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Rodion Y. Malinovsky on 22 February 1961 states that the Soviet Union. Armed Forces is the worlds strongest because of its [Nuclear weapons; Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Short-range ballistic missiles] and maintains that they are intended for defensive purposes; Vasily D. Sokolovskiy reports on 20 February 1961 that the Military force reductions in the [Soviet Union. Army; Soviet Union. Navy] are necessary because Military policy now relies on Missiles; Nikita S. Khrushchev declares on 20 October 1960 that the Soviet Union. Army possesses modern [Missiles; Nuclear weapons] and that the Soviet Union. Armed Forces also have Submarine-launched ballistic missiles; Nikita S. Khrushchev in October 1960 informs delegates from Soviet Bloc countries that Soviet missile deployment enables the Soviet Union to reduce its Conventional weapons; Rodion Y. Malinovsky on 28 June 1960 states that Soviet Technical training for [Military engineers; Military officers] in Missiles technology has been successful; Nikita S. Khrushchev on 21 June 1960 declares that U.S. Aerial reconnaissance during the past three years in Soviet Airspace was illegal because it photographed sites for experimental Missile launchers that were not part of strategic Soviet missile bases; Nikita S. Khrushchev on 7 May 1960 informs the Soviet Union. Supreme Soviet that [Soviet Union. Army; Soviet Union. Navy] Military policy now relies on Missiles; Rodion Y. Malinovsky on 5 January 1960 informs the Soviet Union. Supreme Soviet that the Soviets possess sufficient [Nuclear weapons; Medium-range ballistic missiles; Intercontinental ballistic missiles] to destroy its enemies; Nikita S. Khrushchev asserts that surprise Military intervention against a nation with Nuclear weapons would fail because of the dispersal of Missile bases; Nikita S. Khrushchev on 14 January 1960 informs the Soviet Union. Supreme Soviet that greater reliance on [Nuclear weapons; Missiles; Submarines] will allow Military force reductions of Conventional forces; Nikita S. Khrushchev on 14 November 1959 discusses Intercontinental ballistic missiles Missile development with Soviet Union Journalists but declares that his goal is universal Disarmament; Nikita S. Khrushchev on 26 July 1959 describes Soviet Union [Military policy; Missile launchers; Submarine-launched ballistic missiles] and Intercontinental ballistic missiles [Missile development; Missile flight tests] to Richard M. Nixon; Nikita S. Khrushchev on 26 July 1959 informs Richard M. Nixon that the Soviet Union is not furnishing Missiles to \"anyone\"; Richard M. Nixon informs Nikita S. Khrushchev that carrying out Missile flight tests in secrecy is \"very difficult\"; Nikita S. Khrushchev declares on 23 June 1959 to W. Averell Harriman that Missiles enable the Soviet Union to destroy [Western Europe; Taiwan]; Nikita S. Khrushchev declares on 5 February 1959 that United States [Military officers; Government officials] who presume that foreign Military bases provide a shield from Nuclear warfare are mistaken because the Soviet Union possesses Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Nikita S. Khrushchev on 27 January 1959 announces Arms production of Intercontinental ballistic missiles to Soviet Government officials; Nikita S. Khrushchev informs Hubert H. Humphrey of Soviet Intercontinental ballistic missiles Missile development and of concern that their 14,000 km range makes safe Missile flight tests difficult; Nikita S. Khrushchev announces the commencement of Intercontinental ballistic missiles Arms production in a seven-year plan released 14 November 1958; Nikita S. Khrushchev states on 9 July 1958 that the government of the Soviet Union values its [Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Satellites] specialists highly but that concern for Internal security requires that they remain anonymous; Nikita S. Khrushchev states on 22 January 1958 that he is willing to discuss Intercontinental ballistic missiles in the context of Disarmament and the elimination of U.S. Military bases encircling countries in the Soviet Bloc; Nikita S. Khrushchev asserts on 14 November 1957 that Intercontinental ballistic missiles have made Bomber aircraft obsolete and increased the vulnerability of the United States relative to the Soviet Union; Nikita S. Khrushchev states on 7 October 1957 that he supports peaceful coexistence because Warfare involving [Nuclear weapons; Intercontinental ballistic missiles] would cause extensive Casualties; Nikita S. Khrushchev reports on 7 October 1957 that the Soviet Union has sufficient [Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Medium-range ballistic missiles] for the Soviet Union. Armed Forces; TASS (Soviet Union news agency) reports that successful August 1957 Intercontinental ballistic missiles Missile flight tests establish the Military capability to \"reach remote areas\" without using strategic Soviet Union. Air Force; John F. Kennedy receives a compendium of statements by Soviet Union leaders made between 1957 and 1961 on [Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Nuclear weapons; Nuclear strategy; Satellites; Berlin Question; China (People's Republic); U-2 Downing over Soviet Union (1 May 1960); Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines]

