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11 result(s) for "Single Resolution Board."
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Complexity in the EU’s Resolution Mechanism: An Expanding but Unavoidable Phenomenon?
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which has been in operation since 2016, is particularly complex. It is headed by a ‘specific’ agency, the Single Resolution Board (SRB), but national authorities as well as national legal frameworks continue to play a decisive role in its operation. The Meroni doctrine also sets limitations on the extent to which (discretionary) powers may be delegated to the SRB. For this reason, very complex mechanisms had to be devised to guarantee that the European Commission and the Council would be sufficiently involved. Also, the SRM only applies to Banking Union Member States (i.e., euro area Member States and states in close cooperation). The co-existence of the Internal Market/EU27 on the one hand and the Banking Union on the other is a further source of complexity, as is the fact that the SRM partially relies on international law (the Single Resolution Fund and perhaps the European Stability Mechanism in the future). In short, the complexities within the SRM are many, and this article sheds light on them by considering complexities of a procedural, institutional and legal nature. It concludes by demonstrating that complexity has increased over time, yet it is probably unavoidable at this stage of European integration. However, efforts could still be made to simplify the applicable legal framework.
Liability of Financial Supervisors and Resolution Authorities: Perspectives from Comparative and European Union Law
This article offers a thorough comparative law overview, analysis and discussion of the liability regimes which apply to financial supervisors and resolution authorities at the level of selected individual EU Member States and in major jurisdictions worldwide. There is a growing tendency to limit their liability in one way or another. The extent to which they are protected against liability claims, and the exact shape that this takes, is, however, not uniform across the jurisdictions studied. At the same time, a counter-movement is emerging, as limitations of liability are by no means undisputed and are under attack on various grounds. The large variety of approaches to liability of financial supervisors and resolution authorities is especially a concern within the European Banking Union (EBU). The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Single Resolution Board (SRB) collaborate closely with the National Competent Authorities (NCAs) and the National Resolution Authorities (NRAs) within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), respectively, so liability questions will often be intertwined. Yet, the applicable liability standards often differ, and different courts will have jurisdiction. In the view of the authors it would be preferable to adopt a uniform liability standard for the ECB/SRB and the NCAs/ NRAs. In line with this, the authors would be in favour of including a provision in the SSM Regulation/SRM Regulation to the effect that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the liability of both the ECB/SRB and the NCAs/NRAs.
State aid after the Banking Union: serious disturbance and public interest
An objective of the European Union’s Banking Union is to prevent Member States from having to subsidise banks. The Single Resolution Mechanism may have limited but has not eliminated state aid to banks. This is shown by the relevant statistics, the number of positive Commission decisions and the provisions of the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. State aid is allowed in three situations: when a bank is resolved, when it is liquidated and when it is solvent but needs temporary liquidity or more capital. This article identifies a difference between the European Commission and the Single Resolution Board in the interpretation of the concept of “public interest”. The article further argues that this difference may not contradict the objectives of the Banking Union if state aid is still necessary to prevent damage to regional economies.
THE TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF BANK RESOLUTION AND THE TREATMENT OF NATIONAL REGULATORY VARIATION IN THE EU
The transnational governance of bank resolution must be well-designed to provide credible solutions to financial crisis management. While at policy level, there is a broad consensus on best practice, the implementation stage often leaves something to be desired. Focusing on the implementation of the relevant Financial Stability Board (FSB) recommendations in the EU, this article explores this issue and proposes certain reforms. It argues for closer EU control and scrutiny over national decision-making without, however advocating a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Its main insight is that the promotion of transnational convergence need not come at the expense of the distinctive attentiveness of EU law to local conditions nor indeed involve a massive shake-up of the existing EU architecture. Its aim is to contribute to scholarly and public policy debates in this field in anticipation of the EU response to the final conclusions of the post-implementation evaluation of the FSB recommendations, which is currently in progress.
ECB Decision-making Within the Banking and Monetary Union: The Principle of Confidentiality on Its Way Out?
