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Military personnel recently arriving in Cuba have not included Soviet combat teams according to the U.S. Department of State

John F. Kennedy Statement on Cuba (4 September 1962) warns of grave consequences if [Soviet missile bases; Soviet combat teams; Offensive weapons] are present in Cuba or if Cuba-United States Treaty of Relations of 1934 is violated; John F. Kennedy Statement on Cuba (4 September 1962) reports no evidence of the presence of Soviet Union. Armed Forces or Soviet missile bases in Cuba; John F. Kennedy Statement on Cuba (4 September 1962) declares that there is no evidence of a violation of the Cuba-United States Treaty of Relations of 1934 or that the Soviet arms shipments to Cuba have contained Offensive weapons; John F. Kennedy Statement on Cuba (4 September 1962) confirms the arrival of 3,500 Soviet Union Military advisors in Cuba as well as Soviet arms shipments of [Torpedo boats; Anti-aircraft weapons; Radar equipment; Electronic equipment]

Soviet Union. Mission to the United Nations Diplomats speculated that the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) would be imposed but Interdiction of Soviet Ships would not occur due to the risk of Warfare; Stuart L. Symington comments that MiG-21 Aircraft are more dangerous that IL-28 Aircraft during Dean Rusk briefing of U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs; Dean Rusk states that [Cuban aggression; Cuban intervention] against other countries could provoke U.S. military intervention in Cuba regardless of the U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment; Nikita S. Khrushchev sent messages to the Kennedy Administration through [Georgi S. Bolshakov; Soviet Union Embassy. United States] declaring that there would be no Soviet missile deployment of Offensive weapons in Cuba; ExComm developed Contingency plans for all Courses of action during the Cuban Crisis except the possibility of doing nothing and ignoring Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; Dean Rusk briefs U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs on the Cuban Crisis including [Contingency plans; Photographic evidence; Aerial reconnaissance; Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); Cuba-Turkey missile parallel; U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment; U.S. military intervention in Cuba]; Dean Rusk tells the U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs that the U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment is invalid because there was no [On-site inspection; Verification] of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; Dean Rusk states that the \"most serious\" elements of the Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military personnel in Cuba include Soviet combat teams who originally were responsible for protecting the Soviet missile bases and the crews operating the Surface-to-air missile sites; Dean Rusk states that Fidel Castro refused to meet with Anastas I. Mikoyan during the Anastas I. Mikoyan Visit to Cuba (2-26 November 1962) until he was given an ultimatum; Dean Rusk declares to U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs that Soviet [Medium-range ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles] with Nuclear warheads were never seen raised Missile launchers during the crisis

Roger Hilsman, Jr. estimates that 3,000 to 5,000 Soviet Union [Technical advisors; Military advisors] have arrived in Cuba since July 1962 but reports no arrivals of Soviet combat teams; Roger Hilsman, Jr. states that the decision of the Soviet Union to increase Security assistance for Cuba antedates the Raul Castro Visit to the Soviet Union (2-17 July 1962); Surface-to-air missiles in Cuba would only be a problem if they are installed around Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) says Roger Hilsman, Jr.; Roger Hilsman, Jr. speculates that crates viewed during Soviet arms shipments to Cuba contained Surface-to-air missiles but not Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Soviet Union since 26 July 1962 has sent about 20 Ships to Cuba carrying [Electronic equipment; Construction equipment; Vehicles] which are probably intended to improve Cuban [Air defense systems; Coastal frontier defense systems]; Roger Hilsman, Jr. believes that Cuba Missiles will not be equipped with Nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union has not transferred any Nuclear weapons; Roger Hilsman, Jr. presents an Intelligence Report to substantiate allegations of a Military build-up in Cuba at a U.S. Department of State Press Conference

