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We identify employees at seven companies whose 401(k) investment choices are dominated because they are contributing less than the employer matching contribution threshold despite being vested in their match and being able to make penalty-free 401(k) withdrawals for any reason because they are older than 59½. At the average firm, 36% of match-eligible employees over age 59½ forgo arbitrage profits that average 1.6% of their annual pay, or $507. A survey educating employees about the free lunch they are forgoing raised contribution rates by a statistically insignificant 0.67% of income among those completing the survey.

Does culture shape the demand for social insurance against risks to health and work? We study this issue across language groups in Switzerland where a language border sharply separates social groups at identical actual levels of publicly provided social insurance. We find substantially stronger support for expansions of social insurance among residents of French, Italian or Romansh-speaking language border municipalities compared with their German-speaking neighbours in adjacent municipalities. Informal insurance does not vary enough to explain stark differences in social insurance but differences in ideology and segmented media markets potentially contribute to the discrepancy in demand for social insurance.

This paper examines how labor market fluctuations around the time of retirement affect the labor force status and Social Security receipt of individuals ages 55 to 69 and the income of retirees in their 70s, using data from the March Current Population Survey, Census, and American Community Surveys. We find that workers are more likely to leave the labor force, to collect Social Security earlier, and to have lower Social Security income when they face a recession near retirement. The impact is greatest for the less-educated, who are more susceptible to job loss and rely more heavily on Social Security.

We analyze the insurance provided by the U.S. social security and income tax system within a model in which agents receive idiosyncratic, wage rate shocks that are privately observed. We consider two reforms: a piecemeal reform that optimally chooses the social security benefit function and a radical reform that eliminates the entire social insurance system and replaces it with an optimal tax on lifetime earnings. The radical reform outperforms the piecemeal reform and achieves nearly all of the maximum possible welfare gain when wages differ permanently over the lifetime. When wage shocks match properties in U.S. data, the piecemeal reform outperforms the radical reform.

This study uses data from pre- and post-crash surveys from the Cognitive Economics study to examine the impact of recent stock and labor market wealth losses on the planned retirement ages of older Americans. Regression estimates imply that the average wealth loss between July 2008 and May/June 2009 is associated with an increase in planned retirement age of approximately 2.5 months. Furthermore, pessimism about future stock market returns is found to amplify the impact of wealth losses on retirement timing.

We examine changes in subjective probabilities regarding retirement between the 2006 and 2008 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. Using a first-difference approach to eliminate individual heterogeneity, we find that the steep drop in asset prices in 2008 increased the reported probability of working at age 62 during the Great Recession. Increasing unemployment at least partly attenuated this effect, but subjective probabilities of working did not respond to changes in housing markets. Older workers' probabilities of working were more sensitive to fluctuations in the stock market, but less responsive to changes in labor market conditions.

Rapid population ageing has dramatically increased the social and economic cost of elderly care. As a consequence of the search for cost effectiveness/reduction we observe a convergence in how the care market is organised: all countries are moving towards home care, private provision and cash transfers. The aim of this paper is twofold. It is argued that the way in which elderly care is provided and financed may entail considerable differences in the creation of a formal care market. National employment models in turn shape the features of the care labour market, affecting both the quantity and quality of care labour supply, the extent of the care labour shortage, and the degree of dependence on migrant carers. This paper presents a comparative analysis of various European country models of elderly care to show how these two factors combine to shape the characteristics of elderly care regimes, and their differing capacity to meet increasing demand for care either by using native workers or, alternatively, by turning to immigrant workers in order to cope with labour shortages.

In the broader social science literature, most studies of social protection investigate welfare in democracies, and at the national level, and typically assume that welfare is given in order to influence voting. This paper, to the contrary, considers social assistance in authoritarian China at the urban level. Its findings are compatible with an explanation that there are two dissimilar logics influencing the distributional decisions of lower-level administrators. That is, there appear to be two modes of social policy implementation, which vary with the fiscal capacity of a given city, as indicated by its average wage: Wealthier cities seem to prefer to push off the streets those viewed as unsuited to a modern city, therefore allocating a substantial proportion of their social assistance funds to them, in order to entice them to stay at home. On the other hand, poorer places seem to permit such people to work outside, in the hope that they will thus be better able to support themselves, thereby saving the city money. A data set from China's Ministry of Civil Affairs was used.

We study unemployment insurance for workers who sequentially sample job opportunities. We focus on the optimal timing of benefits and the desirability of allowing borrowing and saving. When workers have constant absolute risk aversion, a simple policy is optimal: a constant benefit during unemployment, a constant tax during employment, and free access to a riskless asset. With constant relative risk aversion, optimal policy involves nearly constant benefits; more elaborate policies offer minuscule welfare gains. We highlight two distinct policy roles: ensuring workers have sufficient liquidity to smooth their consumption; and providing unemployment subsidies to insure against uncertain spell duration.

This paper provides evidence on the effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment and subsequent employment duration in Europe using individual data from the European Community Household Panel. Country-specific estimates based on a multivariate discrete-time duration model, which takes into account dynamic selection issues and the endogeneity of benefit receipt, suggest that although receiving benefits has an adverse effect in the sense of increasing unemployment duration, there is also a positive effect associated with the increased duration of subsequent employment. This beneficial effect of unemployment insurance on employment stability is pronounced in countries with relatively generous benefit systems, and for recipients who have remained unemployed for at least six months. These findings are in line with theories that suggest a matching effect of unemployment insurance.