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Ruslan Khasbulatov has played a central role in the dramatic changes in Russia over the last three years. He became Acting Speaker of the Russian parliament in July 1991 and helped to defend the Russian White House during the coup attempt of that August. He has since consolidated his influence in the Parliament, and has become one of the country's most powerful and controversial politicians. In this book, Khasbulatov presents his views on Russian politics before the coup, offers a vivid first-hand account of the resistance to the coup, and concludes with his views on the problem of power in the new Russia. He provides a unique insight into the development of Russia from communism to embryonic democracy and an unparalleled insider's account of some of the most momentous events of the late twentieth century.

This is the first work to set one of the great bloodless revolutions of the twentieth century in its proper historical context. John Dunlop pays particular attention to Yeltsin's role in opposing the covert resurgence of Communist interests in post-coup Russia, and faces the possibility that new institutions may not survive long enough to sink roots in a traditionally undemocratic culture.

The Parliament Speaker called again for elections by the spring of next year for both the presidency and the parliament and accused Mr. [Boris N. Yeltsin] of playing games. \"If he wants a referendum, then let's have one,\" Mr. [Ruslan I. Khasbulatov] said. \"If he doesn't, he should say so. I don't understand these games.\"

When asked whether he will become an independent candidate or will be nominated by a party, [Ruslan Khasbulatov] said he will be nominated \"by the people of Chechnya and he will be their candidate\". Khasbulatov said he is sure he will win in the first round. \"I have my own programme for settling the situation in Chechnya, but I will voice it only after I take office,\" Khasbulatov said.

[Ruslan Khasbulatov] said that some time ago he drafted \"A peace plan for the Chechen Republic\" and gave it to Russian Nationalities Policy Minister Vladimir Zorin. He added that Akhmed Zakayev, a representative of Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov, had approved of this plan.

The generals are literally clinging to the Chechen war and do not intend to end it because it provides immense opportunities that are inconceivable in peacetime: an ever-growing political role in society, major funding, rank and office (yesterday's colonels are today's colonel-generals), material well-being, of which the treasury is by no means the only source, and so on. This is happening not because of the military's subjective qualities and not because of a tendency towards brutality and violence (although some officers certainly do possess these vile tendencies), but because of the objective interests of the stratum (social group) as such. These narrow interests are expressed by the General Staff, for which the defeats in the last war in Chechnya were a painful experience. Through the efforts of the General Staff and its political allies myths were created to the effect that the \"army lost the last war owing to interference by politicians\". This claim is very far from the truth. The truth is that the last war was waged as ineptly as the present one and it was completely lost by the army and the General Staff, lost (in particular) as a result of the Chechen population's displeasure over the army's actions, since the forces behaved like brutal occupiers, resorting to reprisals against civilians. We know that a professional military man (officer) prepares all his life for war, so as soon as it starts he drives himself to the limit. But if you have a war like that in Chechnya, where you can commit with impunity any act, in particular in the sphere of personal enrichment, at minimal risk, that kind of war is a godsend. But to \"prolong the war\" you need to create myths, shout about a \"formidable enemy\", \"battered but not destroyed\"; dispatch \"on high\" secret reports containing bogus data about the \"behaviour\" of people allegedly \"sympathizing with the bandits\", and so on. This policy by the military leadership in Chechnya is effectively leading to further mass deaths among civilians, preventing them from contributing to the general task of stopping guerrilla activity, and preventing the formation of a properly functioning republic Internal Affairs Ministry and police system, which, without doubt, would have eliminated the remnants of the gunmen's detachments in short order, with the assistance of the population and army units. In a whole series of pieces and articles on the results of the first Chechen war I said that the brutal treatment of the civilian population was one of the main factors in the defeat. The brutal treatment of the people by the military in this war far exceeds all that went before, in the infamous first war. Then and now the army's ideologists and the commanders committed a fatal mistake (or crime?) by inculcating upon men and officers a hatred of civilian mountaineers. This \"inculcation\" was based on the words of 19th century commanders (Yermolov, Baryatinskiy, and others) taken out of context, such as \"a good Chechen is a dead Chechen\", and so on. What is ignored is the specific policy of, for example, Gen Yermolov, which came down to solicitous, honest, chivalrous treatment of Chechen civilians, old people, children and women. Yermolov brutally punished entire Cossack subunits for displaying brutality and destroying villages, stripped commanders of their officer's epaulettes for carrying out such actions, gave a great deal of material and medical assistance to people, and built highways, bridges, and cities. Yermolov was not only a conqueror, but also a creator. But what do the \"Chechen generals\" who have left behind ravaged cities, smouldering ruins and weeping widows and orphans have to be proud of? The people have long been aware of the need to get together both to tackle the task of dealing with the consequences of the Dudayev- Maskhadov rule and to regenerate the economy. But certain official organizations and their employees with \"their own\" appreciation of the problem are taking vigorous but covert action to prevent the people from uniting with more or less famous representatives living, in particular, outside Chechnya, in various Russian cities. The tactics that are being used are those of inserting dubious \"leaders\", who directly or indirectly destroy the process of collaboration and cooperation between various influential figures. Conflicts are provoked even between the declared \"leaders\": in Chechnya itself. What is the purpose of this subversive activity, which is causing enormous damage to a people in adversity? It does not conform to the aims and tasks declared by the president or to state interests in Chechnya. And pardon me, but how is one supposed to interpret these far from complex, indeed, rather primitive games at a time when thousands of people are dying and their deaths are caused not only and not so much by the Maskhadovs, Basayevs and Khattabs as by the authorities' policy?

