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The Terror Management Theory (TMT) offered a great deal of generative hypotheses that have been tested in a plethora of studies. However, there is a still substantive lack of clarity about the interpretation of TMT-driven effects and their underlying neurological mechanisms. Here, we aimed to expand upon previous research by introducing two novel methodological manipulations aimed to enhance the effects of mortality salience (MS). We presented participants with the idea of the participants’ romantic partner’s death as well as increased the perceived threat of somatosensory stimuli. Linear mixed modelling disclosed the greater effects of MS directed at one’s romantic partner on pain perception (as opposed to the participant’s own mortality). The theta event-related oscillatory activity measured at the vertex of the scalp was significantly lower compared to the control condition. We suggest that MS aimed at one’s romantic partner can result in increased effects on perceptual experience; however, the underlying neural activities are not reflected by a classical measure of cortical arousal.

Emotions are often felt in the body, and somatosensory feedback has been proposed to trigger conscious emotional experiences. Here we reveal maps of bodily sensations associated with different emotions using a unique topographical self-report method. In five experiments, participants (n = 701) were shown two silhouettes of bodies alongside emotional words, stories, movies, or facial expressions. They were asked to color the bodily regions whose activity they felt increasing or decreasing while viewing each stimulus. Different emotions were consistently associated with statistically separable bodily sensation maps across experiments. These maps were concordant across West European and East Asian samples. Statistical classifiers distinguished emotion-specific activation maps accurately, confirming independence of topographies across emotions. We propose that emotions are represented in the somatosensory system as culturally universal categorical somatotopic maps. Perception of these emotion-triggered bodily changes may play a key role in generating consciously felt emotions.

Cognitive science-based enactive theories of perception afford surprising insight onto a less examined component of perceptual experience: perceptual entrainment through the embodied encounter with tools. My analysis of the body/tool/perception nexus in Neal Stephenson's Snow Crash (1992) introduces the concept of perceptual entrainment in two steps: first I explain Alva Noë's claim that perception is virtual—that it takes place as an active process of environmental investigation rather than through computer-processing-like brain activity. I then take Noë's approach to perception a step further by examining how tool use directs and amplifies our perceptual focus. I argue that in Snow Crash, tools contain within them ideologies of repression that emerge precisely at the “technological interface,” moments when characters in the novel engage with tools that interpellate them, enable them to wield power, or blur the boundaries between control and abjection. This article analyzes the novel's computational anxiety—the fear of loss of self identity via an informational/mathematical determinism mapped by the tool that entrains our perception.

Whether seeing a movie, listening to a song, or feeling a breeze on the skin, we coherently experience these stimuli as continuous, seamless percepts. However, there are rare perceptual phenomena that argue against continuous perception but, instead, suggest discrete processing of sensory input. Empirical evidence supporting such a discrete mechanism, however, remains scarce and comes entirely from the visual domain. Here, we demonstrate compelling evidence for discrete perceptual sampling in the somatosensory domain. Using magnetoencephalography (MEG) and a tactile temporal discrimination task in humans, we find that oscillatory alphaand low beta-band (8–20 Hz) cycles in primary somatosensory cortex represent neurophysiological correlates of discrete perceptual cycles. Our results agree with several theoretical concepts of discrete perceptual sampling and empirical evidence of perceptual cycles in the visual domain. Critically, these results show that discrete perceptual cycles are not domain-specific, and thus restricted to the visual domain, but extend to the somatosensory domain.

People see with feeling. We 'gaze', 'behold', 'stare', 'gape' and 'glare'. In this paper, we develop the hypothesis that the brain's ability to see in the present incorporates a representation of the affective impact of those visual sensations in the past. This representation makes up part of the brain's prediction of what the visual sensations stand for in the present, including how to act on them in the near future. The affective prediction hypothesis implies that responses signalling an object's salience, relevance or value do not occur as a separate step after the object is identified. Instead, affective responses support vision from the very moment that visual stimulation begins.

Touch is both the first sense to develop and a critical means of information acquisition and environmental manipulation. Physical touch experiences may create an ontological scaffold for the development of intrapersonal and interpersonal conceptual and metaphorical knowledge, as well as a springboard for the application of this knowledge. In six experiments, holding heavy or light clipboards, solving rough or smooth puzzles, and touching hard or soft objects nonconsciously influenced impressions and decisions formed about unrelated people and situations. Among other effects, heavy objects made job candidates appear more important, rough objects made social interactions appear more difficult, and hard objects increased rigidity in negotiations. Basic tactile sensations are thus shown to influence higher social cognitive processing in dimension-specific and metaphor-specific ways.

