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In Erik Mueggler's powerful and imaginative ethnography, a rural minority community in the mountains of Southwest China struggles to find its place at the end of a century of violence and at the margins of a nation-state. Here, people describe the present age, beginning with the Great Leap Famine of 1958-1960 and continuing through the 1990s, as \"the age of wild ghosts.\" Their stories of this age converge on a dream of community—a bad dream, embodied in the life, death, and reawakening of a single institution: a rotating headman-ship system that expired violently under the Maoist regime. Displaying a sensitive understanding of both Chinese and the Tibeto-Burman language spoken in this region, Mueggler explores memories of this institution, including the rituals and poetics that once surrounded it and the bitter conflicts that now haunt it.To exorcise \"wild ghosts,\" he shows, is nothing less than to imagine the state and its power, to trace the responsibility for violence to its morally ambiguous origins, and to enunciate calls for justice and articulate longings for reconciliation.

There is a widespread belief, among both political scientists and government policymakers, that \"democracies don't fight each other.\" Here Joanne Gowa challenges that belief. In a thorough, systematic critique, she shows that, while democracies were less likely than other states to engage each other in armed conflicts between 1945 and 1980, they were just as likely to do so as were other states before 1914. Thus, no reason exists to believe that a democratic peace will survive the end of the Cold War. Since U.S. foreign policy is currently directed toward promoting democracy abroad, Gowa's findings are especially timely and worrisome. Those who assert that a democratic peace exists typically examine the 1815-1980 period as a whole. In doing so, they conflate two very different historical periods: the pre-World War I and post-World War II years. Examining these periods separately, Gowa shows that a democratic peace prevailed only during the later period. Given the collapse of the Cold War world, her research calls into question both the conclusions of previous researchers and the wisdom of present U.S. foreign policy initiatives. By re-examining the arguments and data that have been used to support beliefs about a democratic peace, Joanne Gowa has produced a thought-provoking book that is sure to be controversial.

As a journalist of Uruguay’s Marcha weekly newspaper, Eduardo Galeano visited China in September 1963; he was warmly received by Chinese leaders including Premier Zhou Enlai. At first, Galeano published some experiences of his China visit in Marcha . In 1964, he published the complete journal of the trip, under the title of China, 1964: crónica de un desaf í o [“ China 1964: Chronicle of a Challenge ”]. Based on Chinese-language materials, this paper explores Galeano’s trip to China at that time and includes a close reading of Galeano’s travel notes. By analyzing his views on the New China, Socialism, and the Sino-Soviet Split, we will try to determine whether this China visit influenced his world view and cultural concepts.Como periodista del semanario uruguayo Marcha , Eduardo Galeano visitó China en septiembre de 1963 donde fue calurosamente recibido por los líderes chinos, incluido el Primer Ministro Zhou Enlai. Al principio, Galeano publicó algunas experiencias de su visita a China en Marcha . En 1964, publicó el diario completo del viaje bajo el título China, 1964: crónica de un desafío . Basado en materiales en chino, este artículo explora el viaje de Galeano e incluye una lectura detallada de sus notas. Por medio de un análisis de sus puntos de vista sobre la Nueva China, el socialismo y la ruptura sinosoviética, se intenta determinar si esta visita a China influyó en su visión del mundo y en sus conceptos culturales.

Between 1951 and 1965, the People’s Republic of China regularly exhibited at the international trade fairs in the East German city of Leipzig. One of the major attractions of the fairs, China’s grand pavilion was second in size only to the pavilion of the Soviet Union. This article examines the planning and execution of China’s exhibitions, illustrating how the young communist regime displayed its products and political system abroad and how citizens of other socialist and capitalist countries experienced China through objects, materials, images and narratives. Because the People's Republic of China was a new revolutionary state of enormous political and economic significance and yet also a state that other socialist regimes deemed too poorly developed to transition to socialism, these exhibitions were the site of constant negotiations and tension between Chinese and East German organizers and other local decision-makers and participants. As such, the People's Republic of China’s engagement with the fairs sheds further light on its international activities after 1949 and on the local history of the Sino-Soviet split. It is also a case study that calls attention to the historical significance of materiality that underpinned China’s interactions with the wider world, from minute quotidian things to grand gifts and major export goods.

Much of the Cold War took place in the Third World. The three works authored by Gregg A. Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War; Jeffry James Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order; and Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World, are reviewed here and they provide historical details. A consistent theme that emerges is the importance of ideological factors in driving the events are discussed. It is also clear that the Third World states were not passive objects of pressure from great powers but had agendas of their own. These books provide useful material for theorists of international relations and policy makers.

