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Around 7:22 PM on November 8, the night of the 2016 presidential election, a member of Republican candidate Donald Trump's campaign team told CNN reporter Jim Acosta: It will take a miracle for them to win. The Trump campaign was not alone in this view. Most political observers also expected a win by Trump's Democratic rival, former secretary of state Hillary Clinton. The Clinton campaign staff certainly did: They were \"all smiles\" at 5 PM, when a Boston Globe reporter arrived at the scene of their anticipated victory party. There is, then, no simple way to interpret the election outcome. Of course, Trump was the clear victor given the rules of US presidential elections. But he also received many fewer popular votes than Clinton. Any explanation must be able to account for both of these facts. Their analysis highlights three key factors -- two that involved the broader social, economic, and political conditions that the candidates faced, and one that resulted from choices made during the campaign itself.

Face-to-face diplomacy is an important feature of international relations. But when and why do high-level diplomatic interactions occur? We examine different theoretical perspectives using a new dataset of diplomatic visits by the US President and Secretary of State. We argue for assessing these visits along two dimensions. First, we posit that the degree of discretion or constraint in the diplomatic calendar falls along a spectrum. Strategic and domestic factors are at opposite extremes while diplomatic routines fall in the middle. Second, we consider the convergence in the relative influence of these sets of factors across the President's and the Secretary's calendars. We develop and test hypotheses about the determinants of visits by the President and Secretary of State across twelve presidencies from 1946 to 2010. Overall, the travels of the President and Secretary converge to serve a set of priorities that derive from a fairly stable set of national interests and from diplomatic routine. We observe that the President effectively retraces the footsteps of the Secretary more than the reverse. We find some evidence of domestic (including individual-level) influences on diplomacy, but only limited evidence that times of crisis produce distinct patterns in face-to-face encounters.

On June 9, 1995, several stories surfaced in al-Ahram , Egypt’s leading newspaper. A conversation with Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, a scientific study on the feeling of love and its chemical connections to the brain, and a meeting in Cairo between Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to discuss the prospects for peace in the Middle East were among the day’s headlines. Buried at the very back of the periodical, obituaries filled an entire page. If readers managed to reach this point in the issue, the black-and-white photographs of four compatriots likely would have caught their eye, including one image of a man wearing a cap and sunglasses. Opening with a verse of poetry, this entry’s authors, the Egyptian National Forces (al-Quwwa al-Wataniyya al-Misriyya), announced the passing of Shaykh Imam ʿIsa, “the artist of the people” ( fanān al-shaʿb ). 1

Previous scholarly investigations of the effectiveness of political lobbying are abundant but have not yet reached a consensus. This study incorporates the work of Adam Smith, Vernon Smith, and Deidre McCloskey to consider the question from a new perspective, that of humanomics, with its emphasis on the efficacy and significance of human relationships. In doing so, we test the proposition that lobbying is neither a one-time quid pro quo nor reducible to dollars and cents but most often is based on a relationship between the lobbyist and the lobbied that has developed over time. We explore the impact of a more powerful executive branch by analyzing the efforts to lobby people who are or may become governors of US states. We estimate the effect of new term limits for state legislators (adopted from 2000 to 2015) on political donations to governors, lieutenant governors, attorneys general, and secretaries of state. If, as we suspect, shorter terms of office for legislators undermine the likelihood of durable lobbyist-legislator relationships, it follows that lobbyists will shift their focus, proxied by repeat-contribution behavior, toward the executive branch. Our findings indicate that that, indeed, is what happens, offering empirical evidence that relationship-building over time is a key component of the effort to exercise political influence.

Newly available sources show how the 1993–95 debate over the best means of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unfolded inside the Clinton administration. This evidence comes from documents recently declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library, the Defense Department, and the State Department because of appeals by the author. As President Bill Clinton repeatedly remarked, the two key questions about enlargement were when and how. The sources make apparent that, during a critical decisionmaking period twenty-five years ago, supporters of a relatively swift conferral of full membership to a narrow range of countries outmaneuvered proponents of a slower, phased conferral of limited membership to a wide range of states. Pleas from Central and Eastern European leaders, missteps by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and victory by the pro-expansion Republican Party in the 1994 U.S. congressional election all helped advocates of full-membership enlargement to win. The documents also reveal the surprising impact of Ukrainian politics on this debate and the complex roles played by both Strobe Talbott, a U.S. ambassador and later deputy secretary of state, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister. Finally, the sources suggest ways in which the debate’s outcome remains significant for transatlantic and U.S.-Russian relations today.

