self and others is essential for social interactions. Previous research has probed the neural substrates signaling rewards in social decision‐making tasks as well as the differentiation between self‐ and other‐reward representations. However, studies with different designs have yielded mixed results. After analyzing and comparing previous designs, we differentiated three components in this study: task (reward representation vs. social judgment of reward allocation), agency (self vs. other), and social context (without vs. within). Participants were asked to imagine various share sizes as a proposer in a dictator game during fMRI, and then rated their willingness and preference for these offers in a post‐scan behavioral task. To differentiate the regions involved in processing rewards without and within context, we presented the reward to each agent in two sequential frames. Parametric analyses showed that, in the second frame (i.e., within social context), the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) signaled self‐reward and preferences for the offer, whereas the right insula tracked the likelihood of proposing the offer. Belief in a just world is positively associated with aMCC responses to self‐reward. These results shed light on the role of the aMCC in coding self‐reward within the social context to guide social behaviors. The current study highlights the key role of the aMCC in processing self‐reward within context and preferences for an offer to other individuals. Moreover, we demonstrate individual variation in the degree to which the aMCC responds to self‐reward, with only those who have a strong belief in a just world showing enhanced aMCC activity for self‐reward. Additionally, we shed light on the adaptive nature of neural circuits when facing different conditions in the social world by providing evidence of contextual neural coding of self‐reward.

Empathy for pain engages both shared affective responses and self-other distinction. In this study, we addressed the highly debated question of whether neural responses previously linked to affect sharing could result from the perception of salient affective displays. Moreover, we investigated how the brain network involved in affect sharing and self-other distinction underpinned our response to a pain that is either perceived as genuine or pretended (while in fact both were acted for reasons of experimental control). We found stronger activations in regions associated with affect sharing (anterior insula [aIns] and anterior mid-cingulate cortex) as well as with affective self-other distinction (right supramarginal gyrus [rSMG]), in participants watching video clips of genuine vs. pretended facial expressions of pain. Using dynamic causal modeling, we then assessed the neural dynamics between the right aIns and rSMG in these two conditions. This revealed a reduced inhibitory effect on the aIns to rSMG connection for genuine pain compared to pretended pain. For genuine pain only, brain-to-behavior regression analyses highlighted a linkage between this inhibitory effect on the one hand, and pain ratings as well as empathic traits on the other. These findings imply that if the pain of others is genuine and thus calls for an appropriate empathic response, neural responses in the aIns indeed seem related to affect sharing and self-other distinction is engaged to avoid empathic over-arousal. In contrast, if others merely pretend to be in pain, the perceptual salience of their painful expression results in neural responses that are down-regulated to avoid inappropriate affect sharing and social support. Empathy enables us to share and understand the emotional states of other people, often based on their facial expressions. This empathic response involves being able to distinguish our own emotional state from someone else’s, and it is influenced by how we recognize that person’s emotion. In real life, knowing and identifying whether the facial expression we are witnessing reflects genuine or pretended pain is particularly important so that we can appropriately react to someone’s emotions and avoid unnecessary personal distress. How our brains manage to do this is still heavily debated. Two areas, the anterior insular (aIns for short) and the mid-cingulate cortex, appear to be activated when someone ‘feels’ someone else’s pain. However, these regions might just automatically be triggered by vivid emotional facial expressions, regardless of whether we really respond to that pain. To examine this question, Zhao et al. measured brain activity as healthy adults watched video clips of people either feeling or pretending to feel pain. The activation of aIns was particularly related to the emotional component that someone shared with another person’s genuine pain, but not to pretended pain. This suggests that neurons in the aIns track a truly empathic response when seeing someone who is actually experiencing pain. Effective connectivity analyses which reflect how brain areas ‘crosstalk’ also revealed distinct patterns when people viewed expressions of genuine, as opposed to pretended pain. Zhao et al. focused on the interactions between the alns and the right supramarginal gyrus, a brain region which helps to distinguish another person’s emotions from our own. This crosstalk tracked others’ feelings when participants viewed expressions of genuine but not of pretended pain. Put together, these findings provide a more refined model of empathy and its neural underpinnings. This will help further our understanding of conditions such as autism or depression, in which a person’s social skills and emotional processing are impaired.

We recently proposed that the right hemisphere plays a crucial role in the processes underlying mental model building and updating. Here, we review the evidence we and others have garnered to support this novel account of right hemisphere function. We begin by presenting evidence from patient work that suggests a critical role for the right hemisphere in the ability to learn from the statistics in the environment (model building) and adapt to environmental change (model updating). We then provide a review of neuroimaging research that highlights a network of brain regions involved in mental model updating. Next, we outline specific roles for particular regions within the network such that the anterior insula is purported to maintain the current model of the environment, the medial prefrontal cortex determines when to explore new or alternative models, and the inferior parietal lobule represents salient and surprising information with respect to the current model. We conclude by proposing some future directions that address some of the outstanding questions in the field of mental model building and updating. Nous avons récemment proposé que l'hémisphère droit joue un rôle déterminant dans les procédés appuyant la création et la mise à jour de modèles mentaux. Dans cet article, nous examinons les preuves que nous-mêmes et d'autres ont amassé pour appuyer ce rapport novateur de la fonction de l'hémisphère droit. Nous présentons d'abord des preuves qui laissent entrevoir un rôle déterminant de l'hémisphère droit dans la capacité à apprendre au moyen de données dans l'environnement (création d'un modèle) et à s'adapter aux changements dans l'environnement (mise à jour d'un modèle). Nous fournissons ensuite une revue de la recherche en neuroimagerie qui met en relief un réseau de parties du cerveau participant à l'actualisation du modèle mental. Ensuite, nous définissons les rôles précis des diverses parties du réseau; ainsi, le cortex insulaire antérieur participerait au maintien du modèle actuel de l'environnement, le cortex préfrontal interne déterminerait le moment d'explorer un nouveau ou un autre modèle, et le lobe pariétal inférieur représenterait l'information saillante et étonnante sur le modèle actuel. L'article se termine sur des orientations possibles des recherches pour répondre aux questions qui demeurent au sujet de la création et de la mise à jour de modèles mentaux.