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\"President Bush was unable...to win from Russian President Vladimir Putin a commitment to aid U.S. forces in Iraq or a pledge to end Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear-power program. While the two leaders underscored what they termed a close diplomatic and personal relationship, the meeting at Camp David nevertheless pointed up sharp differences between the nations and Bush's ongoing difficulty in rallying world support behind U.S. efforts in Iraq.\" (Chicago Tribune) Learn about the issues Bush and Putin discussed during their meeting. Russia's positions on a nuclear program in Iran and providing aid to Iraq are explained.

Russia and the United States have settled on oil as the basis of a new partnership. This move is dangerous, however, because it ignores the divergent interests of the two countries and their inability to influence global oil markets. Indeed, war in Iraq could tear this partnership apart. A far better basis for U.S.-Russian ties would be the two nations' durable common interest in developing and safeguarding nuclear power.

One of the major policy concerns surrounding violent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Russia's North Caucasus region, Somalia, and Syria has been that these struggles may both attract and breed transnational insurgents, or foreign fighters. Yet despite this growing worry, relatively little is known about the ways in which transnational insurgents influence the domestic struggles they join. Existing scholarship assumes that such \"outsiders\" strengthen domestic opposition movements by bringing with them fighters, weapons, know-how, and access to financial resources. Indeed, access to such assets explains why domestic resistance leaders may initially welcome transnational insurgents. Foreign fighters, however, can also weaken domestic insurgencies by introducing new ideas regarding their objectives and how these struggles should be waged. The introduction of new goals and tactics can not only create divisions with opposition movements, but can also complicate the ability of local leaders to attract and maintain vital public support. Domestic resistance leaders' willingness and ability to adapt the ideas of transnational insurgents to local conditions is key to determining whether and how foreign fighters strengthen homegrown insurgencies.

This article explores the policy choices and political stances that lie behind Turkey's growing isolation both from its western allies and its regional neighbours. It details Ankara's approach to a range of current issues in its region—particularly relating to Syria but also Iraq, Libya, Iran, Russia and Israel—and seeks to trace these approaches back to the world-view of the country's ruling party and its leading figures, most notably President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu. It also assesses Turkey's reactions to the complex regional circumstances that have confronted Turkey in recent years. It considers the content and impact of some of the rhetoric emanating from Ankara, especially where it is directed towards the West. The article asks whether and why Turkish foreign policy has acquired an anti-western tone, and also looks at the extent to which its dealings with its neighbours can be explained by sectarian considerations or by pro-Muslim Brotherhood leanings. It then goes on to speculate about Turkey's future relationship with NATO and to a lesser degree the EU. It considers the prospects for an improvement in Ankara's relationship with its western allies, or whether Turkey— US relations in particular are now likely to be characterized by 'strategic drift' and a more transactional and contingent approach to alliance relationships.

[...] strange as it may seem, these kinds of opinions can also be heard: If the United States becomes reconciled with Iran, it will be bad for us, and the Americans will push us out of Iranian economic space. Russian-Iranian relations improved in the 1 99Os, but there are still many outstanding differences between them, including those over Putin's proposals for a joint U.S.-Russian missile-defense system directed toward Iran, the division of the Caspian Sea, repeated Russian delays in completing the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Russian delays in supplying S-300 air-defense missile systems, and different approaches to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue.\\n27 Senator Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian legislature), made clear that Moscow feared a \"color revolution\" in Iran that would bring to power a pro-American, anti-Russian regime in Tehran.28 But since the opposition is anti-Russian, Moscow had little choice but to stick with the increasingly beleaguered Tehran regime.

Contends that Russia has a long-term goal of cooperation with Iran regarding the latter's nuclear program. Russian policy is examined from a historical & analytical perspective. Attention is given to the effect that Russian involvement has on Russian-US relations, the role of the IAEA, EU policy with respect to the nuclear issue, & how Russian involvement with North Korea relate to Russian attitudes & policy regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Russia's nuclear strategy & its long-term objectives & policy orientations are considered, arguing that the Russian strategy is one of two-track diplomacy that helps determine policy orientation on the nuclear issue. Four Russian objectives are outlined, & an explanation of Russian two-track diplomacy is offered. D. Edelman

Presenting the views of leading experts on strategic considerations in Eurasia, this volume shows that the 11 September attacks and subsequent developments have affected the way in which international relations are evaluated. In addition, these developments have turned the concept of asymmetric threats, including large-scale international terrorist

After September 11, 2001, Russia had emerged as one of the strongest supporters of the American-led war on terrorism and its rhetoric has often been stronger than that expressed by America's allies in Europe. It appeared that the promise of a close US-Russian relationship might have a chance of coming to pass. These hopes were quickly dashed as a result of the row over the Bush administration's planned invasion of Iraq. The dispute over Iraq was bitter and divisive, and seriously tested the Russo-American relationship. It marked one of the most significant great power disputes of the post-Cold War international system, and within Russia the language of multipolarity returned with a vengeance. This paper seeks to understand the reasons for Russia's foreign policy shift and its opposition to the US invasion of Iraq. It aims to answer three questions: 1. Why did Russia oppose the US? 2. How can international relations theory account for this policy? 3. What role did US policies play in precipitating a seeming return to a policy of balancing from the post-9/11 promise of a Russo-American alliance? It is posited that the concept of \"positional goods\", particularly the importance of international prestige and status, can best explain Russian policy over the Iraq war.

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has been faced with numerous crises since coming to office in 2000, most importantly the war in Chechnya, the Iraq War was the first major international crisis with which his administration was confronted. As in the case of Kosovo for Yeltsin, and the Gulf War for Gorbachev, the Russian President had to deal with conflicting domestic pressures and apparently still more conflicting Russian national and international interests. Indeed, one result of such a situation was a post-war accusation that Putin actually had no policy or at least no consistent policy with regard to the Iraq crisis [Golan, G., 1992. Gorbachev's difficult time in the Gulf. Political Science Quarterly 107 (2), 213–230]. One may remember similar accusations of Gorbachev's “zigzaging” in the Gulf War and claims that the Yeltsin government failed to forge a Kosovo policy altogether [Levitin, O., 2000. Inside Moscow's Kosovo muddle. Survival 42 (1), 130]. Yet, a certain pattern did appear to repeat itself in the Iraqi crisis, namely, pre-war efforts to prevent a military conflict from breaking out, then gradual escalation of rhetoric if not actual involvement, and finally gradual but relatively rapid retreat to conciliatory posture toward the United States (in all three crises). Moreover, Putin was indeed consistent throughout the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in his opposition to the Americans' use of force against Iraq and in the need to remain within a United Nations framework. Actually, one might ask (and we shall below) why Putin did not abandon the first part of this policy, in order to maintain the second component, when it became certain that the U.S. was going to attack with or without UN Security Council approval.