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This article examines the main causes of insecurity on the African continent by attempting to identify the structural factors. Starting from these, the study examines and proposes a series of generic EU action lines for an integrated response. The work aimed to answer the following questions: What are the structural factors of insecurity in Africa? What lines of action should the European Union adopt? Is the action in the security sector sufficient? The methodology used was the comparative analysis of similar phenomena in the three mentioned countries. Process tracing and document analysis techniques were also used to determine causality and similarities. The findings indicate that violent extremism, inter- and intra- community conflict, climate change, population growth and poor governance are exacerbating instability and fragmentation on the African continent. Moreover, armed conflicts have become internationalized due to the involvement of external actors such as Russia and China, even if their strategies are different and complementary in nature. In this context, the main axes of the European Union's response must be subordinated to diplomacy and political dialogue, support for socio-economic development and the strengthening of the security sector. These measures should be complemented by coordinating the actions of like-minded actors and articulating appropriate strategic communication actions.

India currently faces a security dilemma specifically because of the rise of China, Russia’s strategic convergence with China, and the US’s indeterminate Indo-Pacific policy stance. To overcome this dilemma, India’s shift from non-alignment to strategic autonomy poses several questions about its future strategic orientation, notably: Will India enter into a formal alliance with the USA, will India continue to engage China, will India retain close historical relations with Russia or will it more robustly pursue its ‘Act East’ policy? This article attempts a critical analysis of the different strategic options available to India and argues that while entering into a quasi-alliance with the USA, it will retain its strategic autonomy. India could simultaneously retain relations with Russia, China and the ASEAN. However, to the extent possible, its tendency will be to support a multipolar-Asia paradigm rather than a zero-sum alliance system to play a leading role in international fora.

Once again, the world is polarizing along ideological lines and this time India can neither stand aside nor stand alone. In the face of China’s mounting provocations and patent military superiority, Narendra Modi knows that India has no choice but to seek security through Sino-resistant channels like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad), in league with America, Japan, and Australia. It is no accident that India’s most dependable allies are liberal democracies. This puts Modi in a stupendous ideological bind. The Davos globalism he has courted in the past was so economistic that his domestic repression was all but ignored. Now, however, he is playing in a liberal international league where his style of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) autocracy will not be condoned. His fate as well as India’s hinges on how he navigates a post-globalist geopolitics that is presently defined by the moral realism of the Biden Doctrine. Una vez más, el mundo se está polarizando en líneas ideológicas y esta vez la India no puede quedarse al margen ni estar sola. Frente a las crecientes provocaciones y la superioridad militar patente de China, Narendra Modi sabe que India no tiene más remedio que buscar la seguridad a través de canales resistentes a China como el Diálogo de Seguridad Cuadrilateral (o Quad), en alianza con Estados Unidos, Japón y Australia. No es casualidad que los aliados más confiables de la India sean las democracias liberales. Esto pone a Modi en un estupendo aprieto ideológico. El globalismo de Davos al que ha cortejado en el pasado era tan economicista que su represión interna fue casi ignorada. Ahora, sin embargo, está jugando en una liga internacional liberal donde su estilo de autocracia del Partido Bharatiya Janata (BJP) no será tolerado. Su destino, así como el de la India, depende de cómo navegue por una geopolítica posglobalista que actualmente está definida por el realismo moral de la Doctrina Biden. 世界再次出现意识形态极化现象，这一次，印度既不袖手旁观也不独自 行动。面临中国逐渐增加的挑衅和明显的军事优越，纳伦德拉·莫迪明白 印度已别无他法，只能通过例如与美国、日本和澳洲结盟的四边安全对 话（Quad）等制衡中国的机制寻求安全。印度最可靠的盟友是自由民主 国家，这并非偶然。这将莫迪置于巨大的意识形态困境中。他过去所追 求的达沃斯全球主义（Davos globalism）过度追求经济，以至于他在印度 实行的国内压制（domestic repression）几乎被忽视。不过，他目前是 Quad这一自由国际联盟的一员，后者不会容忍其印度人民党（BJP）的 专制风格。他和印度的未来将取决于他如何应对后全球主义地缘政治， 目前该地缘政治由拜登主义的道德现实主义所定义。

