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There is an ongoing transformation of the Italian housing public service from public to social provision. This paper argues that the Italian transformation from public to social housing represents a ‘surreptitious’ and uncontrolled privatisation that mimics the English transition from council to social housing. By looking at the English experience, I advocate the Italian public housing service should backpedal from social to public housing, retaking state control of social housing provision given to non-profit organisations to redevelop a systematic, coordinated and participative national housing public service.

National interest, also as a critisism against the pradigm of New Public Management (NPM), is very much emphasised nowadays in public policies, even in sector ones. This article is about a removal from the classical meaning of general (public) interest to that new approach represented by certain EU Member States and the reasons behind. Our analysis focuses on contextual motives and impacts of these changes illustrated by the Hungarian case. The result shows that the market of public utility services has already been influenced by direct political considerations. Our findings indicate that these understandings for legitimate influence on EU market rules can also be derived from the legal framework itself. Measures examined in the paper run completely counter to the spirit of the original intention of the founders of the integration, and recent changes in EU law do not seem to raise unavoidable obstacles to such cases. Lessons of this case may be relevant for other EU Member States as well, at least for those from the Central-European region.

On 17 December 2020, the Court of Justice brought an end to the Inpost saga, following the compatibility assessment by the Commission – and the subsequent appeal before the General Court – of an aid scheme for universal service obligations in the postal sector. Together, these decisions and judgments provide the opportunity to reflect on three more general issues of State aid law. First, the acceptable calculation method of ‘an unfair financial burden’ should be highlighted, a key notion in the Postal Services Directive. Second, the rules of interaction between non-State aid provisions of EU law and the aid analysis will be revisited. Third, and finally, the connection between the transparency requirements of the SGEI Framework and the public service inquiry has to be clarified.

This article examines for which type of transactions the use of a competing, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure excludes the provision of an advantage and for which type of transactions this is not the case. In answering that question, it will be discussed whether the found distinction can be logically explained and criteria will be developed in accordance with which transactions can be distinguished for which a tender procedure will exclude State aid and for which it will not. Finally, suggestions will be given on how the framework of assessment could be made more consistent. Keywords: Advantage; Public Procurement; SGEI.

Slovenian legislation defines complementary health insurance as an activity of the public interest, which represents an inseparable and essential element of healthcare system and as such pursues objectives identical to those of compulsory health insurance – financial security of population against high healthcare expenses and appropriate and fair access to efficient and quality healthcare. EU Member States often introduce different regulatory measures to safeguard the public interest in the field of economic activities. These measures often contravene the Union acquis (the rules on the functioning of the internal market and competition law), which is in principle unacceptable. This article aims to define Slovenian complementary health insurance as a service of general economic interest, which opens up new prospects for the Member States’ adoption of the regulatory measures that are not compliant with therules on the functioning of the internal market and EU competition law.

The evolution of the State aid rules has made incursions into the sovereignty of the Member States to identify, fund and operate public services (SGEI). This sensitive issue tends to be managed by the European Commission with few cases brought before the national courts or referred to the CJEU. Nevertheless, national courts may be faced with a growing number of challenges in understanding and applying the European Commission policy and the European Courts’ case law in this area. The article provides an overview of some of the recent policy developments and case law to highlight the legal complexities of applying State aid to public services. Keywords: SGEI; Altmark; Public Services; National Courts.

On 1 March 2017, the General Court confirmed a decision by which the European Commission ordered France to recover €220 million from SNCM. In practice, the judgment has little consequences because of SNCM’s bankruptcy. From a legal standpoint however, the judgment is significant because it refuses to endorse the Commission’s thesis according to which Member States must in all cases evidence a market failure in order to correctly define a SGEI. In other words, the Commission attempted to increase the scope of the control it performs on the definition of SGEIs and the GC – as it has sometimes in the past – refused to condone this approach. Keywords: Altmark; SGEI; Market Failure; Public Service.

The Court of Justice confirmed the obligation for a national judge to order the payment of illegality interest also where the aid, implemented in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU, has been declared by the Commission compatible with the internal market under Article 106(2) TFEU. By extending the findings in CELF to illegal State aid granted in favour of undertaking entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, the Court has clarified that the performance of SGEI tasks cannot, in and of itself, justify an exemption from the notification and standstill requirements under Article 108(3) TFEU.

Seeking to improve cost estimates for services of general economic interest (SGEI), the European Commission in the 2012 SGEI package introduced the new net avoided cost (NAC) methodology for calculating the cost of such services. This article conducts a comprehensive review of the Commission’s case practice with respect to the application of the NAC methodology. The review shows that the Commission has a low threshold for what is considered a ‘duly justified’ reason for not using the NAC methodology. First, the Commission has held that the undertaking performing the SGEI must be known in advance. This effectively means that it cannot be used in conjunction with tenders or public procurement. In practice, the NAC methodology can only be applied where the undertaking is already engaged in the activity in question. Second, the Commission has implicitly established two criteria for when a relevant counterfactual scenario can be defined. These criteria are interpreted strictly, effectively restricting the application of the NAC methodology to very few cases not already covered by sector specific regulation. The implication of these findings is that the introduction of the NAC methodology did not contribute anything substantial to SGEI regulation.