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The legal rules governing the use of force between States are one of the most fundamental, and the most controversial, aspects of international law. An essential part of this subject is the question of when, and to what extent, a State may lawfully use force against another in self-defence. However, the parameters of this inherent right remain obscure, despite the best efforts of scholars and, notably, the International Court of Justice. This book examines the burgeoning relationship between the ICJ and the right of self-defence. Since 2003 there have been three major decisions of the ICJ that have dealt directly with the law governing self-defence actions, in contrast to only two such cases in the preceding fifty years. This, then, is an opportune moment to reconsider the jurisprudence of the Court on this issue. This book is the first of its kind to comprehensively draw together and then assess the merits of this jurisprudence. It argues that the contribution of the ICJ has been confused and unhelpful, and compounds inadequacies in existing customary international law. The ICJ’s fundamental conception of a primary criterion of ‘armed attack’ as constituting a qualitatively grave use of force is brought into question. The book then goes on to examine the underlying causes of the problems that have emerged in the jurisprudence on this crucial issue. Winner of the American Society of International Law’s Lieber Society Book Prize 2009 Dr Green’s monograph demonstrates a thorough understanding of the law of self-defence, coupled with an informed and evaluative discussion of the role and function of the International Court. It is an impressive analysis of the International Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on self-defence. Professor Iain Scobbie, Judge of the American Society of International Law’s Lieber Society Book Prize 2009, Sir Joseph Hotung Research Professor, School of Oriental and African Studies, London James Green’s “The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in International Law” usefully draws together the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice on the international law governing self-defence. The work could not be more timely in light of both contemporary State practice and the Court’s recent controversial judgements on the topic. Of particular note is his analysis of the very complex, and as yet unsettled, notion of “armed attack.” Professor Michael Schmitt, Chairman of the American Society of International Law’s Lieber Society Book Prize Committee, Chair of Public International Law, Durham University Winner of the University of Reading Faculty of Social Sciences outputs prize for the best research output in 2010.

The armed conflict in Gaza raises a series of questions under international law. The most significant questions concern the Israel’s use of force under jus ad bellum, the military operations conducted by the belligerents in relation to the law of armed conflict, and the proceedings brought before certain international courts, such as the International Criminal Court. This article examines each of these three issues in two stages. Firstly, it shows that the answers to these questions give rise to uncertain solutions insofar as they depend on the point of view adopted in relation to fundamental controversies concerning Palestine, such as the latter’s statehood. Secondly, it sets out the solutions that emerge independently of these controversies, whether these solutions express certainties or likelihoods.

During the last few years Russia has repeatedly evoked the doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad in all cases when it has resorted to the use of force. Russia’s invocation of this doctrine has been harshly criticized, mainly because it has been deemed as a neo-hegemonic interpretation thereof. That is, several deprecating remarks over Russia’s policy have been made, given that it has treated the doctrine as a tool to achieve its neo-imperialistic goals, in essence repudiating all the legal developments that had taken place from 1945 onwards. The invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 further resulting in Crimea’s illegal annexation, as well as the 2022 ongoing war against it, all relied more or less on the alleged danger to Russian nationals in the invaded areas. This paper will explore Russia’s invocation of the doctrine in the ongoing war against Ukraine. It will examine whether there are sufficient legal bases on these grounds, and it will demonstrate how Russia disregards the doctrine’s interpretation after the entry into force of the UN Charter promoting a hegemonic reading thereof. It will argue that the state’s policy shows the emergence of a new pattern regarding the forcible protection of its nationals abroad, which has endured for the last two decades. Finally, it will propose that continuity in such state practice is a constant threat to the former Soviet Union countries’ sovereignty, while it questions the very notion of their citizens’ nationality rights.

This book examines to what extent the right of self-defence, as laid down in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, permits States to launch military operations against other States. In particular, it focuses on the occurrence of an 'armed attack' - the crucial trigger for the activation of this right. In light of the developments since 9/11, the author analyses relevant physical and verbal customary practice, ranging from the 1974 Definition of Aggression to recent incidents such as the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan and the 2006 Israeli intervention in Lebanon. The notion of 'armed attack' is examined from a threefold perspective. What acts can be regarded as an 'armed attack'? When can an 'armed attack' be considered to take place? And from whom must an 'armed attack' emanate? By way of conclusion, the different findings are brought together in a draft 'Definition of Armed Attack'.

On 23 September 2014, the United States of America sent a letter to the Security Council justifying the launch of an air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on Syrian territory. In this letter, the US referred to a formula that appeared a few years ago in certain scholarly writings: the ‘unwilling or unable’ test. The aim of this article is to show that this test has not been accepted by the international community of states as a whole in the Syrian case. It is also to stress that such an acceptance would lead to a radical transformation of the jus contra bellum regime, one that a large majority of states is probably not ready to accept.