While historians are paying greater attention to the role of the post-colonial Third World in international affairs, there is a tendency to focus on North-South relations and the discourse of the 1955 Bandung Conference. Relying principally on Yugoslav and Algerian archival sources, this paper re-emphasises the dynamic historicity of 'Third Worldism' and the significance of 'South-South' connections. It explores the evolution of the Third World movement in the decade following Bandung, when smaller countries and non-state movements exerted greater influence while larger actors, such as India and China, quarrelled. The founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 represented a victory for smaller actors who took a more provocative and subversive approach to international relations, to the extent that NAM was a means for the weak to wage the cold war on their terms. Over the following half-decade, Non-Alignment supplanted Afro-Asianism as the primary organisational concept for the Third World, confirming that the Third World was a political project with a potentially unbounded membership rather than the expression of a non-Western, non-white identity.

Shortly after its establishment in the mid-1950s, the state-run China International Travel Service began to supplement its work hosting foreign tourists with a program of outbound tours for Chinese citizens to other socialist nations. This article examines this tourism program in the decade prior to the Cultural Revolution. I conclude that this tourist trade was part of the formation of a vision of socialist modernity and a component of the socialist world economy. Up until the late 1950s, China’s participation in tourist trade with the Soviet Union was motivated by economic concerns as much as by political ones, but China’s state tourism officials became preoccupied with the political implications of this exchange as relations between the two countries deteriorated. By the early 1960s, with the Soviet Union no longer a major economic partner and China’s vision of socialist modernity no longer a Soviet one, the rationale for this program largely evaporated.

Pondering the origins of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Professor Chen turns to the Indochinese war (1946-1954), the Vietnamese Communist movement under Ho Chi Minh (1944-1945), and even earlier to Ho's activities in the late 1930's. He examines the questions: Did the Sino-Vietnamese relationship after World War II assist or hinder the Vietminh Communists? Why was the Vietminh able to obtain Chinese military aid without inviting massive Chinese intervention, as happened in Korea? What was the Soviet position on the Indochinese war and what was it at the Geneva Conference of 1954? Is there any difference between Vietnam's relations with the weak Nationalist China in the 1940's and those with powerful Communist regime in the 1950's? Finally, Professor Chen compares the position of the United States, North Vietnam, Britain, Communist China, and the Soviet Union in 1954 and 1968. Originally published in 1969. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

A decade after the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China established their formidable alliance in 1950, escalating public disagreements between them broke the international communist movement apart. InThe Sino-Soviet Split, Lorenz Lüthi tells the story of this rupture, which became one of the defining events of the Cold War. Identifying the primary role of disputes over Marxist-Leninist ideology, Lüthi traces their devastating impact in sowing conflict between the two nations in the areas of economic development, party relations, and foreign policy. The source of this estrangement was Mao Zedong's ideological radicalization at a time when Soviet leaders, mainly Nikita Khrushchev, became committed to more pragmatic domestic and foreign policies. Using a wide array of archival and documentary sources from three continents, Lüthi presents a richly detailed account of Sino-Soviet political relations in the 1950s and 1960s. He explores how Sino-Soviet relations were linked to Chinese domestic politics and to Mao's struggles with internal political rivals. Furthermore, Lüthi argues, the Sino-Soviet split had far-reaching consequences for the socialist camp and its connections to the nonaligned movement, the global Cold War, and the Vietnam War. The Sino-Soviet Splitprovides a meticulous and cogent analysis of a major political fallout between two global powers, opening new areas of research for anyone interested in the history of international relations in the socialist world.

Purpose-The purpose of this paper is to examine the DPRK s first attempts to establish itself independently within the socialist bloc, and specifically with the Eastern European people s democracies, using the Sino-Soviet split to its own benefit. Design, Methodology, Approach-This paper is based on the recently declassified files from the former Soviet archives and from the Eastern European embassies in Pyongyang. It aims to explore and compare how North Korea used the conflict between the USSR and the PRC in attempts to lead its own policies and establish, strengthen and promote its own position with the Eastern European socialist countries. Findings-The analysis of the primary sources shows that, contrary to common perception, the DPRK in the 1960s attempted to conduct its own foreign policy toward the European fraternal countries and to pursue policies that Practical Implications-This research is helpful for understanding the DPRK's foreign diplomacy methods and position toward the socialist bloc and the SinoSoviet split in the first half of the 1960s. Originality, Value-Bringing some of the primary sources to scholarly attention for the first time, this paper provides an insight into the DPRK's diplomatic efforts in the first half of the 1960s, not simply toward the main participants in the SinoSoviet split but also toward the Eastern European socialist countries.