IL-28 Aircraft were removed from [Nuevitas; Mariel] Ports aboard [Okhotsk (Soviet Union ship); Kasimov (Soviet Union ship); Krasnograd (Soviet Union ship)]; Intelligence Report on the Deployment of IL-28 Aircraft in Cuba is disseminated to U.S. Government officials on 9-10 October 1962; Photographic evidence taken on 28 September 1962 shows the Kasimov (Soviet Union ship) carrying crates containing 33 IL-28 Aircraft to Cuba for Deployment at San Julian Airfield (Cuba); 57 mm Anti-aircraft guns at the San Cristobal MRBM Complex (Cuba) were among the Anti-aircraft weapons deployed to defend against U.S. Low altitude reconnaissance flights; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) denies that the U.S. Navy has detected the arrival of material used for Nuclear warheads in Cuba; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) states that there is no Evidence that Cuba is being used as a base for Subversive activities in other countries in Latin America; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) declares that Photographic evidence indicates that there are no Offensive weapons hidden in Caves in Cuba; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) declares that Photographic evidence indicates that there are no organized Soviet combat teams in Cuba; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) reports that the U.S. has Evidence that no Submarines carrying Missiles are present in Cuba; Aerial reconnaissance indicates that Military equipment associated with Soviet combat teams is being returned from Cuba to the Soviet Union; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) reports that Defensive weapons and 17,000 Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military personnel remain in Cuba; Photographic evidence of Missile deployment fo Surface-to-air missiles in Cuba was first obtained with Aerial reconnaissance U-2 Flights over Cuba on 29 August 1962; Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba resulted in the removal of 42 Missiles on eight Ships from 5 November through 9 November 1962; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) reports that after announcement of the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) 16 of 1 Soviet Ships en route to Cuba reversed course; Verification of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba was obtained through [Low altitude reconnaissance flights; U-2 Flights over Cuba; Ship inspection]; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) reports that all Medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba reached full Operational readiness on 28 October 1962; News media are briefed on [Medium-range ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; MiG-21 Aircraft; FROG Missiles; T-54 Tanks; SA-2 Missiles; Snapper Anti-Tank Missiles; IL-28 Aircraft] Deployment and Soviet Military construction in Cuba; IL-28 Aircraft never achieved full Operational readiness although seven Bomber aircraft were classified as \"flyable\"; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) shows the News media Aerial reconnaissance Verification of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; Robert S. McNamara Press Briefing (6 February 1963) dismisses allegations of an Intelligence gap noting that U-2 Flights over Cuba on 29 August and 5 September 1962 showed no evidence of Military construction at sites later identified as [Guanajay IRBM Complex (Cuba); Sagua la Grande MRBM Complex (Cuba); San Cristobal MRBM Complex (Cuba); Remedios IRBM Complex (Cuba)]

CIA believes that [IL-28 Aircraft; Cruise missiles; Coastal frontier defense systems] in Cuba are manned by Soviet Union. Armed Forces; CIA reports that [Surface-to-air missiles; Air defense systems; Radar equipment; Communications] in Cuba are manned by Soviet Union. Armed Forces; CIA does not know if FROG Missiles in Cuba are equipped with Nuclear warheads; CIA reports the Deployment of four Soviet combat teams in Cuba equipped with [T-4 Tanks; Rocket launchers; FROG Missiles; Snapper Anti-Tank Missiles; Mortars]

