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The U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program has grown dramatically over the last 20 years in size and expense. This growth poses significant risks to the finances of the DI program and the broader Social Security system, and raises troubling questions as to whether the program is being misused by claimants. This article first provides an overview of the Disability Insurance program, describing who qualifies for the program, how an individual applies for benefits and how the level of benefits is determined. Next, we summarize the factors responsible for the growth in the DI rolls and discuss how the characteristics of DI recipients have changed as a result. We then explore the extent of moral hazard in the DI program and the effectiveness of the screening process in distinguishing meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. Finally, we identify the challenges that the DI program creates for Social Security finances and Social Security reform, and discuss potential reforms to the DI program.

We present the first causal estimates of the effect of Social Security Disability Insurance benefit receipt on labor supply using all program applicants. We use administrative data to match applications to disability examiners and exploit variation in examiners' allowance rates as an instrument for benefit receipt. We find that among the estimated 23 percent of applicants on the margin of program entry, employment would have been 28 percentage points higher had they not received benefits. The effect is heterogeneous, ranging from no effect for those with more severe impairments to 50 percentage points for entrants with relatively less severe impairments.

The share of working-age Americans receiving disability benefits from the federal Disability Insurance (DI) program has increased significantly in recent decades, from 2.2 percent in the late 1970s to 3.6 percent in the years immediately preceding the 2007–2009 recession and 4.6 percent in 2013. With the federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund currently projected to be depleted in 2016, Congressional action of some sort is likely to occur within the next several years. It is therefore a good time to sort out the competing explanations for the increase in disability benefit receipt and to review some of the ideas that economists have put forth for reforming US disability programs.

Household surveys, one of the main innovations in social science research of the last century, are threatened by declining accuracy due to reduced cooperation of respondents. While many indicators of survey quality have steadily declined in recent decades, the literature has largely emphasized rising nonresponse rates rather than other potentially more important dimensions to the problem. We divide the problem into rising rates of nonresponse, imputation, and measurement error, documenting the rise in each of these threats to survey quality over the past three decades. A fundamental problem in assessing biases due to these problems in surveys is the lack of a benchmark or measure of truth, leading us to focus on the accuracy of the reporting of government transfers. We provide evidence from aggregate measures of transfer reporting as well as linked microdata. We discuss the relative importance of misreporting of program receipt and conditional amounts of benefits received, as well as some of the conjectured reasons for declining cooperation and for survey errors. We end by discussing ways to reduce the impact of the problem including the increased use of administrative data and the possibilities for combining administrative and survey data.

Longitudinal administrative data show that rejected male applicants to the Disability Insurance (DI) program who are younger or have low-mortality impairments such as back pain and mental health problems exhibit substantial labor force attachment. While we confirm that employment rates of older rejected applicants are low, continued high numbers of younger and low-mortality beneficiaries have raised the potential employment of DI beneficiaries. Three findings support economic inducement to apply. Mean preapplication earnings have fallen, rejected applicants experience preapplication declines in earnings, and beneficiaries whose first applications were rejected at the DDS level but who ultimately received benefits exhibit substantial employment. JEL: H55, J14, J28, J31

In 2008, a group of uninsured low-income adults in Oregon was selected by lottery for the chance to apply for Medicaid. Using this randomized design and 2009 administrative data, we find no significant effect of Medicaid on employment or earnings. Our 95 percent confidence intervals allow us to reject that Medicaid causes a decline in employment of more than 4.4 percentage points, or an increase of more than 1.2 percentage points. Medicaid increases food stamps receipt, but has little, if any, impact on receipt of other measured government benefits, including SSDI.

The degree to which disability benefit programs provide an adequate standard of living to those with work-limiting disabilities has long been overlooked in social policy research. This paper presents a framework for assessing disability-related decommodification and then applies that framework to an analysis of the Social Security Disability (SSD) programs in the United States. The paper draws on survey data from the Health and Retirement Study linked to administrative records from the Social Security Administration, and further compares the U.S. estimates to those from 27 other countries. The results indicate that more than 50 percent of older adults of working-age with work-disabilities in the U.S. do not receive SSD benefits, though rates of benefit receipt are higher than the average across other high-income countries. Those that receive SSD benefits, moreover, experience greater difficulty achieving an adequate standard of living, as measured by an index of financial security, than those with similar characteristics in the U.S. who do not receive disability benefits. The paper thus provides a framework for future policy research on benefit adequacy, while evaluating the availability and generosity of disability benefits in the U.S.

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program, which provides income support to individuals who become unable to work because of a disability, has not been substantially reformed since the 1980s, despite sweeping changes in health, medical technology, and the functional requirements of jobs. I review how the SSDI program works, its history in terms of caseloads and reforms, and findings from the research evidence that offer lessons for the future. I then propose two interlocking reforms that would modernize the core functions of the program. The first is to improve SSDI’s process for determining whether an applicant has remaining capacity to work by replacing the outdated medical-vocational “grid” with a new system of individual work capacity measurement. Second, I propose the introduction of partial disability benefits, which would make use of the new system for measuring work capacity and allow beneficiaries to combine benefit receipt with work. Partial benefits could be paired with a generalized benefit offset to further encourage work by beneficiaries, and the Social Security Administration’s complex array of work-related rules could be eliminated.

This paper exploits the effectively random assignment of judges to Disability Insurance cases to estimate the causal impact of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply. We find that benefit receipt reduces labor force participation by 26 percentage points three years after a disability determination decision, although the reduction is smaller for older people, college graduates, and those with mental illness. OLS and instrumental variables estimates are similar. Furthermore, over 60 percent of those denied benefits by an administrative law judge are subsequently allowed benefits within ten years, showing that most applicants apply, reapply, and appeal until they get benefits.

The US Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is designed to provide income support to workers who become unable to work because of a severe, long-lasting disability. In this study, we use administrative data to estimate the effect of labor market conditions, as measured by the unemployment rate, on the number of SSDI applications, the number and composition of initial allowances and denials, and the timing of applications relative to disability onset. We analyze the period of the Great Recession, and compare this period with business cycle effects over the past two decades, from 1992 through 2012.