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The scholarly literature on the eviction legal system has repeatedly concluded that eviction courts are courts of mass settlement. In court hallways, landlords' attorneys pressure unrepresented tenants into signing settlement agreements in a factory-like process, and judges approve the agreements with a perfunctory rubber stamp. Yet while we know most eviction cases settle, no one has asked, much less answered, the salient follow-up question: What are the terms of the settlements? Based on a representative sample of eviction cases in one jurisdiction, this article is the first to answer that question and, in doing so, generates a novel theory about the eviction legal system. The article demonstrates empirically that the substantial majority of eviction settlements in the study jurisdiction contain a distinct set of interlocking terms that amount to what the article labels \"civil probation.\" Civil probation is the civil analogue in the eviction context to probation in the criminal context. Specifically, it is the imposition of court-ordered conditions on a person's tenancy that, if violated, can result in swift eviction through an alternative legal process. This article is the first to identify and conceptualize the phenomenon of civil probation in the eviction legal system. The article empirically documents the prevalence and features of civil probation in eviction proceedings in the study jurisdiction. The article then advocates for a new understanding of the eviction legal system as a whole through an analysis of civil probation's consequences. These consequences are threefold. First, civil probation gives rise to a shadow legal system by establishing procedural and substantive rules for eviction that differ substantially from those established by statutory law. The data demonstrate that tenants are subject to these rules at a widespread, pervasive level, and that the rules underlie the vast majority of eviction orders issued by judges. This shadow legal system undermines the rule of law, erodes substantive rights, and threatens public regulatory enforcement. Second, civil probation results in the expansion of landlord control. It both increases the number of tenancy terms with which tenants must comply and strengthens landlords' tool for enforcing those terms. The article argues that the expansion of landlord control is a primary outcome of the eviction legal system. And third, civil probation raises the possibility that a phenomenon of \"net-widening\" of the eviction legal system is occurring, akin to the phenomenon that scholars have documented in the context of criminal probation. The article offers recommendations for reform based on these conclusions.

This Note presents a novel defense of the Attorney General's authority to settle litigation against the United States and, in the process, make policy commitments. After canvassing the existing law and critiques of the settlement authority, the Note argues that the constitutional separation of powers does not forbid entering into policymaking settlements. The Note then proposes (1) new doctrine to make these settlements more consistent with administrative law norms, and (2) institutional norms and statutory changes that would improve the administration of settlement agreements.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 transformed environmental law by imposing joint and several strict liability on those who contaminate the environment, referred to as potentially responsible parties (PRPs). Under the auspices of CERCLA, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has overseen cleanup at thousands of sites, protecting public health and natural resources and returning land to productive use. But thousands more sites require attention. The best opportunity for the continued success of CERCLA lies in the EPA's ability to convince PRPs to enter settlements and agree to fund cleanups. CERCLA encourages settlement by protecting settling parties from contribution claims brought by other PRPs. Recent doctrinal developments, however, threaten to substantially undermine that incentive because now some PRPs—typically the least cooperative—may bring \"cost recovery\" actions, which appear to evade the protection against contribution claims. This Article exposes this appearance as an illusion. Courts have long recognized that common law principles govern cost recovery claims. Where the government sues on behalf of the public, those principles render PRPs jointly and severally liable. But the common law treats claims brought by joint tortfeasors—like PRPs—differently. Such claims are quintessential contribution claims, and they are therefore barred. Few courts or commentators have addressed the nature of PRP cost recovery claims. Yet this issue requires urgent attention to ensure that the EPA's CERCLA program remains viable in the current political reality. This Article analyzes common law principles, statutory language, and case law and identifies a path forward. Recognizing that PRP cost recovery claims are contribution claims reinvigorates CERCLA's settlement incentives while ensuring that each statutory provision retains importance and meaning.

Hatfield's legal victory in the Probate Division of Washington County Circuit Court involves complex issues that are also being litigated in U.S. District Court in Fayetteville. The attorneys wrote in a Dec. 28 motion that Arnold's conduct in the case showed that he \"holds a demonstrable bias\" against Noe Jesus Mancia Polanco, the appointed representative and special administrator of Valle's estate, certain family members and Pirani and Kherkher. \"Because no fair, impartial, and unbiased judge could reasonably reach such an outlandish decision, and certainly not in the manner in which this Court did, such outrageous conduct alone constitutes, at a minimum, an objective 'appearance of unfairness' mandating recusal,\" they wrote. U.S. District Court Judge P.K. Holmes III wrote in his Jan. 10 order that he has to determine how the probate case rulings impact the federal case.

Securities class actions are supposed to vindicate the rights of investors injured by corporate fraud. Yet, despite multimillion- or even multibillion-dollar settlements, many injured investors never receive a dime in compensation. To receive money from a settlement in a securities class action, investors must comply with a cumbersome claims process, documenting their transactions in the defendant corporation's stock and detailing their losses. Faced with this hurdle, many investors never claim their shares of the settlement funds. Courts continue to insist that investors comply with cumbersome claims processes because they do not think they have another way to accurately identify class members. Companies do not know who purchased their shares during the class period, nor has there been a global database that tracks securities purchases down to the level of individual shareholders. As a result, the only way to identify injured investors has been to require them to identify themselves, typically by filing a claim and documenting their transactions.