U.S. Army practices airborne training in Exercise Sun Shade from 12 November to 10 December as rehearsal of Operation Plan 316; Cuba. Revolutionary Navy Komar Missile Attack Boats depart Mariel on October 18 for operations at Banes; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command proposed the capture of intact SA-2 Missiles Surface-to-air missile sites as part of [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 316]; Commander of the U.S. Navy Naval Base Guantanamo indicated that movement of FROG Missiles into positions threatening Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) should be deemed \"an offensive act unacceptable\" to the U.S. due the missiles capacity to carry Nuclear warheads; Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) reported a marked increase in Cuba harassment in June 1962; Military build-up in Cuba of the Cuba. Revolutionary Navy included the acquisition of [Military training; Komar Missile Attack Boats; Kronshtadt Patrol Boats] from the Soviet Union; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force Military build-up in Cuba was indicated from 1961 to 1962 by [MiG-15 Aircraft; MiG-17 Aircraft; MiG-19 Aircraft; MiG-21 Aircraft; Helicopters; Light aircraft; Military training] from the Soviet Bloc; Soviet Union Merchant vessels traffic to Cuba increased in July 1962; Cuba. Ground Forces Military equipment includes new shipments of [Tanks; Weapons; Rocket launchers; Artillery; Anti-aircraft weapons; Rifles; Mortars; Machine guns; Amphibious vehicles; Armored personnel carriers]; Intelligence confirms [Surface-to-air missiles; IL-28 Aircraft] Deployment in Cuba and Soviet Submarines in the northwestern Atlantic Ocean region during September to October 1962; Intelligence indicated Soviet combat teams are in control of [FROG Missiles; Snapper Anti-Tank Missiles] at [Artemisa; Santiago de las Vegas; Remedios IRBM Complex (Cuba); Holguin (Cuba)] Military bases; Contingency plans to assure maximum Operational readiness for [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 314] were implemented during 1-22 October 1962; Robert S. McNamara informs Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command that Soviet counteractions against Berlin (Federal Republic of Germany) will be considered valid reason for U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Robert S. McNamara directs that evidence of Offensive weapons in Cuba or Attacks by Cuba against Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) will be considered sufficient to warrant U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Robert S. McNamara reports that Cuban intervention in Latin America or indication of support for Cuban anti-Castro groups Attacks will be considered sufficient to warrant U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes problems of U.S. Armed Forces Deployment affecting implementation of Operation Plan 316; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet Submarines operations during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet service force operations during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Armed Forces Amphibious operations during the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet operations in conducting the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet count of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba does not match with reports from Soviet Ships; U.S. Navy reports minor collisions between its Naval vessels taking part in the Naval quarantine line; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet. Task Force 135 involvement in Cuban Crisis operations; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet. Anti-Submarine Force involvement in the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) operations; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes Anti-submarine warfare activities against Soviet Submarines in the Atlantic Ocean; [Anti-submarine warfare; Air defense systems] forced Soviet Submarines to surface prior to implementation of the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); Latin America-U.S. Naval Task Force involvement with the U.S. South Atlantic Force during the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command analysis of U.S. Atlantic Command role in the Cuba Crisis; Cuba Alliances with Soviet Union lead to increased requests for [Economic assistance; Security assistance]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates numbers of Soviet Bloc Military personnel assigned to assist the [Cuba. Revolutionary Army; Cuba. Revolutionary Navy; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force]; Soviet Bloc Shipping for [Arms shipments; Trade with Cuba] during period of the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes status of and command structures for Contingency plans for military actions against Cuba as specified in [Operation Plan 314-61; Operation Plan 312-62; Operation Plan 316]; [Exercise Blue Water; Exercise Phibriglex-62] are carried on prior to Cuban contingency operations; [U-2 Aircraft; Low altitude reconnaissance flights] received fire only twice over Cuba during Surveillance of Soviet missile bases; U.S. Atlantic Command Communications plans and activities during the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command initial reaction to knowledge of the Cuban Crisis was to improve Operational readiness of U.S. Atlantic Command to be able to execute Operation Plan 312; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command of events that may lead to execution of [U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Operation Plan 314]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates number of Soviet Union. Armed Forces in Cuba and Cuban [Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force; Military personnel] trained in the Soviet Union; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strike Forces increased Operational readiness and prepositioning of Military personnel for the implementation of Operation Plan 314 prior to the days of the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command developed plans for Military governments to assume control of a zone of Emergency powers in southern Florida to start at the \"commencement of hostilities\"; U.S. Federal Aviation Administration participated in planning for [Military air transit rights; Military aircraft] to assume priority over civilian and non-tactical Air traffic as part of implementation of [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 314; Operation Plan 316]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates of Military personnel staffing requirements for U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command evaluates problems affecting the implementation of Military actions and operations; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates of expected Casualties of U.S. Armed Forces with implementation of Operation Plan 316; Psychological operations preparations for [Operation Plan 314; Operation Plan 316]; Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) participation in and command structures during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Marine Corps participation in U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet operations during the Cuban Crisis

