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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore parallels between scientific management and the new scientific management to gain insight into applications of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) to human resource management and employee assessment. Design/methodology/approach Analysis of Taylor’s work and its interpretation by scholars is contrasted with modern analysis of human resource analytics to demonstrate conceptual and methodological commonalities between the old and the new forms of scientific management. Findings The analysis demonstrates how the epistemology, ethos and cultural trajectory of scientific management has resulted in a mindset that has influenced the implementation and objectives of the new scientific management with respect to human resources analytics. Social implications This paper offers an alternative to the view that machine learning and AI as applied to work and employees are beneficial and points out why important challenges have been overlooked and how they can be addressed. Originality/value Commonalties between Taylorism and the new scientific management have been overlooked so that attempts to gain an understanding of how machine learning is likely to influence work, employees and work organizations are incomplete. This paper provides a new perspective that can be used to address challenges associated with applications of machine learning to work design and employee rights.

Voice mail. E-mail. Bar codes. Desktops. Laptops. Networks. The Web. In this exciting book, Gene Rochlin takes a closer look at how these familiar and pervasive productions of computerization have become embedded in all our lives, forcing us to narrow the scope of our choices, our modes of control, and our experiences with the real world. Drawing on fascinating narratives from fields that range from military command, air traffic control, and international fund transfers to library cataloging and supermarket checkouts, Rochlin shows that we are rapidly making irreversible and at times harmful changes in our business, social, and personal lives to comply with the formalities and restrictions of information systems. The threat is not the direct one once framed by the idea of insane robots or runaway mainframes usurping human functions for their own purposes, but the gradual loss of control over hardware, software, and function through networks of interconnection and dependence. What Rochlin calls the computer trap has four parts: the lure, the snare, the costs, and the long-term consequences. The lure is obvious: the promise of ever more powerful and adaptable tools with simpler and more human-centered interfaces. The snare is what usually ensues. Once heavily invested in the use of computers to perform central tasks, organizations and individuals alike are committed to new capacities and potentials, whether they eventually find them rewarding or not. The varied costs include a dependency on the manufacturers of hardware and software--and a seemingly pathological scramble to keep up with an incredible rate of sometimes unnecessary technological change. Finally, a lack of redundancy and an incredible speed of response make human intervention or control difficult at best when (and not if) something goes wrong. As Rochlin points out, this is particularly true for those systems whose interconnections and mechanisms are so deeply concealed in the computers that no human being fully understands them. The complete text ofTrapped in the Netis available online at http://pup.princeton.edu

We propose a measure of managerial ability, based on managers' efficiency in generating revenues, which is available for a large sample of firms and outperforms existing ability measures. We find that our measure is strongly associated with manager fixed effects and that the stock price reactions to chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers are positive (negative) when we assess the outgoing CEO as low (high) ability. We also find that replacing CEOs with more (less) able CEOs is associated with improvements (declines) in subsequent firm performance. We conclude with a demonstration of the potential of the measure. We find that the negative relation between equity financing and future abnormal returns documented in prior research is mitigated by managerial ability. Specifically, more able managers appear to utilize equity issuance proceeds more effectively, illustrating that our more precise measure of managerial ability will allow researchers to pursue studies that were previously difficult to conduct. This paper was accepted by Mary E. Barth, accounting.

Microloan markets allow individual borrowers to raise funding from multiple individual lenders. We use a unique panel data set that tracks the funding dynamics of borrower listings on Prosper.com, the largest microloan market in the United States. We find evidence of rational herding among lenders. Well-funded borrower listings tend to attract more funding after we control for unobserved listing heterogeneity and payoff externalities. Moreover, instead of passively mimicking their peers (irrational herding), lenders engage in active observational learning (rational herding); they infer the creditworthiness of borrowers by observing peer lending decisions and use publicly observable borrower characteristics to moderate their inferences. Counterintuitively, obvious defects (e.g., poor credit grades) amplify a listing's herding momentum, as lenders infer superior creditworthiness to justify the herd. Similarly, favorable borrower characteristics (e.g., friend endorsements) weaken the herding effect, as lenders attribute herding to these observable merits. Follow-up analysis shows that rational herding beats irrational herding in predicting loan performance. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta, marketing.

