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"Selling Computer programs."
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SAP Sales Cloud : sales force automation with SAP C/4HANA
\"Looking for the tools to boost your sales sky high? With this comprehensive guide, you'll learn to implement, configure, and use SAP Sales Cloud. Create leads, process opportunities, and explore partner channel management. Then integrate the solution with your ERP system to handle quotations and orders. Finally, migrate and replicate your existing sales data and personalize and extend SAP Sales Cloud\"-- Provided by publisher.
Customer obsessed : a whole company approach to delivering exceptional customer experiences
\"Whether or not you use Salesforce, this book will provide you with a strategic framework to drive business transformation for your organization and your customers, and give an understanding of how cloud technology influences, and is influenced by, current trends and developments in design, analytics, and customer and employee culture\"-- Provided by publisher.
Selling Information Security to the Board
2016,2010
Information technology plays a fundamental role in the operations of any modern business. While the confidentiality and integrity of your organisation's information have to be protected, a business still needs to have this information readily available in order to be able to function from day to day. If you are an information security practitioner, you need to be able to sell complex and often technical solutions to boards and management teams.
Persuading the board to invest in information security measures requires sales skills. As an information security professional, you are a scientific and technical specialist; and yet you need to get your message across to people whose primary interests lie elsewhere, in turnover and overall performance. In other words, you need to develop sales and marketing skills.
This pocket guide will help you with the essential sales skills that persuade company directors to commit money and resources to your information security initiatives.
How this book can help information security professionals:
Understand basic sales techniquesFind out what to do to capture the attention of management and win them over
Understand how to present yourselfPresent yourself so that management takes you seriously, and ensure your proposal receives a proper hearing.
Find out how to earn management's trustThis guide shows you how to persuade management that you are the kind of information security professional who is interested in supporting, rather than impeding, business success.
Learn how to craft a successful proposalThis guide offers you invaluable tips on how to write a proposal that will communicate your ideas effectively to senior executives.
Improve your powers of persuasion with the board ... Buy this pocket guide today!
About the author
Alan Calder is the CEO and founder of IT Governance Ltd. He has written widely on IT governance and information security management. This pocket guide is the first in a suite of products to focus on the important subject of making sure you can convince management of information security's importance. A book, a podcast, and more will follow shortly.
Authors:Alan Calder
Customer Obsessed
2016
\"Whether or not you use Salesforce, this book will provide you with a strategic framework to drive business transformation for your organization and your customers, and give an understanding of how cloud technology influences, and is influenced by, current trends and developments in design, analytics, and customer and employee culture\"--
Group Buying: A New Mechanism for Selling Through Social Interactions
by
Jing, Xiaoqing
,
Xie, Jinhong
in
Applied sciences
,
Computer science; control theory; systems
,
Computer systems and distributed systems. User interface
2011
This paper examines a unique selling strategy, Group Buying, under which consumers enjoy a discounted group price if they are willing and able to achieve a required group size and coordinate their transaction time. We argue that Group Buying allows a seller to gain from facilitating consumer social interaction, i.e., using a group discount to motivate informed customers to work as \"sales agents\" to acquire less-informed customers through interpersonal information/knowledge sharing. We formally model such an information-sharing effect and examine if and when Group Buying is more profitable than (1) traditional individual-selling strategies, and (2) another popular social interaction scheme, Referral Rewards programs. We show that Group Buying dominates traditional individual-selling strategies when the information/knowledge gap between expert and novice consumers is neither too high nor too low (e.g., for products in the midstage of their life cycle) and when interpersonal information sharing is very efficient (e.g., in cultures that emphasize trust and group conformity, or when implemented through existing online social networks). We also show that, unlike Referral Rewards programs, Group Buying requires information sharing before any transaction takes place, thereby increasing the scale of social interaction but also incurring a higher cost. As a result, Group Buying is optimal when interpersonal communication is very efficient or when the product valuation of the less-informed consumer segment is high.
This paper was accepted by Preyas Desai, marketing.