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that the Soviet Union. Armed Forces presence in Cuba adversely affects United States \"image and prestige\"; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that Soviet Union. Armed Forces Submarine bases could easily be established in Cuba; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that Airfields in Cuba could serve as Military bases for Soviet Union. Air Force Air attacks on the U.S.; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that Soviet Union. Armed Forces Interdiction of U.S. [Shipping lanes; Air traffic] could be carried out from Cuba; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that Cuba could be a base for Military actions against the Panama Canal; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that an Electronic warfare Military capability could be established in Cuba; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee concludes that Cuba is a Military threat to Latin America as a source for [Insurrections; Sabotage; Weapons]; Intelligence agencies do not consider Cuba a Military threat to the [United States; Latin America]; Cuba. Armed Forces Military personnel numbers are the same as before the Cuban Crisis and consist of 75,000 in the Cuba. Revolutionary Army and 10,000 in the Cuba. Revolutionary National Militia and 100,000 in the Civil patrols; Military build-up in Cuba includes [Snapper Anti-Tank Missiles; FROG Missiles] which are among the most modern Soviet tactical Missiles; Soviet Union. Armed Forces in Cuba are equipped with [SA-2 Missiles; Ammunition; Anti-aircraft weapons; Cruise missiles; Komar Missile Attack Boats; Artillery; Tanks; Armored personnel carriers; Missile launchers; Radios]; Submarine bases do not require extensive Military construction and can therefore be provided on short notice; Cuba. Armed Forces are equipped with [Rifles; Machine guns; Mortars; Artillery; Tanks; Armored personnel carriers; Anti-aircraft weapons]; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee concludes that Intelligence agencies consistently downgraded any Intelligence Report from Cuban refugees; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee praises Cuban Crisis Intelligence gathering but concludes that Intelligence agencies interpreted the Evidence too optimistically; Aerial reconnaissance was unable to determine the precise number of [Medium-range ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles] introduced during Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command U-2 Flights over Cuba produced Photographic evidence of the San Cristobal MRBM Complex (Cuba) on 14 October 1962; Photographic interpretation identifies IL-28 Aircraft in Cuba on 9 October 1962; Photographic evidence obtained on 5 September 1962 provided Verification of MiG-21 Aircraft Deployment in Cuba; Photographic evidence of Coastal frontier defense systems Missile bases and of Komar Missile Attack Boats was obtained between 29 August and 7 October 1962; U-2 Flights over Cuba from 29 August until 9 October 1962 provided Photographic evidence of SA-2 Missiles Surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba; Intelligence agencies concluded in early 1962 that Cuba would receive IL-28 Aircraft from the Soviet Union; Intelligence agencies collected thousands of Human intelligence reports before 1962; CIA increased the frequency of U-2 Flights over Cuba in early 1962; Intelligence agencies concluded that the Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force had received vast amounts of Soviet Military equipment before July 1962 and that the Cuba. Revolutionary Army was one of the best equipped in Latin America; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force had acquired [MiG-15 Aircraft; MiG-17 Aircraft; MiG-19 Aircraft] and propeller-driven Aircraft as well as Military training in Soviet Bloc countries by the beginning of 1962; Cuba has thousands of Caves suitable for use as Missile storage sites but Intelligence agencies believe that they are used to store Defensive weapons; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee rejects allegations of conflict between the [CIA; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command] regarding control of U-2 Flights over Cuba; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee rejects the charge that an Intelligence gap in Aerial reconnaissance coverage of Cuba existed from 5 September until 14 October 1962; Intelligence agencies underestimated the number of Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military personnel throughout the Cuban Crisis; Intelligence agencies state that the number of Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military personnel in Cuba reached 22,000; Intelligence agencies are criticized for not obtaining Verification of the presence of Soviet combat teams in Cuba until 25 October 1962; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee praises Intelligence agencies for identifying Offensive weapons in Cuba before they reached Operational readiness; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee discusses persistent reports that Soviet Missiles are concealed in Cuban Caves and that the number of Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military personnel greatly exceeds estimates by Intelligence agencies; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee conducts Governmental investigations of the Military build-up in Cuba

Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet recommends that 11 Airplane pilots from the [U.S. Navy; U.S. Marine Corps] receive the distinguished flying cross award for Operation Blue Moon Aerial reconnaissance flights over Cuba; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command reported that Soviet Ships are making no effort to pass through rendezvous points established for Ship inspection; U.S. Marine Corps. 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade has been assigned to the landing force for Operation Plan 316; Commander of the U.S. Navy Naval Base Cud reports that U.S. Marine Corps sentries drove pick-up Trucks through a fence into Cuban territory and were assisted back to Cud Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) by Cuban sentries; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force Atlantic Command takes measures to maintain the Airborne alert for two more weeks without sacrificing Air attacks capabilities; Soviet combat teams equipped with [FROG Missiles; Rocket launchers; Armored personnel carriers; Tanks; SU-100 Assault Guns] are believed to be located at [Artemisa; Santiago de las Vegas]

