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"Solipsism"
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The Limits of Computer Science. Weizsäcker’s Argument
The main purpose of this paper, which takes the form of an essay, is an attempt to answer the question of the limits of artificial intelligence (AI). In the introductory section, we present the key milestones in AI development, both historical and future projections, in which two terms – Artificial Human (AH) and Artificial ‘god’ (AG) – play a special role. In the second section, we clarify the question of the limits of AI by indicating the hypothetical goal of AI development. The third section develops the argument proposed by C. F. Weizsäcker, originally formulated for cybernetics. The conclusion of this argument is optimistic about limitations to the possibilities of cybernetic simulations. We apply this argument to AI and subject it to a critique which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of its conclusion. We base the critique on two well-known results: the theorem of the unsolvability of the halting problem and Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, and we formulate two objections interpreted without adopting Church’s thesis. In the crucial fourth section, we present a third objection in the form of a hypothesis for which we argue that AI (AH), understood as a subject, will always be solipsistic.
Journal Article
Husserl Et Heidegger de 1913 À 1931 : LA Postface de Husserl Aux Ideen III
In 1931 Husserl writes and publishes the Epilogue to his Ideas, where he aims to explain the core of his work. Aware that this is his a legacy which must be carried forward, he seeks to preserve it from what he calls “the mistaken views” found in the new ways of conducting phenomenology. Our text underlines the polemic side of Husserl’s project, which is basically but tacitly against Heidegger, and sustains that this auto-interpretive piece is a fundamental key within Husserl’s corpus, where he defines the direction of his phenomenological project. At the center of the controversy are the answers to the objections of intellectualism and solipsism, and the disavowal of all forms of anthropologism in the conception of subjectivity.
Journal Article
Collective Solipsism in Alfred Tennyson’s “The Lotos-Eaters”
Solipsism and solitude are almost the core of the Romantic poetry and experience. Many romantic poets encourage people to abandon society and have a moment of interaction between nature and the self to transcend the materialistic, industrial, and capitalist society. For example, in “Frost at Midnight.” Coleridge experiences the harsh side of nature as he spends the night in a freezing place. Also, Wordsworth’s speaker wanders lonely as a cloud as he solitarily interacts with nature. This article aims at tracing the solipsistic experience in Alfred Tennyson’s “The Lotos-Eaters.” This, of course, suggests that the Romantics influenced Tennyson to encourage such an experience. However, the major concern of this article is to show that Tennyson, in his poem, extends and complicates the solipsistic experience; that is, the individual’s solipsism in the Romantic poetry becomes a collective solipsism in Tennyson’s poetry.
Journal Article
The Invisible Racialized Minority Entrepreneur: Using White Solipsism to Explain the White Space
Few studies in the business ethics literature explore marginalized populations, such as the racially minoritized entrepreneur. This absence is an ethical issue for the business academy as it limits the advancement of racial epistemologies. This study explores how this exclusionary space emerges within the academy by identifying white solipsistic behavior, an ‘othering’ of minoritized populations. Using a multi-method approach, we find the business literature homogenizes the racially minoritized business owner regardless of race/ethnic origin and categorizes them as lacking in comparison to White entrepreneurs. A critical discourse analysis of university entrepreneurship website language and images reveals that the racially minoritized are presented as the outgroup. The language used to describe entrepreneurs was found to be predominantly agentic, building a hegemonic categorization of White men dominating entrepreneurship. Troublingly, but consistent with the literature review, when racialized minorities were present in images, we found them to be marginalized. Employing an experimental design to mock-up four websites featuring student entrepreneurs differing by race and gender, we ask ‘what if we make these under-represented entrepreneurs visible?’ Results show that women, and specifically racially minoritized women, have a greater impact on the entrepreneurial interests of university students compared to men. Overall, the results provide empirical evidence for white solipsism in the business academy. We call for self-reflexivity to transparentize the ‘invisible’ racially minoritized entrepreneur and fill the ‘white space’ by changing the framing and context of business research to be more inclusive.
Journal Article
Is Intersubjectivity Proven? A Reply to Khrennikov and to QBists
In two recent papers Khrennikov [
1
,
2
] uses what he calls Ozawa’s intersubjectivity theorem [
3
] to claim that intersubjectivity is necessarily verified in quantum mechanics and to criticize QBism and more generally all interpretations that are perspectival. In agreement with two previous QBist’s papers [
4
,
5
], I explain here why Khrennikov’s proof is not valid but in contrast with one of these papers [
5
], I criticize the way intersubjectivity is dealt with in QBism.
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All My Friends are Zombies: The Search for Consciousness
A brief introduction to the problem of other minds and knowledge of the world outside our own minds.
Journal Article
From Solipsism to the Limits of Experience: A Reflection in the Light of Wittgenstein’s TLP
In this paper, we will discuss solipsism and the limits of experience in the light of Wittgenstein’s
TLP
. One cannot draw the limits of experience without bringing in the notion of the experiencer. That is to say, the notion of self is very relevant to the discussion on the limits of experience. Solipsism means that ‘I’ is the only reality, and what I experience is all that I could know. We will focus on solipsism from two points of view, the empirical point of view and the transcendental point of view. The empirical approach to solipsism makes the self as a matter of its experience. However, from the transcendental point of view, the transcendental or metaphysical self becomes the transcendental ground of our experiences. In the second section, we will discuss the relationship between solipsism and realism. Then how the self is related to the world will be discussed in the third section. For Wittgenstein, the self ‘I' is neither causally nor logically related to the world. This self is the metaphysical subject, and it is the limit of the world. In the fourth section, we will discuss the importance of the limit-self. The limit-self is not the matter or object of experience; rather, it is the ground of our world's experience. For Wittgenstein, it is not an item of the world; rather, it is the limit of the world. The limit-self cannot be described in language, and thus it is beyond our language. It is the limit of our language and also the limit of the world. Then, we will critically analyze the limit of experience, and the metaphysical self is placed on the limit of experience. This self is the non-solipsistic self.
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Scrutinizing the foundations: could large language models be solipsistic?
In artificial intelligence literature, “delusions” are characterized as the generation of unfaithful output from reliable source content. There is an extensive literature on computer-generated delusions, ranging from visual hallucinations, like the production of nonsensical images in Computer Vision, to nonsensical text generated by (natural) language models, but this literature is predominantly taxonomic. In a recent research paper, however, a group of scientists from DeepMind successfully presented a formal treatment of an entire class of delusions in generative AI models (i.e., models based on a transformer architecture, both with and without RLHF—reinforcement learning with human feedback, such as BERT, GPT-3 or the more recent GPT-3.5), referred to as auto-suggestive delusions. Auto-suggestive delusions are not mere unfaithful output, but are self-induced by the transformer models themselves. Typically, these delusions have been subsumed under the concept of exposure bias, but exposure bias alone does not elucidate their nature. In order to address their nature, I will introduce a formal framework that clarifies the probabilistic delusions capable of explaining exposure bias in a broad manner. This will serve as the foundation for exploring auto-suggestive delusions in language models. Next, an examination of self- or auto-suggestive delusions will be undertaken, by drawing an analogy with the rule-following problematic from the philosophy of mind and language. Finally, I will argue that this comprehensive approach leads to the suggestion that transformers, large language models in particular, may develop in a manner that touches upon solipsism and the emergence of a private language, in a weak sense.
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