Long-lived microtubules found in ciliary axonemes, neuronal processes, and migrating cells are marked by α-tubulin acetylation on lysine 40, a modification that takes place inside the microtubule lumen. The physiological importance of microtubule acetylation remains elusive. Here, we identify a BBSome-associated protein that we name αTAT1, with a highly specific α-tubulin K40 acetyltransferase activity and a catalytic preference for microtubules over free tubulin. In mammalian cells, the catalytic activity of αTAT1 is necessary and sufficient for α-tubulin K40 acetylation. Remarkably, αTAT1 is universally and exclusively conserved in ciliated organisms, and is required for the acetylation of axonemal microtubules and for the normal kinetics of primary cilium assembly. In Caenorhabditis elegans, microtubule acetylation is most prominent in touch receptor neurons (TRNs) and MEC-17, a homolog of αTAT1, and its paralog αTAT-2 are required for α-tubulin acetylation and for two distinct types of touch sensation. Furthermore, in animals lacking MEC-17, αTAT-2, and the sole C. elegans K40α-tubulin MEC-12, touch sensation can be restored by expression of an acetyl-mimic MEC-12[K40Q]. We conclude that αTAT1 is the major and possibly the sole α-tubulin K40 acetyltransferase in mammals and nematodes, and that tubulin acetylation plays a conserved role in several microtubule-based processes.

When we carry out an act, we typically attribute the action to ourselves, the sense of agency. Explanations for agency include conscious prior intention to act, followed by observation of the sensory consequences; brain activity that involves the feed-forward prediction of the consequences combined with rapid inverse motor prediction to fine-tune the action in real time; priming where there is, e.g., a prior command to perform the act; a cause (the intention to act) preceding the effect (the results of the action); and common-sense rules of attribution of physical causality satisfied. We describe an experiment where participants falsely attributed an act to themselves under conditions that apparently cannot be explained by these theories. A life-sized virtual body (VB) seen from the first-person perspective in 3D stereo, as if substituting the real body, was used to induce the illusion of ownership over the VB. Half of the 44 experimental participants experienced VB movements that were synchronous with their own movements (sync), and the other half asynchronous (async). The VB, seen in a mirror, spoke with corresponding lip movements, and for half of the participants this was accompanied by synchronous vibrotactile stimulation on the thyroid cartilage (Von) but this was not so for the other half. Participants experiencing sync misattributed the speaking to themselves and also shifted the fundamental frequency of their later utterances toward the stimulus voice. Von also contributed to these results. We show that these findings can be explained by current theories of agency, provided that the critical role of ownership over the VB is taken into account. Significance Under normal circumstances we consciously attribute authorship of our actions to ourselves, the sensation of agency. We describe an experiment where participants observed a virtual human character speak and falsely attributed the speaking to themselves. They later shifted the FF of their own voice toward the stimulus voice. This only occurred when the life-sized VB substituted their own and moved with their own movements. A further contribution to the effect was vibrotactile stimulation on the thyroid cartilage synchronized with the speaking. This suggests that agency can be self-attributed even in the absence of prior intention, feed-forward prediction, priming, and cause preceding effect. A critical contributor is the illusion of ownership over the VB that spoke.

The computational principles by which the brain creates a painful experience from nociception are still unknown. Classic theories suggest that cortical regions either reflect stimulus intensity or additive effects of intensity and expectations, respectively. By contrast, predictive coding theories provide a unified framework explaining how perception is shaped by the integration of beliefs about the world with mismatches resulting from the comparison of these beliefs against sensory input. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging during a probabilistic heat pain paradigm, we investigated which computations underlie pain perception. Skin conductance, pupil dilation, and anterior insula responses to cued pain stimuli strictly followed the response patterns hypothesized by the predictive coding model, whereas posterior insula encoded stimulus intensity. This novel functional dissociation of pain processing within the insula together with previously observed alterations in chronic pain offer a novel interpretation of aberrant pain processing as disturbed weighting of predictions and prediction errors. All over the human body, there are receptors that help to alert the brain to potential harm. For example, intense heat on the skin elicits a signal that travels to the brain and activates many parts of the brain. Some of the same brain regions that are switched on by signals of potential bodily harm also help the brain to form expectations about events. A person’s expectations may have a strong influence on how they experience pain. For example, if a person expects that taking a pill will reduce their pain, they may feel less pain even if the pill is a fake. Exactly how the brain processes pain signals and expectations remains unclear. Does the brain activity simply reflect how intense the heat is? Some scientists think there may be two separate processes going on: one that predicts what will happen and another that calculates the difference between the prediction and what the receptors actually detect. This difference is called a prediction error. If every unpredicted sensory signal elicits a calculation of the prediction error that would help improve the brain’s future predictions. Now, Geuter et al. show that the predictions are a key part of how the brain perceives pain induced by heat. In the experiments, 28 people had heat applied to skin on their forearm at temperatures that were either noticeable but not painful or painful. Their brain activity was recorded using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and measurements were taken of the pupils in their eyes and their skin’s response to heat. The fMRI scans showed that activity in the back part of a brain region called the insular cortex reflects the intensity of the heat that is applied to the person’s arm, while the front part of the same region signals pain predictions and the prediction error. This suggests that scientists are correct that pain predictions and prediction error calculations are an integral part of the pain response. More studies are needed to determine if these brain processes might contribute to chronic pain and whether a similar process occurs in response to other types of unpleasant experiences.

In this article we present the theoretical and empirical bases of distress tolerance research. Although distress tolerance offers a promising lens through which to better understand various psychological symptoms and disorders, further theoretical development and empirical inquiry is needed to promote our understanding of the construct. Overall, a number of questions regarding its theoretical conceptualization and measurement, associations with related constructs and psychopathology, and role(s) in therapeutic change and intervention remain unanswered. Directions for future research are discussed to stimulate further empirical study on this theoretically and clinically promising topic.