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One of the most compelling, yet little known stories of race relations in the twentieth century is the account of blacks who chose to leave the United States to be involved in the Soviet Experiment in the 1920s and 1930s. Frustrated by the limitations imposed by racism in their home country, African Americans were lured by the promise of opportunity abroad. A number of them settled there, raised families, and became integrated into society. The Soviet economy likewise reaped enormous benefits from the talent and expertise that these individuals brought, and the all around success story became a platform for political leaders to boast their party goals of creating a society where all members were equal.In Blacks, Reds, and Russians, Joy Gleason Carew offers insight into the political strategies that often underlie relationships between different peoples and countries. She draws on the autobiographies of key sojourners, including Harry Haywood and Robert Robinson, in addition to the writings of Claude McKay, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Langston Hughes. Interviews with the descendents of figures such as Paul Robeson and Oliver Golden offer rare personal insights into the story of a group of emigrants who, confronted by the daunting challenges of making a life for themselves in a racist United States, found unprecedented opportunities in communist Russia.

The Geography of Ethnic Violenceis the first among numerous distinguished books on ethnic violence to clarify the vital role of territory in explaining such conflict. Monica Toft introduces and tests a theory of ethnic violence, one that provides a compelling general explanation of not only most ethnic violence, civil wars, and terrorism but many interstate wars as well. This understanding can foster new policy initiatives with real potential to make ethnic violence either less likely or less destructive. It can also guide policymakers to solutions that endure. The book offers a distinctively powerful synthesis of comparative politics and international relations theories, as well as a striking blend of statistical and historical case study methodologies. By skillfully combining a statistical analysis of a large number of ethnic conflicts with a focused comparison of historical cases of ethnic violence and nonviolence--including four major conflicts in the former Soviet Union--it achieves a rare balance of general applicability and deep insight. Toft concludes that only by understanding how legitimacy and power interact can we hope to learn why some ethnic conflicts turn violent while others do not. Concentrated groups defending a self-defined homeland often fight to the death, while dispersed or urbanized groups almost never risk violence to redress their grievances. Clearly written and rigorously documented, this book represents a major contribution to an ongoing debate that spans a range of disciplines including international relations, comparative politics, sociology, and history.

United States Embassy. Soviet Union doubts that concerns about Soviet citizens who are Muslims will lead to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan ; Military actions by the Soviets against Afghanistan would harm Soviet interests by endangering [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (1972-1979); Detente] and by justifying charges of Soviet [Imperialism; Expansionism] by [China (People's Republic); Muslims] ; United States Embassy. Soviet Union officials believe that the presence of Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan will be increased but that Soviet intervention will not occur

Soviet Union Embassy. Afghanistan officer asserts that United States policy toward Afghanistan has created Political unrest and threats to Soviet interests in Afghanistan ; Soviet Union Embassy. Afghanistan officer states that \"about 10\" Soviet advisors have been victims of Assassination in Afghanistan since the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan (27 April 1978)

Vassily S. Safronchuk states that a speech by Leonid I. Brezhnev on 11 June 1979 indicating that the Soviet Union would not abandon Afghanistan does not signify that Soviet military intervention is under consideration ; Soviet advisors state that Soviet military intervention would harm Soviet interests regarding [International relations; International opinion; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (1972-1979); Soviet Union-United States relations] and would undermine the Internal security of Afghanistan ; Vassily S. Safronchuk declares that the Soviets will not undertake Military intervention to save the Political power of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in accordance with the precept of Vladimir I. Lenin stating that Revolutions must defend themselves

Llewellyn E. Thompson provides his views on [Soviet interests; Soviet intentions] asserting that Nikita S. Khrushchev will almost certainly proceed with the Soviet proposed peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic if no progress is made on the German problem, and believes that there is no prospect for German reunification on a satisfactory basis for many years

Burhanuddin Rabbani is alleged to have deposited Funding provided as part of United States assistance to Afghan rebels in Banks in the [United States; Western Europe; Japan] ; TASS (Soviet Union news agency) reports that Burhanuddin Rabbani was formerly among the large Landowners in [Kabul Province; Badakhshan Province] and derived considerable Profits from Trade in carpets and from the Narcotics trade; Gorbachev Administration (1985-) criticizes United States assistance to Afghan rebels and decries Arms shipments of Stinger Surface-to-air missiles ; Evgeny Primakov asserts that the stated support of the Reagan Administration (20 January 1981-20 January 1989) for a political settlement of the Afghanistan Conflict (1978-) is for Public relations purposes while actual United States policy toward Afghanistan obstructs a resolution in order to damage Soviet interests ; TASS (Soviet Union news agency) reports that Congressional delegations and representatives of the Soviet Union. Supreme Soviet discussed the Afghanistan Conflict (1978-) and agreed that a settlement would normalize Soviet Union-United States relations and improve International relations in general

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency asserts that the failure of [Military assistance; Economic assistance] to stem the growth of the National Resistance (Mozambique) or improve Economic conditions led Samora Machel to turn to [South Africa; United States; Western Europe] for assistance; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency discusses Soviet interests in Mozambique asserting that the Soviet Union has established a broad range of [Military relations; Economic relations; Foreign relations] with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique since Mozambique gained its Independence; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency asserts that possibilities for increasing Soviet influence in Mozambique include increasing Economic assistance and upgrading [Soviet military advisors; Cuban military advisors] as well as pressing Fidel Castro Ruz to introduce Cuba. Armed Forces in support of Counterinsurgency operations; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency asserts that the Soviet Union is trying to reassert Soviet influence with Mozambique in order to gain access to [Airfields; Naval facilities] to enable it to monitor U.S. and South African activities in the region and undermine their Diplomatic initiatives as well as reestablishing Mozambique as a base of operations for anti-South Africa Liberation movements

Chester A. Crocker states that United States policy toward Southern Africa is to counter Soviet intervention by using peaceful means to achieve settlements in [Angola; Namibia]; Chester A. Crocker states that the [Soviet Union; Warsaw Pact; Cuba] are playing an active role in Southern Africa and communist influence in the [South West Africa People's Organization; African National Congress (South Africa)] is significant; Chester A. Crocker provides Congressional testimony before the U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary on the influence of Communist countries in Southern Africa; Chester A. Crocker asserts that there has been a substantial strengthening of Soviet interests in Southern Africa including an increase in the number of [Soviet military advisors; Cuban military advisors] in [Angola; Mozambique]

United States Embassy. Afghanistan asserts that Soviet Diplomats may be urging the reorganization of the Taraki Administration (30 April 1978-14 September 1979) in order to counter [Political opposition; Insurgency] without resorting to Soviet military intervention ; Soviet Union. Armed Forces presence in Afghanistan indicates that the Soviet Union is prepared to use Soviet military intervention to support the Taraki Administration (30 April 1978-14 September 1979) ; United States Embassy. Afghanistan asserts that Soviet Diplomats are urging the Taraki Administration (30 April 1978-14 September 1979) to improve Afghanistan-United States relations because the reduction of U.S. Economic assistance could be counter to larger Soviet interests