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Chatbot identity disclosure negatively affects customer purchases because customers perceive the disclosed bot as less knowledgeable and less empathetic. Empowered by artificial intelligence (AI), chatbots are surging as new technologies with both business potential and customer pushback. This study exploits field experiment data on more than 6,200 customers who are randomized to receive highly structured outbound sales calls from chatbots or human workers. Results suggest that undisclosed chatbots are as effective as proficient workers and four times more effective than inexperienced workers in engendering customer purchases. However, a disclosure of chatbot identity before the machine–customer conversation reduces purchase rates by more than 79.7%. Additional analyses find that these results are robust to nonresponse bias and hang-ups, and the chatbot disclosure substantially decreases call length. Exploration of the mechanisms reveals that when customers know the conversational partner is not a human, they are curt and purchase less because they perceive the disclosed bot as less knowledgeable and less empathetic. The negative disclosure effect seems to be driven by a subjective human perception against machines, despite the objective competence of AI chatbots. Fortunately, such negative impact can be mitigated by a late disclosure timing strategy and customer prior AI experience. These findings offer useful implications for chatbot applications, customer targeting, and advertising in conversational commerce.

The best worker is not always the best candidate for manager. In these cases, do firms promote the best potential manager or the best worker in their current job? Using microdata on the performance of sales workers at 131 firms, we find evidence consistent with the Peter Principle, which proposes that firms prioritize current job performance in promotion decisions at the expense of other observable characteristics that better predict managerial performance. We estimate that the costs of promoting workers with lower managerial potential are high, suggesting either that firms are making inefficient promotion decisions or that the benefits of promotion-based incentives are great enough to justify the costs of managerial mismatch. We find that firms manage the costs of the Peter Principle by placing less weight on sales performance in promotion decisions when managerial roles entail greater responsibility and when frontline workers are incentivized by strong pay for performance.

This paper develops a new algorithm for increasing the revenue in a dynamic product assortment problem. Then, it identifies the challenges faced by managers in practice and discusses the conditions under which workers follow the algorithm. To do so, I conducted a field experiment with a beverage vending machine business. The experiment shows that, on average, workers are reluctant to follow the algorithmic advice; however, the workers are more willing to conform once their forecasts are integrated into the algorithm. Analyses using nonexperimental variations highlight the importance of taking worker and context heterogeneity into account to maximize the benefit from adopting a new algorithm. Higher worker’s regret, sales volatility, and fewer delegations increase the conformity, while they mitigate the effects of integration. Workers avoid high-traffic vending machines and focus on machines with high sales volatility when adopting the algorithm. The effects on the sales are largely similar to the effects on product assortments. The results emphasize the gap between nominal and actual performance of an algorithm and several practical issues to be resolved. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.

In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3 percent. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2 percent while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus scheme, the performance of the treatment and control shops converges, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect.

We study the relationship between choice homophily in instrumental relationships and individual performance in knowledge-intensive organizations. Although homophily should make it easier for people to get access to some colleagues, it may also lead to neglecting relationships with other colleagues, reducing the diversity of information people access through their network. Using data on instrumental ties between bonus-eligible employees in the equity sales and trading division of a global investment bank, we show that the relationship between an employee’s choice of similar colleagues and the employee’s performance is contingent on the position this employee occupies in the formal and informal hierarchy of the bank. More specifically, homophily is negatively associated with performance for bankers in the higher levels of the formal and informal hierarchy whereas the association is either positive or nonexistent for lower hierarchical levels.

