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"Spatial voting"
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Crossing the Line: Evidence for the Categorization Theory of Spatial Voting
Bølstad and Dinas (2017) propose a model of spatial voting, based on social identity theory, that suggests supporting a candidate/policy on the other side of the ideological spectrum has a disutility that is not accounted for by common spatial models. Unfortunately, the data they use cannot speak directly to whether the disutility arises because individuals perceive their ideology as a social identity. We present the results of an experimental study that measures the norm against crossing the ideological spectrum; tests the cost of doing so, controlling for spatial effects; and demonstrates that this cost increases with the salience and strength of identity norms. By demonstrating the norm mechanism for the disutility of crossing the ideological spectrum, we provide strong support for B&D's model.
Journal Article
Expressive voting, graded interests and participation
I assume that voters mark ballots exclusively to express their true preferences among parties, leaving aside any considerations about an election’s possible outcome. The paper then analyzes the resulting voting behavior. In particular, it studies how effective different voting systems such as plurality rule, approval voting, and range voting are in fostering high turnout rates of such expressive voters.
Journal Article
With Frenemies Like These: Rising Power Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly
The rise of non-Western powers has led to competing claims about how these states act among each other and how they behave vis-à-vis established powers. Existing accounts argue that the rising powers are a heterogenous group of competing states and that they are socialized into the existing Western-centered order. This article challenges these claims, arguing that the rising powers are dissatisfied with the international status quo and that they have begun to form a bloc against the established powers. The authors contend that this dissatisfaction arises from their lack of influence on the international stage, their status in the international hierarchy and the norms that sustain the current international order. They maintain that the formation of a rising powers bloc is driven by the countries’ economic growth and international dynamics, fostering their institutionalization as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). To support this argument, the study combines spatial modeling techniques to analyze rising power voting behavior in the UN General Assembly over the period 1992–2011.
Journal Article
The case for minimax-TD
In spatial-model computer simulations with artificial voters and candidates, the well-known minimax single-winner voting system far outperformed 10 other systems at picking the best winners. It essentially tied with two others (Schulze and ranked pairs), both of which are far more complex than minimax. Minimax’s other advantages include Condorcet consistency, simplicity, monotonicity, and ease of voting because it allows tied and missing ranks. It also makes insincere strategic voting schemes difficult and dangerous for the schemers. The new minimax-TD system modifies minimax in three ways, all of which make it pick better winners, according to simulation studies: (a) TD includes Smith/minimax, (b) TD uses one particular definition of a candidate’s “largest loss” in two-way elections, and (c) TD includes a multi-stage tie-breaker which breaks nearly all ties. TD avoids four of the worst anomalies afflicting classic minimax. Four other minimax anomalies can be ignored, leaving TD arguably free of anomalies.
Journal Article
SPATIAL VOTING MODELS IN CIRCULAR SPACES
The use of spatialmodels for inferring members' preferences from voting data has become widespread in the study of deliberative bodies, such as legislatures. Most established spatial voting models assume that ideal points belong to a Euclidean policy space. However, the geometry of Euclidean spaces (even multidimensional ones) cannot fully accommodate situations in which members at the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum reveal similar preferences by voting together against the rest of the legislature. This kind of voting behavior can arise, for example, when extreme conservatives oppose a measure because they see it as being too costly, while extreme liberals oppose it for not going far enough for them. This paper introduces a new class of spatial voting models in which preferences live in a circular policy space. Such geometry for the latent space is motivated by both theoretical (the socalled \"horseshoe theory\" of political thinking) and empirical (goodness of fit) considerations. Furthermore, the circular model is flexible and can approximate the one-dimensional version of the Euclidean voting model when the data supports it. We apply our circular model to roll-call voting data from the U.S. Congress between 1988 and 2019 and demonstrate that, starting with the 112th House of Representatives, circular policy spaces consistently provide a better explanation of legislators's behavior than Euclidean ones and that legislators's rankings, generated through the use of the circular geometry, tend to be more consistent with those implied by their stated policy positions.
Journal Article
A Matter of Representation: Spatial Voting and Inconsistent Policy Preferences
The application of spatial voting theories to popular elections presupposes an electorate that chooses political representatives on the basis of their well-structured policy preferences. Behavioral researchers have long contended that parts of the electorate instead hold unstructured and inconsistent policy beliefs. This article proposes an extension to spatial voting theories to analyze the effect of varying consistency in policy preferences on electoral behavior. The model results in the expectation that voters with less consistent policy preferences will put less weight on policy distance when learning about candidates who should represent their political positions. The study tests this expectation for the 2008 US presidential election, and finds that for respondents with less consistent self-placements on the liberal–conservative scale, policy distance less strongly affects their voting decision. The results have implications for the quality of political representation, as certain parts of the electorate are expected to be less closely represented.
Journal Article
A comparison of zero- and minimal-intelligence agendas in majority-rule voting models
Emergent behavior in repeated collective decisions of minimally intelligent agents—who at each step in time invoke majority rule to choose between a status quo and a random challenge—can manifest through the long-term stationary probability distributions of a Markov chain. We use this known technique to compare two kinds of voting agendas: a zero-intelligence agenda that chooses the challenger uniformly at random and a minimally intelligent agenda that chooses the challenger from the union of the status quo and the set of winning challengers. We use Google Co-Lab’s GPU accelerated computing environment to compute stationary distributions for some simple examples from spatial-voting and budget-allocation scenarios. We find that the voting model using the zero-intelligence agenda converges more slowly, but in some cases to better outcomes.
Journal Article
Does the Ideological Proximity Between Candidates and Voters Affect Voting in U.S. House Elections?
Do citizens hold congressional candidates accountable for their policy positions? Recent studies reach different conclusions on this important question. In line with the predictions of spatial voting theory, a number of recent survey-based studies have found reassuring evidence that voters choose the candidate with the most spatially proximate policy positions. In contrast, most electoral studies find that candidates’ ideological moderation has only a small association with vote margins, especially in the modern, polarized Congress. We bring clarity to these discordant findings using the largest dataset to date of voting behavior in congressional elections. We find that the ideological positions of congressional candidates have only a small association with citizens’ voting behavior. Instead, citizens cast their votes “as if” based on proximity to parties rather than individual candidates. The modest degree of candidate-centered spatial voting in recent Congressional elections may help explain the polarization and lack of responsiveness in the contemporary Congress.
Journal Article
Issue Scales, Information Cues, and the Proximity and Directional Models of Voter Choice
One of the most important questions in the study of democratic politics centers on how citizens consider issues and candidate positions when choosing whom to support in an election. The proximity and directional theories make fundamentally different predictions about voter behavior and imply different optimal strategies for candidates, but a longstanding literature to empirically adjudicate between the theories has yielded mixed results. We use a survey experiment to show that the way that candidates' issue positions are described can cue citizens to choose a candidate that is preferred under the expectations of either the proximity or the directional theory. We find that directional voting is more likely when the issue scale is understood to represent degrees of intensity with which either the liberal or the conservative side of the issue is expressed and that proximity voting is more likely when an issue scale is understood to be a range of policies.
Journal Article