Anatoly F. Dobrynin is described as \"ashen\" following his meeting with Dean Rusk where he is informed that John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) will announce the discovery of Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; William P. Bundy reports that Jupiter Missiles are almost obsolete as First strike Nuclear weapons and have little military significance; ExComm Meeting (28 October 1962, 11:00 a.m.) receives Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (28 October 1962) which accepts the terms of Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (27 October 1962); Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (28 October 1962) agrees that the [Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (27 October 1962); Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (28 October 1962)] will be considered the basis for the Cuban Crisis Settlement; Fidel Castro's Five Points Speech (28 October 1962) announces refusal to permit On-site inspection and demands withdrawal from Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) and an end to U.S. [Economic sanctions; Diplomatic sanctions] against Cuba; Soviet Union-United States Negotiations in New York (25 October - 4 December 1962) discussions included Verification of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba as well as [Soviet Commitment Barring Future Deployment of Offensive Weapons; U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment] and continued U.S. Aerial reconnaissance of Cuba; [John F. Kennedy; Nikita S. Khrushchev] used letters as a private Communications channel following the Cuban Crisis Settlement to supplement the Soviet Union-United States Negotiations in New York (25 October - 4 December 1962); Soviet Union removed all IL-28 Aircraft but did not agree to any arrangements for Verification of [Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; Soviet Commitment Barring Future Deployment of Offensive Weapons]; ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) debates Soviet motivations for sending the contradictory [Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (26 October 1962); Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (27 October 1962)]; Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (27 October 1962) acceptance of the proposal advanced in Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (26 October 1962) despite demands for Cuba-Turkey missile exchange included in Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (27 October 1962) is called the \"Trollope ploy\"; ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) discusses Air attacks on Cuba as United States counteractions for Aircraft downings of U.S. Low altitude reconnaissance flights; ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 9:00 p.m.) was called to authorize the Mobilization of the U.S. Air Force Reserve and to discuss the addition of Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants to the materials affected by the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (26 October 1962) proposes Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba and an end to Soviet arms shipments in exchange for U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment and lifting the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) members receive the text of Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (27 October 1962) which demands a Cuba-Turkey missile exchange before Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba can occur; ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) members receive news of the U-2 Downing over Cuba (27 October 1962) and the death of Rudolf Anderson, Jr. simultaneously with the transmission of the Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (27 October 1962); Fidel Castro vows Attacks on U.S. Aerial reconnaissance flights violating Cuban Airspace; Letter from U Thant to Fidel Castro (26 October 1962) requests the suspension of Military construction of Soviet missile bases in order to alleviate tension during the Cuban Crisis; Letter from Fidel Castro to U Thant (27 October 1962) agrees to suspend Military construction of Soviet missile bases only if the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) is lifted; Aleksandr S. Fomin proposes the [Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; Soviet Commitment Barring Future Deployment of Offensive Weapons] in exchange for U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment during meeting with John A. Scali; U.S. Department of State response to the Aleksandr S. Fomin Proposal (26 October 1962) agrees that it could provide grounds for a Cuban Crisis Settlement; John A. Scali states during meeting with Aleksandr S. Fomin that On-site inspection of U.S. Military bases in Florida would not be accepted by the United States; ExComm Meeting (26 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) Intelligence briefing indicates that Soviet missile bases will soon reach Operational readiness; Evacuation of Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) dependents occurred on 26 October 1962; Collangatta (Sweden ship) was allowed to pass through the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) without clearance on 26 October 1962; Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to U Thant (26 October 1962) accepts the U Thant Proposal (24 October 1962) while the Letter from John F. Kennedy to U Thant (26 October 1962) states that U.S. Naval vessels will attempt to avoid confrontation if Soviet ships avoid the Naval quarantine line; Soviet Union-United States Joint Report to U Thant (7 January 1963) agreed to terminate the Soviet Union-United States Negotiations in New York (25 October - 4 December 1962) and remove the Cuban Crisis from the agenda of the U.N. Security Council; Adlai E. Stevenson welcomes Soviet decision to avoid Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) as well as assurances to [Bertrand Russell; U Thant] that no \"reckless\" decisions will be taken regarding the Cuban Crisis; Adlai E. Stevenson confronts Valerian A. Zorin with Photographic evidence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba; U.S. Department of Defense announces that Proclamation of Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba of 23 October 1962 covers Fuels used to power Surface-to-surface missiles; Arthur Sylvester announces on 24 October 1962 that there are eight - ten Soviet missile bases in Cuba consisting of four Missile launchers per bases and with 30 Medium-range ballistic missiles and 20 IL-28 Aircraft; U Thant Proposal (24 October 1962) recommending the voluntary suspension of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba as well as the lifting of the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) for a two week \"cooling-off\" period is advanced during U.N. Security Council Emergency Meeting (23-25 October 1962); John F. Kennedy rejects U Thant Proposal (24 October 1962) because it does not guarantee Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; ExComm decided to attempt the Marucla (Ship) Boarding (26 October 1962) because it was felt that Interdiction of non-Soviet Ships was desirable; Harold D. MacMillan describes attempts by Soviet Union Diplomats to persuade United Kingdom to intercede in Cuban Crisis as an attempt to weaken U.S. Alliances; ExComm proposes blaming Fidel Castro for Soviet missile deployment in John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) in order to press for [Overthrow of Fidel Castro; Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba] in negotiations to end the crisis; [New York Times; Washington Post] were asked not to publish articles regarding the Cuban Crisis before John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962); News media announcements that Andrei A. Gromyko would make an \"important statement\" before John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) causes \"nervousness in the White House\"; U.S. Department of State summary of activities during 20-22 October 1962; [Carlos Sosa-Rodriguez; Patrick Dean; Frank Aiken] of [Venezuela; United Kingdom; Ireland] support the U.S. actions against Cuba during the U.N. Security Council Emergency Meeting (23-25 October 1962); Mircea Malitza supports the Soviet Union position and calls for annulment of the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) during the U.N. Security Council Emergency Meeting (23-25 October 1962); Nonaligned countries at the U.N. propose that the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) be lifted in exchange for a halt to Soviet arms shipments of Offensive weapons; U.S. Department of Defense institutes a new Information policy making Arthur Sylvester responsible for reviewing all information released to the News media and identifying twelve types of Classified information; ExComm explores Courses of action based on [Diplomatic initiatives; Military actions] including [Air attacks; Blockades of Cuba; Surgical air strikes; U.S. military intervention in Cuba] as responses to Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; Andrei A. Gromyko reiterates statements that Soviet arms shipments to Cuba are defensive, during Meeting of John F. Kennedy and Andrei A. Gromyko (18 October 1962); John F. Kennedy warns Andrei A. Gromyko during Meeting of John F. Kennedy and Andrei A. Gromyko (18 October 1962) that the United States will not tolerate the introduction of offensive Military capability in Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff preparations for Blockades of Cuba encompass considerations for Latin America Internal security; United States Intelligence Board Intelligence Report asserts Diplomatic initiatives would not halt the development of Soviet missile bases in Cuba; United States Intelligence Board Intelligence Report asserts that [Blockades of Cuba; U.S. military intervention in Cuba] will increase the risk of Soviet counteractions against Berlin (Federal Republic of Germany) but are unlikely to escalate into general Warfare; Exercise Phibriglex-62 provides an ideal \"cover\" for Mobilization of U.S. Armed Forces as called for in Contingency plans for milita