Moscow, 6th March: Elections for the republic's leader could be held in Chechnya simultaneously with the Russian presidential elections on 26th March, Malik Saydullayev, head of the Moscow-based State Council of Chechnya, told Interfax on Monday [6th March]. \"The earlier such elections are held, the better,\" he thinks.

\"At 8:10 A.M. the deputies, their staff and journalists, gathered in the hall of the Council of Nationalities, which was not exposed to fire from the outside, began to sing,\" wrote Miss Romanenkova, 19 years old, in a diary she kept of the day's events. \"They sang love songs, read poetry and made up rhymes about one another, which for some time neutralized the sound of gunfire. There was no panic. People pulled togeher. They sang 'White Acacia, Fragrant Cluster' and 'My Beloved Capital' in chorus, in hoarse and exhausted voices.\" \"He blamed himself for not having found a way to make a civil peace,\" Mr. [Aleksei Vorobyov] said. \"He said he had made mistakes, that the Parliament had given too much power to the President two years ago, before they understood what kind of man [Boris N. Yeltsin] was.\" Mr. [Ruslan I. Khasbulatov] praised the Parliament for keeping up its work under \"incredibly difficult circumstances,\" and urged them to preserve their memories of \"these tragic days.\" He ended by saying that he hoped to continue the work \"in another city.\" According to Miss Romanenkova's diary, the last word went to Deputy Sergei Baburin, one of Mr. Yeltsin's most unflinching opponents. \"We did our duty to the end,\" he said. \"It is not our fault that the Ministry of Security, the Interior Ministry and the army betrayed the Constitution. We should leave this hall holding our heads up high.\"

Speaking to reporters outside the hall, Mr. [Ruslan I. Khasbulatov] dismissed Mr. [Boris N. Yeltsin]'s draft constitution as \"a lopsided czarist bill,\" and said, \"it has now become clear that we are moving toward dictatorship.\" Mr. Yeltsin stepped up his attack on the Supreme Soviet, the standing Parliament, which he dismissed as a vestige of the old Soviet system. \"In short,\" he said, \"the Supreme Soviet is not a Parliament but a commonplace office with bosses and subordinates.\" \"Yes, and much of the blame for this is on the Parliament,\" he said. \"Two variations of the constitution are under discussion today, and people will automatically vote for the President's draft, without even thinking about it.\"