The term regional security dialogue brings to mind state-organised conferences and events; however, an under-appreciated subset of such dialogues are organised by non-state actors that have unique formal aspects. These quasi-formal dialogues operate alongside, and sometimes in competition to, state-sanctioned processes. Why do some of these forums appear to be more effective at fostering regional dialogue than strictly formal or informal processes with the same goals? Drawing from heterogenous discourse approaches, we address this question by identifying and expanding the concept of the quality of discursive space, as a key feature for the success of security dialogues. We then apply this concept to two of the most successful so-called Track 1.5 security dialogues: the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Europe and the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in Asia. We analyse these cases using a mix of interviews with participants and organisers, participant observation, and public outputs with the aim of improving the understanding of the role and impact of Track 1.5 diplomacy in the practice of international security. Our findings highlight that it is what we call the quality of discursive space, as a mix of different components in this space, which differentiates effective dialogues from mere policy ‘talk shops’.

PurposeThe eruption of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has pointedly subdued global economic growth and producing significant impact on environment. As a medicine or a treatment is yet available at mass level, social distancing and lockdown is expected the key way to avert it. Some outcome advocates that lockdown strategies considered to reduce air pollution by curtailing the carbon emission. Current investigation strives to affirm the impact of lockdown and social distancing policy due to covid-19 outbreak on environmental pollution in the QUAD nations.Design/methodology/approachTo calibrate the social movement of public, six indicators such residential mobility, transit mobility, workplace mobility, grocery and pharmacy mobility, retail and recreation mobility and park mobility have been deliberated. The data of human mobility have been gathered from the Google mobility database. To achieve the relevant objectives, current pragmatic analysis exerts a panel autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL)-based framework using the pooled mean-group (PMG) estimator, proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1999), Pesaran and Smith (1995).FindingsThe outcome reveals that in the long-run public mobility change significantly impact the pollutants such as PM2.5 and nitrogen dioxide; however, it does not lead to any changes on ozone level. As per as short run outcome is concerned, the consequence unearths country wise heterogeneous impact of different indicators of public mobility on the air pollution.Research limitations/implicationsThe ultimate inferences of the above findings have been made merely on the basis of examination of QUAD economies; however, comprehensive studies can be performed by considering modern economies simultaneously. Additionally, finding could be constraint in terms of data; for instance, Google data used may not suitably signify real public mobility changes.Originality/valueA considerable amount of investigation explores the impact of covid-19 on environmental consequences by taking carbon emission as a relevant indicator of environmental pollution. Hence, the present pragmatic investigation attempts to advance the present discernment of the above subject in two inventive ways. Primarily, by investigating other components of environmental pollution such as nitrogen dioxide, PM2.5 and ozone, to reveal the impact of covid-19 outbreak on environmental pollution, as disregarded by the all preceding studies. Additionally, it makes a methodological contribution before integrating supplementary variables accompanying with ecological air pollution. Finally, the current research article provides an alternative and creative approach of modeling the impact of public mobility on environmental sustainability.

Over the past several decades, India and Vietnam have consolidated their relationship through bilateral engagements, which have been complemented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led multilateral mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the India-led Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC). Building up on their traditionally strong relations, India and Vietnam have widened and deepened their defence and strategic links in recent years, which is manifested in joint trainings, military exercises and defence Lines of Credit offered by India. Since the 1990s, especially over the last decade, both India and Vietnam have made strategic readjustments to elevate their respective bilateral ties with like-minded countries bringing about new commonalities in their politico-strategic visions and policies. Like India, Vietnam too is trying to bring the multilateral and multidimensional Indo-Pacific agenda to the mainstream of its foreign policy calculations, facilitated by greater warmth in ties with Japan and the US. Vietnam’s embracing of the Indo-Pacific is also in sync with ASEAN’s Outlook on Indo-Pacific. It also aligns well with Vietnam’s long-standing policy of ‘Three Nos’, expanded to four in its 2019 Defence White Paper. While recent developments in the South China Sea have exacerbated Vietnam’s growing anxieties vis-à-vis China, considering its trade interlinkages and dependence on China (and Russia), it is apparent that Vietnam is not yet ready to uproot its multilayered linkages with China and get on board the ‘Quad Plus’initiative that is perceived as an overtly anti-China coalition of democracies. India–Vietnam ties, therefore, must rely on the bilateral plank along with ASEAN-linked mechanisms, MGC and the Indo-Pacific construct while trying to develop concerted actions through deeper cooperation with Japan and the US. In short, any initiative to include Vietnam in a Quad Plus mechanism without sufficiently developing synergies with individual countries would not yield desired outcomes. This article argues that India–Vietnam ties would benefit most by attaching their bilateral pillar of relationship with the ASEAN- and Indo-Pacificcentred inclusive multilateral mechanisms while gradually engaging the US, Japan and other potential partners in suitable frameworks.

