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Developing practical, effective, and legally sustainable policies to separate firearms from people at risk of harm ing themselves or others presents a potentially important, but challenging, public health opportunity for gun violence prevention in the US. This article sketches the relevant policy landscape in order to demonstrate that point-of-purchase background checks are a necessary but insufficient component of a strategy to reduce gun violence in the US, and that risk-based preemptive gun removal schemes provide a complementary policy to bridge the gap. It then briefly recounts the history of enactment and gradual implementation of Connecticut's risk-based gun removal law, beginning with the high-profile homicide that drove public opinion to support the law.

As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the right to keep and bear arms is coming of age. But although the doctrine has begun to mature in the decade since District of Columbia v. Heller, scholars, advocates, and judges disagree about (and sometimes simply do not know) how to characterize it. This Article is the first comprehensive empirical analysis of post-Heller Second Amendment doctrine. Beginning with a set of more than one thousand Second Amendment challenges, we have coded every available Second Amendment opinion—state and federal, trial and appellate—from Heller up until February 1, 2016. The dataset is deep as well as broad, including dozens of variables regarding the content of each challenge, not just whether it prevailed. Our findings help provide an objective basis for characterizing Second Amendment doctrine and framing new scholarly inquiries. This is a particularly important task now, as the Amendment becomes a part of \"normal\" constitutional law and increasingly susceptible to the standard tools of legal analysis.

Homemade guns are being used in a growing number of crimes across the US, creating what gun control organizations describe as the fastest-growing threat to public safety in America. States and the federal government are cracking down. New laws criminalize gunmaking without a license, prohibit the sale or transfer of homemade guns, and even ban some forms of gunmaking altogether. But the constitutionality of these regulations is uncertain. After the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in 'New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc v Bruen' courts have begun to invalidate rules that are not \"consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.\" Constitutional challenges to new gunmaking regulations have already created court splits on a pair of key questions commanded by 'Bruen'. First, does the plain text of the Second Amendment cover a right to manufacture firearms? Second, are modern restrictions on gunmaking consistent with this country's historical tradition of firearm regulation? This note begins to answer these questions by recounting the history of gunmaking practices and regulations at the Founding. It uncovers evidence that the Second Amendment as originally understood did not cover gunmaking, and that in any event, early Americans regulated gunmaking extensively. In light of this history, 'Bruen' should permit reasonable modern regulations. This case study makes two methodological arguments relevant to Second Amendment jurisprudence. First, non-statutory sources of law should play a role in illuminating original constitutional meaning. Second, after 'United States v. Rahimi', modern regulations may be upheld by legal principles that emerge from disparate bodies of law.

Iowa's newly adopted constitutional right to bear arms was expressly aimed at firearms. The language, however, reaches all arms, including cold weapons like knives. With several cold weapons statutes extant at the time of amendment, their tradition is implicated in the right. At least three competing theories vie for how to apply strict scrutiny to defend that right. This Note argues that state history and tradition should inform the scope of the right, with a full-blooded strict scrutiny guarding the right's extent. Congruent with Iowa's traditions, that may now mean some statutes are unconstitutional.

p-curve, the distribution of significant p-values, can be analyzed to assess if the findings have evidential value, whether p-hacking and file-drawering can be ruled out as the sole explanations for them. Bruns and Ioannidis (2016) have proposed p-curve cannot examine evidential value with observational data. Their discussion confuses false-positive findings with confounded ones, failing to distinguish correlation from causation. We demonstrate this important distinction by showing that a confounded but real, hence replicable association, gun ownership and number of sexual partners, leads to a right-skewed p-curve, while a false-positive one, respondent ID number and trust in the supreme court, leads to a flat p-curve. P-curve can distinguish between replicable and non-replicable findings. The observational nature of the data is not consequential.

This Article argues that what explains the turn to the past in the history-and-tradition decisions of the Roberts Court is not a method of interpretation, but instead a justification for the Court's turn to the past. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, the conservative Justices claim that interpreting the Constitution through history and tradition--when described in granular factual detail--best constrains judicial discretion by tethering law to objective criteria separate from the interpreter's policy preferences. Justice Scalia long ago advanced this claim, and began a decades-long debate over \"levels of generality\" when he urged judges \"to adopt the most specific tradition as the point of reference.\"

In popular and professional discourse, debate about the right to keep and bear arms most often revolves around the Second Amendment. But that narrow reference ignores a vast and expansive nonconstitutional legal regime privileging guns and their owners. This collection of nonconstitutional gun rights confers broad powers and immunities on gun owners that go far beyond those required by the Constitution, like rights to bring guns on private property against an owner's wishes and to carry a concealed firearm in public with no training or background check. This Article catalogues this set of expansive laws and critically assesses them. Unlike the formal constitutional guarantee, this broad collection is not solely libertarian, concerned only with guaranteeing noninterference with a negative right. Instead, it is also aggressively interventionist, countermanding contrary policy judgments by employers, universities, property owners, and local government officials, conferring robust rights and privileges, and shifting the distribution of violence in society. This Article underscores the rhetorical and legal connection between this gunrights expansionism and the formal Second Amendment guarantee. These laws do not derive from a judicial interpretation of the scope of the Constitution, but they are expressed and advocated for in constitutional terms. The Article also highlights how broad gun rights can create unique harm to the body politic and to marginalized groups by fostering fear and mistrust and empowering sometimes-problematic private actors to proactively police their own communities. Finally, the Article shows how gun-rights expansionism influences constitutional doctrine in the context of the Second Amendment, as well as of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.