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This article deals with the theory of truth in Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599) as it is presented in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1577-1612). The first part of the paper is dedicated to Fonseca’s definition of intellective truth within the doctrinal topography of the Aristotelian tradition. The Author especially points out Fonseca’s attempt to justify the notion of a “simple” truth of the “simple apprehension”, based on a specific use of Cajetan’s distinction between “signified act” and “exercised act” as well as on a (partially) nominalist account of the relationship between “simple” and “enunciative” concepts. The second part deals instead with Fonseca’s definition of transcendental truth, understood as the conformity between the intellect and the esse realis of the res, and as the conformity of the latter with exemplars in God’s mind. Here the Author also reconstructs Fonseca’s theory of divine ideas and his theory of logical identities.

The article intends to explore the fruitful intellectual exchange between the historian of art and culture Aby Warburg and the philosopher Ernst Cassirer starting from their first meeting in 1924 and developed over ten years. The author analyses how the Cassirer’s concept of “symbolic form” and the Warburg’s conception that took shape in the Bilderatlas Mnemosyne are deeply linked to the interests of both for the origins of modern physics. The figure of Kepler as a “transitional figure between mythical and mathematical thought” on which they focus on their first meeting has a central role in this reflection. The author wants to demonstrate how the analysis of the theory of symbol is inseparable from the study of the theory of myth, connected to cosmological, astrological and astronomical themes. The principles that inaugurate the scientific revolution of the modern age, present in nuce in the science of physics inaugurated by Kepler, are observed in the more mature results of Einstein’s theory of relativity. A theory which played an important role both in Cassirer’s philosophy and in Warburg’s reflections.

This essay focuses on the theory of recollection in Plato’s Meno. It shows that behind the mythical description of the prenatal vision of intelligible forms by the soul lies Plato’s intention to underpin the thesis according to which the soul possesses a nature that allows it to know true being, because the soul is akin (syngenes) to the intelligible world. This means that Plato’s conception of recollection does not refer to an event but to a condition.

The aim of the article is to examine Flavio Querenghi’s theory of habit as it is presented in several chapters of his Discorsi morali politici et naturali (1644). The Author clearly distinguishes the concept of “abitudine”, the mechanism of repetition which favors the formation of habits (“abiti”), from that of “costume”, the set of cultural rules accepted and interiorized in different ways by different people, in order to explore the question of the primacy of nature over culture. Despite the fact that the original condition of humankind has been obscured by civil life, in which citizens are accustomed to rules established by political and cultural authorities, it survives in uncivilized forms of life, in which people live according to nature, and it is continually rediscovered by human reason. Querenghi brings the classical and modern theories of habit together, in particular those of Aristotle, Plato, the Stoics and Montaigne, with a view to demonstrating the need to do away with constraints and replace bad habits with good ones in private and public life.

In 1679 Henry More published an Epistola altera ad V.C., rather neglected by critics, directed not only against Spinoza but also against the thought of the Socinian Cuperus (Frans Kuyper, 1629-1691), which he considered unsuitable to counter Spinozian pantheism. Among the main points of Socinian doctrine under accusation were the theory of the finiteness of God, the rejection of natural religion, and, above all, the corporeality of God. This last issue allows More to formulate the accusation of “Spinozism” against Cuperus’ thought as well as against that of Sozzini’s followers. The article examines some 18th­century “academic theses” that were inspired by More’s Epistola. The Author aims to highlight not only the particularity of Henry More’s complex strategy, but also the persistence and efficacy of the strictly philosophical category of “Socinianism” within the debates on materialism.

The article considers one aspect of the multi-faceted philosophical legacy of Aleksej Losev, namely his scholarly output dedicated to the history of philosophy and produced in the period after 1953. It is stated that Losev’s entire post-Stalinist production sounds, to an astute reader, like a grand parable whose meaning is both conveyed and hidden at the moment of the narration. In the works in question, Losev’s strategy consisted in developing an historical-philosophical discourse as the main tool for announcing and spreading his own philosophy. That being said, the aim of the article is to shed light on the way in which Losev had recourse to irony in his texts, in order to build up a stratification of levels of meaning . The author analyses two sample texts by Losev: his entry on “Neoplatonism” for the fourth volume of the famous Soviet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967) and his highly successful book on the Aesthetics of the Renaissance (1978).

Some recent studies show in John Buridan a noteworthy degree of originality and innovation in his treatment of Aristotle’s theory of science, for example concerning the doctrines of subalternation of the sciences, or some aspects of the doctrine of definition, which are between the main themes of Posterior Analytics. In this paper, two other topics are investigated: first, the interpretation of the fourth mode of per se predication, about which Buridan in the Summulae proposes a new, original and interesting view definitely overcoming either the previous exegetical tradition, or the opinion Buridan himself expresses in his Questiones on Aristotle’s text. The second is the topic of propter quid demonstration, that Buridan deepens also in order to go beyond the old and maybe almost outdated quaestio de medio demonstrationis. But, what is more, he is higly consistent and very original in connecting these two topics: so, he gives a new unity and systematic order also to some other minor aspect of his reading of Aristotelian theory.

In his dispute with Francesco Pucci, Fausto Sozzini argues that man was not created immortal but, being by nature subject to death, he could be made perpetually immune only through divine grace, which was a gift not included in his creation. It has thus been suggested that the Pucci-Sozzini querelle should be read as an expression of the broader debate that opposed the two ‘souls’ of modern theology, that is the Thomistic and the Augustinian. By reconstructing the late medieval theological debate on the mortality of Adam in the condition of innocence, the Author tries to show that Sozzini’s theses are greatly indebted to Duns Scotus’ criticisms of Thomas Aquinas.

The final books of the Esprit des lois (1748), dedicated to the institutions of the French kingdom in medieval times, have until now been scarcely examined. According to Montesquieu, in order to understand modern institutions, it is essential to acquire a thorough knowledge of history. Knowledge of the Middle Ages is the only way to understand how power should be organized in modern European monarchies. The article focuses in particular on the history of French judicial procedures in relation to the changes occurring in the figure of the sovereign in the medieval period. In Montesquieu’s view, the transformations that took place in judicial procedures guaranteed the creation of a moderate monarchy characterized by a balanced distribution of powers. The Author claims that in his theory Montesquieu uses and re­elaborates various political ideas drawn from medieval philosophers and jurists (such as Guillaume Durand’s Speculum iuris or Baldus’ commentary on the Libri feudorum), as well as from Jean Bodin’s Six livres de la République.

This essay reconstructs the philosophical and historiographical premises to Georg Lukács’ research on irrationalism conducted during the period of Nazi rule in Germany. To this end, the Author focuses chiefly on two posthumous works: How Did Fascist Philosophy Arise in Germany? (1933) and How Did Germany Become the Centre of reactionary Ideology? (1941-1942). After a brief historical contextualization, the Author illustrates the main purpose of these texts: to free German philosophy and culture between the XIX and XX century from those irrationalistic elements asserted and nourished by Fascist philosophy. He then analyzes Lukács’ concept of reason in its three fundamental aspects, namely the methodological link with Marx’s historical image of the political development of Europe during the XIX century, the theoretical debt to Hegel’s critique of immediacy and the connection with some ethical points already discussed during the Goethezeit.