The policy announcement in November 2018 by the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care that: ‘from today, let this be clear: tech transformation is coming’ indicates that confidence in care technologies, so apparent over the past decade in policy circles, remains unabated. This article suggests, based on evidence of significant limitations in technological solutions to care needs, that this confidence is misplaced. The focus is on remote care technologies – primarily telecare – which involve the passive or real-time monitoring of recipients, the majority of whom will be older people. These information and communication technologies (ICT) have been heralded by politicians, policy makers and industry interests alike as a solution to the challenges of demographic change and social care demand. While the research evidence suggests telecare works well for some people, in some circumstances, there are also significant complexities in its use, challenges presented to care relationships, and conflicting interpretations around its efficacy and cost-effectiveness. These critical issues have been marginalised in the mainstream discourse around telecare policy. This article explores the dissonance between this policy and the available evidence, drawing on a Multiple Streams Approach to analyse the emergence of, and continued confidence in, telecare policy based on a congruence of views across policy interests. To the extent that social care for older people is now in crisis, the article argues that the discourse around telecare represents an example of ‘silver bullet’ thinking: that is, too much focus on a single policy solution to address complex problems. Accordingly, the crisis in social care has deepened, without alternative policy proposals being available to address it. The renewed push for ICT-based solutions to this crisis in social care ought therefore to be viewed with some concern.

We introduce a dynamic dataset of all communications by state election officials (EOs) on social media during the 2022 election cycle and develop metrics to assess the effectiveness of trust-building strategies on voter confidence. We employ quantitative manual content analysis of 10,000 organic posts from 118 state EOs’ accounts on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter between September 10 and November 30, 2022, and code for the presence of variables that measure EOs’ efforts to combat misinformation and build trusted networks of communications. The measures we present here address two questions: (1) How much coordination was there among states in terms of incorporating the #TrustedInfo2022 campaign, promoted by the National Association of Secretaries of State, in their social media communications, and (2) How much of states’ social media communications explicitly signaled that EOs are trusted sources of information? We demonstrate the applicability of our data on research that evaluates the impact of trust-building campaigns on voter confidence in elections, which is grounded on theories of deliberative democracy and democratic listening.

Enterprises, be they businesses, nonprofit organizations, or organized events, need memorable names to differentiate themselves from other enterprises. In the United States, geographical panhandles have provided a distinguishing word around which to build an enterprise name that appeals to people having affection for or a connection to a particular panhandle. This essay seeks to uncover the extent of the panhandle-naming phenomenon, trace panhandle namegiving back through time, and create a corpus of panhandle-named enterprises. Data collection tools involved standard online searches; Google’s predictive searching algorithm; business and nonprofit searching tools on the websites of the states’ secretaries of state; and several subscription databases, including Newspapers.com. Florida’s panhandle has inspired, thus far, more than 2,400 panhandle-named enterprises, with Texas coming in second, at 1,600. Four other states turned up with more than two hundred each: Idaho, West Virginia, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. In total, the research yielded a from-scratch corpus of just over 6,200 panhandle-named enterprises.

The E3--France, Germany and Britain--on Thursday triggered the 2015 Iran nuclear deal's \"snapback\" mechanism, initiating a 30-day countdown to the automatic reinstatement of United Nations Security Council sanctions on Iran. The move was immediately met with strong approval from Washington. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated, \"The E3...initiated a process to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran. Snapback sanctions are a direct response to Iran's continuing defiance of its nuclear commitments. The United States supports the E3's decision and urges Iran to engage in serious diplomatic negotiations.\" French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot likewise insisted the move does not spell the \"end of diplomacy,\" but is rather a bid to force dialogue.

During the last week of January, activists who were appalled by the genocide in Gaza decided to set up an encampment outside the McLean VA home of Secretary of State Antony Blinken and his wife Evan Ryan, a White House cabinet secretary. The ask was fairly straightforward: a ceasefire in Gaza. The site, referred to by the activists as \"Kibbutz Blinken,\" consists of a few tents to accommodate those who spend the night, a tent for supplies and lots of flags and signs lining both sides of the street.