Journal Article
Logistics Service Selection Strategy of Green Manufacturers in Green Low-Carbon Supply Chain
2023
In order to analyze the logistics service mode and sales mode selection strategy, a green low-carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single e-commerce platform is considered. First, in the green low-carbon supply chain which consists of a direct selling channel and reselling channel, the selection strategy of the manufacturer’s logistics service mode is analyzed. Second, in the green low-carbon supply chain which consists of a direct selling channel and an agency channel, the selection strategy of the manufacturer’s logistics service mode is analyzed. Last, the manufacturer’s sales mode is analyzed. We use the backward induction method to solve the theoretical model. This study contributes to the literature by considering the optimal decision of a green low-carbon supply chain. This study brings together the literature from streams on the selling channel selection strategy in green supply chains and the logistics service strategy in green supply chains. The impacts of the logistics service cost, the selling cost, and the green input cost coefficient on the optimal decision and the firms’ profit are discussed. The result shows that in the direct selling channel and reselling channel, when the basic market demand and the logistics service level of the third-party logistics service provider are low, manufacturers will choose the e-commerce platform logistics service; in the opposite case, manufacturers will choose the third-party logistics service. In the direct selling channel and agency channels, when the logistics service level of the third-party logistics service provider is greater than or equal to a certain critical value and less than or equal to the logistics service level of the e-commerce platform, manufacturers will choose the e-commerce platform logistics service; in the opposite case, manufacturers will choose the third-party logistics service. No matter whether the manufacturer chooses the logistics service provided by the third-party logistics service provider or the logistics service provided by the e-commerce platform, the manufacturer should choose the direct selling channel and the agency channel.
Journal Article
How Do Consumer Fairness Concerns Affect an E-Commerce Platform’s Choice of Selling Scheme?
2022
Considering consumer fairness concerns, this paper investigates an e-commerce platform’s selling scheme choice when it adopts a wholesale selling scheme or an agency selling scheme to create a contract with a manufacturer. We find that the intensity of the fairness concerns and the platform fee are key factors affecting the platform’s optimal selling scheme choice. Specifically, when these two factors are relatively high or low, the wholesale selling scheme outperforms the agency selling scheme in terms of the e-commerce platform’s profit. Otherwise, the e-commerce platform should adopt the agency selling scheme. Moreover, when these two factors are sufficiently large or small, the wholesale selling scheme will yield a win-win result for the players of the e-commerce supply chain. Interestingly, we find that, considering fairness-minded consumers, a larger platform fee may be harmful to the platform. We also extend the baseline model to consider the consumer heterogeneity of fairness concerns, proportional platform fee, fairness concern about the manufacturer’s profit, and endogenous platform fee. We find that the main insights remain qualitatively unchanged under these model extensions.
Journal Article
Balancing E-Commerce Platform and Manufacturer Goals in Sustainable Supply Chains: The Impact of Eco-Friendly Private Labels
by
Liu, Zhiheng
,
Cui, Xiangcheng
,
Ji, Yuanyuan
in
agency selling
,
Competition
,
Computer programs
2025
This paper analyzes how consumer preferences for eco-friendly private labels affect platform selling formats and manufacturer channel strategies. We construct a game-theoretic model that encompasses both an e-commerce platform and a manufacturer. In this model, the platform chooses its selling format—either wholesale or agency—while the manufacturer determines whether to launch an online direct channel. Our analysis takes into account consumer preferences for both product brands and sales channels. We compare and analyze the equilibrium outcomes across four different scenarios, leading to the following conclusions: (1) When the platform utilizes the wholesale selling format, the manufacturer is consistently motivated to launch the direct channel if the costs associated with it are low. Conversely, when the platform employs the agency selling format, the manufacturer’s decision to establish an online direct marketing channel depends on the relative strength of consumers’ eco-friendly and channel preferences. (2) The platform’s choice of selling format is affected by the manufacturer’s channel strategy, leading the platform to modify its selling format based on varying manufacturer channel approaches. (3) The choices of the platform’s selling format and the manufacturer’s channel strategy are not always in conflict. When consumer preferences for the manufacturer’s direct channel are strong and the cost of introducing it is moderate, the platform’s decision to adopt the agency selling format can create a win-win outcome for both the platform and the manufacturer. And the establishment of online channels by manufacturers further enhances the sustainable growth of eco-friendly products.
Journal Article
Group buying and consumer referral on a social network
2020
This paper examines a unique selling strategy, group buying on a social E-commerce platform. We proposed a framework on how to design a group buying strategy in the presence of different social network attributes (different structures, different referral costs, and different network externalities) to examine the following questions: (1) How will the group buying threshold depend on consumer referrals under social networks attributes? (2) What determines the optimal group buying threshold and the group buying price in different social networks attributes? (3) What is the efficiency of group buying with threshold compared to the traditional group buying without referrals and referral reward program? We show that the threshold causes an induction effect, but this induction effect is meaningless when the externality is considerably greater than the referral cost. Moreover, we also show that higher referral costs and prices result in a larger threshold when referral cost and externality have approximate impact on the utility of the focal consumer. We also find that the firm cannot set a low price of group buying even when the referral cost is much higher than the network externality. Finally, we present a sufficient condition that a group buying strategy is better than a referral reward strategy.
Journal Article