Statistics on configurations and ranges of [SS-4 Missiles; SS-5 Missiles] at Soviet missile bases in Cuba; Soviet missile deployment of SS-4 Missiles is carried out at three Soviet missile bases with four Missile launchers at each site; Maps show range of [Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Medium-range ballistic missiles] deployed in Cuba; Military construction of 12 Missile launchers for SS-5 Missiles is carried out at Soviet missile bases

Nikita S. Khrushchev compares the construction of U.S. Military bases in countries bordering the Soviet Union to the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; Nikita S. Khrushchev highlights perceived inconsistencies in United States policy and reasserts Soviet Union policy of \"peaceful coexistence\"; Nikita S. Khrushchev asserts that there are no plans for establishing Soviet missile bases in Cuba

United States announcements that there was no Missile gap alerted the Soviet Union that the location of their Intercontinental ballistic missiles might be known to the U.S., according to Roger Hilsman, Jr.; Soviet motivations were to create Soviet missile bases in Cuba to increase the weight of a Soviet First strike as well as freeing [Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines] for other missions; Soviet motivations for Soviet missile deployment in Cuba were to increase Soviet influence in Latin America according to Roger Hilsman, Jr.; Roger Hilsman, Jr. speculates that the Soviet Union expected the U.S. to react to Soviet missile deployment in Cuba through U.N. action or by bargaining foreign Military bases