Constituent Assembly Government. Human Rights Commission activities; Right wing alliances with [General Confederation of Trade Unions; National Workers Central; Inter-American Regional Workers Organization]; American Institute for Free Labor Development concentration on work with centrist Popular Democratic Union to promote Agrarian reform; United States Government Development assistance planned in relation to [Education; Health; Housing]; United States Government Humanitarian assistance intended for [Refugees; Displaced persons]; Caribbean Basin Initiative assistance planned for El Salvador; Population growth effects on [Population density; Health conditions]; Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front strategy; Salvadoran National Plan is achieving success in protecting San Vicente Department Agricultural production; United States Government Security assistance objectives; Salvadoran armed forces orders concerning support for [Election (1984); Constitution]; Salvadoran armed forces officials declaration against Death squads; Security conditions description; United States Government Economic assistance goals; Economic Support Fund most important aspect of Economic assistance; Bank reform necessary to improve efficiency; Economic conditions description; Constitution provisions on Judicial system; Judicial system description; [Human rights violations; Massacres] attributed to [Salvadoran armed forces; Civil patrols; Atlacatl Battalion]; Human rights developments; Cuba Arms supply Guerrilla groups caused renewed authorization of Security assistance Carter, Jimmy; [Soviet Union; Cuba] support for Guerrilla groups through Nicaragua; Revolutionary Governing Junta accomplishments; Land concentration exacerbated by Population growth Rural lands; Left wing boosted by victory of Sandinistas Nicaragua; [Popular Liberation Forces; People's Revolutionary Army; Armed Forces of National Resistance; Popular Revolutionary Bloc; United Popular Action Front; Popular Leagues - 28th of February] formation; [Democratic Nationalist Organization (El Salvador); White Warriors Union; Death squads] Assassination targets included [Teachers; Clergy]; [Violence; Death squads] increased during Romero Administration; U.S. Department of State believes Violence traditional part of culture in El Salvador; Election (1972) events leading to Molina Administration; Central American Common Market initially had positive effect on Inflation; U.S. Department of State report prepared to justify Reagan, Ronald veto of Human rights certification proposals; U.S. Department of State history of [Elections, Constituent Assembly in El Salvador (1982); Agrarian reform; Judicial reform; Economic assistance; Constitution]; Reforms progress reduced by Political violence directed by [Cuba; Nicaragua; Soviet Union]; Christian Democratic Party (El Salvador) involvement in Revolutionary Governing Junta brought major [Economic reform; Political reform]; U.S. Department of State views Constituent Assembly Government as offering reformist alternative between [Leftwing; Right wing]; U.S. Department of State report on El Salvador; Judges experience Intimidation against judgments concerning members of [Salvadoran armed forces; Salvadoran security forces]; Justices of the peace operate without [Training; Education]; United States Government Legal assistance offered to encourage Judicial reform; [Constituent Assembly Government; United States Government] support for Contadora Initiative; Agrarian reform accomplishments; Agrarian Reform Program-Phase I Cooperatives need extensive Technical assistance; Agrarian Reform Program-Phase II guaranteed under Constitution; Agrarian Reform Program-Phase III problems of [Evictions; Compensation]; Labor code [currently has no provisions for collective bargaining; does not protect against harassment of leaders]; Left wing alliances with Unitary Trade Union and Guild Movement of El Salvador; Constituent Assembly Government accomplishments include [Constitution; Law of Amnesty and Social Rehabilitation; Agrarian reform; Negotiations]; Constitution includes provisions on [Judicial system; Prison; Human rights; Labor code; Elections]; Constituent Assembly Government. Peace Commission offers have not been accepted by [Democratic Revolutionary Front; Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front]; [Violence; Killings] against Civilians declining; Death squads Violence increasing against [Teachers; Trade union leaders; Clergy; Christian Democratic Party (El Salvador)]; [Secret Anti-Communist Army; Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Anti-Communist Brigade] publishing threatening Advertisements in Newspapers; International public opinion forced the release of [Ibarra, Angel; Political prisoners]; International Committee of the Red Cross finds Prison conditions to be adequate; Popular Liberation Forces Assassination targets are frequently officials of Nationalist Republican Alliance; Guerrilla groups strategy to disrupt [Economy; Agricultural production; Elections]; Guerrilla groups using Civilians as shield during Combat; [Catholic Church; Rivera y Damas, Arturo [Archbishop]] claims no popular support for Guerrilla groups; [Sheraton murder case; Sullivan case; Kline murder case; Schaufelberger case; Cuellar case] investigations; U.S. Department of State promises release of report by Tyler Review Team after completion of Trial; El Salvador. Supreme Court undertaking review of Legal procedures; Vides Casanova, Carlos Eugenio speech condemning activities of Death squads; Pickering, Thomas R. first speech to American Chamber of Commerce (El Salvador); Bush, George speech concerning Death squads delivered at reception by Magana, Alvaro Alfredo; Stone, Richard meetings with [Democratic Revolutionary Front; Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] Costa Rica