This paper examines how compensation systems impact peer effects and competition in collocated sales teams. We use department store sales data to show that compensation systems influence worker incentives to help and compete with peers within the same firm, which in turn changes the capability of the firm to compete with rivals. Compensation also affects how salespeople impact peers at collocated competing firms, thereby impacting market competition. Moreover, compensation influences how salespeople strategically discount prices in response to peers. Our results suggest that heterogeneity in worker ability enhances firm performance under team-based compensation while hurting individual-based firms and that peer interactions are critical considerations in designing sales force incentive plans and broader firm strategy. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

Objectives. To assess the risk of COVID-19 by occupation and industry in the United States. Methods. Using the 2020–2021 National Health Interview Survey, we estimated the risk of having had a diagnosis of COVID-19 by workers’ industry and occupation, with and without adjustment for confounders. We also examined COVID-19 period prevalence by the number of workers in a household. Results. Relative to workers in other industries and occupations, those in the industry “health care and social assistance” (adjusted prevalence ratio = 1.23; 95% confidence interval = 1.11, 1.37), or in the occupations “health practitioners and technical,” “health care support,” or “protective services” had elevated risks of COVID-19. However, compared with nonworkers, workers in 12 of 21 industries and 11 of 23 occupations (e.g., manufacturing, food preparation, and sales) were at elevated risk. COVID-19 prevalence rose with each additional worker in a household. Conclusions. Workers in several industries and occupations with public-facing roles and adults in households with multiple workers had elevated risk of COVID-19. Public Health Implications. Stronger workplace protections, paid sick leave, and better health care access might mitigate working families’ risks from this and future pandemics. (Am J Public Health. 2023;113(6):647–656. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2023.307249 )

Since the 1970s, market restructuring has shifted many workers into workplaces heavily reliant on sales to outside corporate buyers. These outside buyers wield substantial power over working conditions among their suppliers. During the same period, wage growth for middle-income workers stagnated. By extending organizational theories of wage-setting to incorporate interactions between organizations, I predict that wage stagnation resulted in part from production workers’ heightened exposure to buyer power. Panel data on publicly traded companies shows that dependence on large buyers lowers suppliers’ wages and accounts for 10 percent of wage stagnation in nonfinancial firms since the 1970s. These results are robust to a series of supplementary measures of buyer power; instrumental variable analysis using mergers between buyers; corrections for selection and missing data; and controls for individual worker characteristics like education and occupation. The results show how product market restructuring and new forms of economic segmentation affect workers’ wages. The spread of unequal bargaining relations between corporate buyers and their suppliers has slowed wage growth for workers.

Domestic public debate continues over the economic impacts of environmental regulations that require environmental restoration. This debate has occurred in the absence of broad-scale empirical research on economic output and employment resulting from environmental restoration, restoration-related conservation, and mitigation actions - the activities that are part of what we term the \"restoration economy.\" In this article, we provide a high-level accounting of the size and scope of the restoration economy in terms of employment, value added, and overall economic output on a national scale. We conducted a national survey of businesses that participate in restoration work in order to estimate the total sales and number of jobs directly associated with the restoration economy, and to provide a profile of this nascent sector in terms of type of restoration work, industrial classification, workforce needs, and growth potential. We use survey results as inputs into a national input-output model (IMPLAN 3.1) in order to estimate the indirect and induced economic impacts of restoration activities. Based on this analysis we conclude that the domestic ecological restoration sector directly employs ~ 126,000 workers and generates ~ $9.5 billion in economic output (sales) annually. This activity supports an additional 95,000 jobs and $15 billion in economic output through indirect (business-to-business) linkages and increased household spending.

Economic growth requires confidence in the state's ability to enforce secure exchange. But when states selectively enforce rule of law, political considerations can moderate the trust that buyers have in sellers. I argue that political connections produce moral hazard in exchange because they introduce biases in expectations of judicial enforcement. Buyers avoid trade with politically connected sellers, and, in this context of unequal enforcement, formal contracts disproportionately protect politically connected buyers. To examine these features of connections and contracts, I created a sales business in Senegal and randomized whether employees signaled political connections and/or offered formal contracts during transactions. The results show that political connections decreased buyers' willingness to exchange. Formal contracts increased exchange, though primarily for connected buyers. These findings show that asymmetric political connections can impede daily trade and intensify economic inequalities in developing contexts, while simultaneously demonstrating the limits of state institutions for mitigating politically driven moral hazard.