Are the attitudes and beliefs of chief executive officers (CEOs) linked to their firms' innovative performance? This paper uses a measure of overconfidence, based on CEO stock-option exercise, to study the relationship between a CEO's \"revealed beliefs\" about future performance and standard measures of corporate innovation. We begin by developing a career concern model where CEOs innovate to provide evidence of their ability. The model predicts that overconfident CEOs, who underestimate the probability of failure, are more likely to pursue innovation, and that this effect is larger in more competitive industries. We test these predictions on a panel of large publicly traded firms for the years from 1980 to 1994. We find a robust positive association between overconfidence and citation-weighted patent counts in both cross-sectional and fixed-effect models. This effect is larger in more competitive industries. Our results suggest that overconfident CEOs are more likely to take their firms in a new technological direction. This paper was accepted by Kamalini Ramdas, entrepreneurship and innovation.

Power outages: catastrophic failure of linked networks On 28 September 2003, Italy suffered a near-nationwide power cut (Sicily was spared) that also brought down the Internet. Buldyrev et al . take this event, typical of a number that have occurred worldwide in recent years, and examine how such a cascade of failures involving independent networks can occur. They find that, surprisingly, a broader degree of distribution increases the vulnerability of interdependent networks to random failure — the opposite of what happens in a single network. This highlights the need to consider interdependent network properties when designing robust networks if a random failure is not to have catastrophic results. Modern networks are rarely independent, instead being coupled together with many others. Thus the failure of a small fraction of nodes in one network may lead to the complete fragmentation of a system of several interdependent networks. Here, a framework is developed for understanding the robustness of interacting networks subject to such 'cascading' failures. Surprisingly, a broader degree distribution increases the vulnerability of interdependent networks to random failure. Complex networks have been studied intensively for a decade, but research still focuses on the limited case of a single, non-interacting network 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 . Modern systems are coupled together 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 and therefore should be modelled as interdependent networks. A fundamental property of interdependent networks is that failure of nodes in one network may lead to failure of dependent nodes in other networks. This may happen recursively and can lead to a cascade of failures. In fact, a failure of a very small fraction of nodes in one network may lead to the complete fragmentation of a system of several interdependent networks. A dramatic real-world example of a cascade of failures (‘concurrent malfunction’) is the electrical blackout that affected much of Italy on 28 September 2003: the shutdown of power stations directly led to the failure of nodes in the Internet communication network, which in turn caused further breakdown of power stations 20 . Here we develop a framework for understanding the robustness of interacting networks subject to such cascading failures. We present exact analytical solutions for the critical fraction of nodes that, on removal, will lead to a failure cascade and to a complete fragmentation of two interdependent networks. Surprisingly, a broader degree distribution increases the vulnerability of interdependent networks to random failure, which is opposite to how a single network behaves. Our findings highlight the need to consider interdependent network properties in designing robust networks.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the reader to the field of closed-loop supply chains with a strong business perspective, i.e., we focus on profitable value recovery from returned products. It recounts the evolution of research in this growing area over the past 15 years, during which it developed from a narrow, technically focused niche area to a fully recognized subfield of supply chain management. We use five phases to paint an encompassing view of this evolutionary process for the reader to understand past achievements and potential future operations research opportunities.

In this paper we distinguish between two types of white lies: those that help others at the expense of the person telling the lie, which we term altruistic white lie s, and those that help both others and the liar, which we term Pareto white lies . We find that a large fraction of participants are reluctant to tell even a Pareto white lie, demonstrating a pure lie aversion independent of any social preferences for outcomes. In contrast, a nonnegligible fraction of participants are willing to tell an altruistic white lie that hurts them a bit but significantly helps others. Comparing white lies to those where lying increases the liar's payoff at the expense of another reveals important insights into the interaction of incentives, lying aversion, and preferences for payoff distributions. Finally, in line with previous findings, women are less likely to lie when it is costly to the other side. Interestingly though, we find that women are more likely to tell an altruistic lie. This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, decision analysis.

Contests are a historically important and increasingly popular mechanism for encouraging innovation. A central concern in designing innovation contests is how many competitors to admit. Using a unique data set of 9,661 software contests, we provide evidence of two coexisting and opposing forces that operate when the number of competitors increases. Greater rivalry reduces the incentives of all competitors in a contest to exert effort and make investments. At the same time, adding competitors increases the likelihood that at least one competitor will find an extreme-value solution. We show that the effort-reducing effect of greater rivalry dominates for less uncertain problems, whereas the effect on the extreme value prevails for more uncertain problems. Adding competitors thus systematically increases overall contest performance for high-uncertainty problems. We also find that higher uncertainty reduces the negative effect of added competitors on incentives. Thus, uncertainty and the nature of the problem should be explicitly considered in the design of innovation tournaments. We explore the implications of our findings for the theory and practice of innovation contests. This paper was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations management.