Drawing from scholarship across law, history, politics and philosophy, Self-Defence in International and Criminal Law provides a broad and interdisciplinary approach to the doctrine of self-defence in both domestic criminal and international law. It focuses on the requirement of imminence, which deals with the question of when individuals or States may legitimately resort to defensive force against a serious danger or harm. In both national and international law the imminence requirement, if strictly applied, renders any defensive measure taken in anticipation of a would-be attack illegal. Recently, however, attempts have been made to relax the temporal requirement of the self-defence doctrine (imminence) with a view to allowing individuals or States to employ deadly force to arrest an anticipated threat when they 'believe' that using 'pre-emptive' lethal force would be the only way to thwart an expected harm. In domestic criminal law, it has been argued that it is necessary to relax the rule of imminence in domestic violence cases where women employ lethal force against their abusive partners when there is no imminent threat to justify defensive force. At the international level, while there has long been controversy as to the justifiability of pre-emptive force in non-confrontational settings, following the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration's 'war on terror' policy radically shifted the focus from the notion of anticipation to that of prevention, making it clear that, if necessary, it would invoke unilateral force against emerging threats before they are fully formed. The book surveys the roots, role, rationale, and objectives of self-defence and questions whether the requirement of imminence should be removed from the traditional contours of the self-defence doctrine in national and international law.

This article examines the use by the US of drone strikes in regions described as ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ a phrase that appears to presume the application of international humanitarian law. In response to this, the article examines these regions to assess whether armed conflicts can be said to exist, and thereby whether international humanitarian law does in fact apply. Periods of armed conflict are identified, as are periods which cannot be characterized as such. Consequently the relevant paradigms of international law applicable to the strikes are established, belying the presumption that international humanitarian law applies generally to drone strikes.

The past decades have seen a remarkable development of military operations both within the United Nations collective security system and in other international settings. While traditional forms of military operations have been maintained and further developed, there have also been substantive developments, responding to new challenges for international security, specific requirements of international and multinational cooperation, and legal regulation. Treaty law, customary law, and best practice relevant for military operations derive from various branches of international law which must be applied in context. Cooperation between States and international organizations has brought about a progressive development of applicable rules, and a requirement for legal control both at the national and international level. The correct application of legal rules and best practice has become one of the benchmarks for the assessment of military operations and failure to meet appropriate standards can have significant military, political, and legal implications. This makes the identification and correct application of these rules of crucial importance in the planning and conduct of all types of military operations. The absence of an all-encompassing set of regulations and the need to find specific solutions for tasks characterized by an interdependence of efforts make a reassessment of this important part of international law both timely and topical. This book offers insight into the relevant principles and provisions. Chapters address important rules for enforcement, peace enforcement, and peace operations, as well as for other military operations conducted within the context of self-defence and other possible legal bases for use of force.

The internet has changed the rules of many industries, and war is no exception. But can a computer virus be classed as an act of war? Does a Denial of Service attack count as an armed attack? And does a state have a right to self-defence when cyber attacked? With the range and sophistication of cyber attacks against states showing a dramatic increase in recent times, this book investigates the traditional concepts of 'use of force', 'armed attack', and 'armed conflict' and asks whether existing laws created for analogue technologies can be applied to new digital developments. The book provides a comprehensive analysis of primary documents and surrounding literature, to investigate whether and how existing rules on the use of force in international law apply to a relatively new phenomenon such as cyberspace operations. It assesses the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, whether based on treaty or custom, and analyses why each rule applies or does not apply to cyber operations. Those rules which can be seen to apply are then discussed in the context of each specific type of cyber operation. The book addresses the key questions of whether a cyber operation amounts to the use of force and, if so, whether the victim state can exercise its right of self-defence; whether cyber operations trigger the application of international humanitarian law when they are not accompanied by traditional hostilities; what rules must be followed in the conduct of cyber hostilities; how neutrality is affected by cyber operations; whether those conducting cyber operations are combatants, civilians, or civilians taking direct part in hostilities. The book is essential reading for everyone wanting a better understanding of how international law regulates cyber combat.

The ban on the use of force in current international law is of mandatory character. The only exceptions are actions under the auspices of the UN Security Council and self-defence. The article addresses the issue of the use of force, with particular emphasis on cyberspace. As the nature of the conflicts has changed in recent years as well as the space where the individual operations have been moving, a number of fundamental questions arise in this context, which the authors will try to answer.