Once again, the world is polarizing along ideological lines and this time India can neither stand aside nor stand alone. In the face of China's mounting provocations and patent military superiority, Narendra Modi knows that India has no choice but to seek security through Sino‐resistant channels like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad), in league with America, Japan, and Australia. It is no accident that India's most dependable allies are liberal democracies. This puts Modi in a stupendous ideological bind. The Davos globalism he has courted in the past was so economistic that his domestic repression was all but ignored. Now, however, he is playing in a liberal international league where his style of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) autocracy will not be condoned. His fate as well as India's hinges on how he navigates a post‐globalist geopolitics that is presently defined by the moral realism of the Biden Doctrine. LA CREACIÓN DEL REALISMO CUÁDRUPLE: LA “IDEA DE LA INDIA” SE ENCUENTRA CON LA DOCTRINA BIDEN Una vez más, el mundo se está polarizando en líneas ideológicas y esta vez la India no puede quedarse al margen ni estar sola. Frente a las crecientes provocaciones y la superioridad militar patente de China, Narendra Modi sabe que India no tiene más remedio que buscar la seguridad a través de canales resistentes a China como el Diálogo de Seguridad Cuadrilateral (o Quad), en alianza con Estados Unidos, Japón y Australia. No es casualidad que los aliados más confiables de la India sean las democracias liberales. Esto pone a Modi en un estupendo aprieto ideológico. El globalismo de Davos al que ha cortejado en el pasado era tan economicista que su represión interna fue casi ignorada. Ahora, sin embargo, está jugando en una liga internacional liberal donde su estilo de autocracia del Partido Bharatiya Janata (BJP) no será tolerado. Su destino, así como el de la India, depende de cómo navegue por una geopolítica posglobalista que actualmente está definida por el realismo moral de la Doctrina Biden. 四边安全对话‐现实主义的缔造: “印度思想”遇见拜登主义 世界再次出现意识形态极化现象，这一次，印度既不袖手旁观也不独自行动。面临中国逐渐增加的挑衅和明显的军事优越，纳伦德拉·莫迪明白印度已别无他法，只能通过例如与美国、日本和澳洲结盟的四边安全对话（Quad）等制衡中国的机制寻求安全。印度最可靠的盟友是自由民主国家，这并非偶然。这将莫迪置于巨大的意识形态困境中。他过去所追求的达沃斯全球主义（Davos globalism）过度追求经济，以至于他在印度实行的国内压制（domestic repression）几乎被忽视。不过，他目前是Quad这一自由国际联盟的一员，后者不会容忍其印度人民党（BJP）的专制风格。他和印度的未来将取决于他如何应对后全球主义地缘政治，目前该地缘政治由拜登主义的道德现实主义所定义。

Japan's Security Relations with China since 1989 raises the crucial question of whether Japan's political leadership which is still preoccupied with finding a new political constellation and with overcoming a deep economic crisis is able to handle such a complex policy in the face of an increasingly assertive China and a US alliance partner with strong swings between engaging and containing China's power. This study of the highly topical bilateral relationship will be of great interest to students and researchers in Japanese and Chinese Studies, Politics, International Relations and Security Studies.