Soviet Union placement of Nuclear weapons in Cuba would be counter to Soviet Union policy according to the CIA; CIA states that the construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba would contradict Soviet Union policy in Latin America; Soviet missile deployment of [Medium-range ballistic missiles; Intercontinental ballistic missiles] in Cuba would permit Nuclear strikes on an increased number of United States Targets; CIA concludes that Soviet Union policy supports Military build-up in Cuba to strengthen control of the Popular Socialist Party (Cuba) and to protect against U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Soviet policy toward Cuba included [Economic assistance; Security assistance] to insure the survival of Communism while avoiding serious risks to [Soviet Union-United States relations; East-West relations]; Soviet arms shipments to Cuba combined with Military training will increase the Military capability of the Cuba. Armed Forces and could pose a threat to Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba); CIA states that Offensive weapons such as [IL-28 Aircraft; TU-16 Aircraft; FROG Missiles; SS-2 Missiles; Submarines] might be included in Soviet arms shipments to Cuba in order to test United States counteractions; CIA predicts that a two thirds majority could be obtained from the OAS for Economic sanctions if offensive Military bases are established in Cuba

John F. Kennedy Draft Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) states that two Soviet missile bases for Deployment of Intermediate-range ballistic missiles and large numbers of medium-range Bomber aircraft have been detected in Cuba; United States steps to remove Soviet missile bases from Cuba include tightening of Economic sanctions by requiring all U.S. trading partners to stop Ship chartering to the Sino-Soviet Bloc; John F. Kennedy Draft Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) declares his willingness to meet with Nikita S. Khrushchev to discuss complete Independence for Cuba and the dismantling of all [United States; Soviet Union] Military bases; United States will hold the Soviet Union responsible for any Missile launches from Cuban territory and will respond with massive Attacks on the Soviet Union; [U.N.; OAS] will be asked to demand the removal of Soviet missile bases and to send On-site inspection teams to supervise Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; United States steps to achieve Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba include close Surveillance of the Soviet missile bases and targeting by the U.S. Armed Forces; John F. Kennedy Draft Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) lists Courses of action that will be taken in response to Soviet missile deployment in Cuba beginning with Blockades of Cuba to effect Arms shipments Interdiction; Soviet missile deployment in Cuba contravenes previous U.S. and Soviet Nuclear strategy of careful and open Missile deployment; Soviet missile deployment of offensive [Medium-range ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles] constitutes a Military threat to Regional security and will not be tolerated; John F. Kennedy Draft Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) states that four to five Soviet missile bases for Medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying Nuclear warheads have been detected in Cuba; John F. Kennedy Draft Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) states that U.S. Surveillance revealed offensive Soviet missile deployment in Cuba

Josip Broz Tito considered warning Nikita S. Khrushchev about the \"unconstructive approach\" of Fidel Castro according to a Yugoslavia official; Yugoslavia Government officials do not support Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; Yugoslavia official agrees with the United States Embassy. Yugoslavia that U.S. missile bases in Turkey are not equivalent to Soviet missile bases in Cuba

Fidel Castro introduction of Cud Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) into the question of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba is an effort to disrupt the Cuban Crisis Settlement which had already been agreed to by [United States; Soviet Union]; Cud Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) is in no way equivalent to Soviet missile bases in Cuba and the U.S. will not consider its removal

Aerial reconnaissance of Cuba reveals that four Soviet missile bases for Medium-range ballistic missiles have reached Operational readiness and three sites for Intermediate-range ballistic missiles will be operational by 1-15 December; Poltava (Soviet Union ship) is large enough to carry [Medium-range ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles] and will arrive in Cuba on 28-29 October; CIA has not detected a change in Operational readiness of Soviet Union. Armed Forces following the John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962); CIA reports that 27 Soviet Ships carrying Soviet arms shipments are en route to Cuba; CIA does not have Evidence that Soviet Union Cargo ships are carrying Military equipment; Leninsky Konsomol (Soviet Union ship) is believed to be carrying 13 IL-28 Aircraft and will arrive in Cuba approximately 24-25 October; Bolshevik Sukhanov (Soviet Union ship) is carrying seven crates which may contain Aircraft; CIA reports that 23 of 24 Surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba have attained Operational readiness and that the Cuba. Armed Forces are on full Military alert