Art. 15 TFEU requires EU institutions to work as transparently as possible. Within the framework of that provision, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been able to benefit from a more lenient transparency regime, in which confidential decision-making takes centre stage in relation to monetary policy and prudential supervision. Somewhat contradictorily, other key actors within the banking and monetary Union (national banking supervisory authorities, the Single Resolution Board and the Eurogroup) do not share the ECB's preference for confidential decision-making. This Article compares those different transparency approaches and questions whether the lack of coherence between them can still be maintained within the current EU constitutional law framework. In that regard, it submits that maintaining confidentiality at least in the field of prudential supervision is difficult to square with the spirit of art. 15 TFEU. In addition, the German Federal Constitutional Court judgment in Weiss has a profound impact on the maintenance of confidential decision-making in the context of monetary policymaking as well. It follows from those observations that the era of confidential decision-making, although not over yet, is at least likely to erode gradually towards more transparency at the ECB.
De/centralized Decision Making Under the European Resolution Framework: Does Meroni Hamper the Creation of a European Resolution Authority?
The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) shifts the focus from reacting in the face of a crisis, to planning and preparing to avoid uncoordinated, ad hoc measures and aims to ensure banks resolvability; it strengthens and harmonizes early intervention measures and gives supervisors new tools and powers for managing failing banks while continuing part of their business, i.e. critical functions. The BRRD was conceived out of a need to reduce public funds being used to bail out banks considered ‘too big to fail’ and strengthen cooperation and coordination between Member States. The first part of this paper sets out how key resolution decisions, including during recovery and resolution planning, are taken for cross-border banking groups within the EU, and within the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) of the euro area. It also considers the impact of the BRRD on cooperation with third countries (small host countries). The second part of the paper offers a legal analysis of why no autonomous centralized decision-making powers were delegated to the Single Resolution Board (SRB). It considers whether legal judgements made in 1956 and enshrined as the ‘Meroni doctrine’ actually prohibit delegation of fully autonomous resolution powers to the SRB and more broadly prevent the creation of a centralized resolution agency for the whole EU.
Evaluating Factors Shaping Real-Time Internet-of-Things-Based License Plate Recognition Using Single-Board Computer Technology
Reliable and cost-efficient license plate recognition (LPR) systems enhance security, traffic management, and automated toll collection in real-world applications. This study addresses optimal unique configurations for enhancing LPR system accuracy and reliability by evaluating the impact of camera angle, object velocity, and distance on the efficacy of real-time LPR systems. The Internet of Things (IoT) LPR framework is proposed and utilized on single-board computer (SBC) technology, such as the Raspberry Pi 4 platform, with a high-resolution webcam using advanced OpenCV and OCR–Tesseract algorithms applied. The research endeavors to simulate common deployment scenarios of the real-time LPR system and perform thorough testing by leveraging SBC computational capabilities and the webcam’s imaging capabilities. The testing process is not just comprehensive, but also meticulous, ensuring the system’s reliability in various operational settings. We performed extensive experiments with a hundred repetitions at diverse angles, velocities, and distances. An assessment of the data’s precision, recall, and F1 score indicates the accuracy with which Thai license plates are identified. The results show that camera angles close to 180° significantly reduce perspective distortion, thus enhancing precision. Lower vehicle speeds (<10 km/h) and shorter distances (<10 m) also improve recognition accuracy by reducing motion blur and improving image clarity. Images captured from shorter distances (approximately less than 10 m) are more accurate for high-resolution character recognition. This study substantially contributes to SBC technology utilizing IoT-based real-time LPR systems for practical, accurate, and cost-effective implementations.
Approaches to private participation in Water services: A toolkit
Approaches to Private Participation in Water Services is an informative toolkit that provides options for the design of policies to facilitate the delivery of good quality water and sanitation services to the poor. It highlights the need for tariffs, investment, stakeholder consultation, and regulatory policies to address the affordability and sustainability of those services. Targeted to an audience that includes government advisors as well as consultants, lawyers, and donors, the toolkit builds on previous global experience in private participation in water and sanitation supply. Developing country governments and those interested in private participation in water and sanitation supply will find this toolkit an invaluable resource.