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The relationship of Turks with philosophy or their contribution to philosophy, determining the main lines of a philosophy tradition known as Turkish philosophy, its expression and description by a definition is a controversial and complex problem that should be clarified. However, it is necessary to carry out a critical investigation from the perspective exhibited from different fronts regarding Turkish philosophy currently. In this way, it would be more likely to determine where or from which case the controverse results from and it would give way to make an integration definition by taking all peculiar sides into account with a consideration of the lacking and kept out components. It is just the only thing aimed in the current study. It is because, it is only possible for Turkish philosophy to find its place on earth or in universal philosophy culture just like other philosophy understandings and traditions by revealing what it means, where it gets its origin from and what its general structure is. Depending on these senses, the studies in the literature were investigated by means of a critical perspective in both groups as the ones having a positive and a negative approach, and an integrating definition trial was made and the components taking place in the definition were explained in detail.

In my paper I respond to comments regarding my book Omnisubjectivity: An Essay on God and Subjectivity. W artykule odpowiadam na komentarze dotyczące mojej książki Omnisubjectivity: An Essay on God and Subjectivity.

In this paper, I elaborate a broadly Zagzebskian case for divine omnisubjectivity understood along the lines of her Empathy Model, defend it against an objection, and consider some implications of it.

Linda Zagzebski argues that God is omnisubjective: that God has a perfect first-person grasp of all subjective states, including belief states. While it’s impossible for any finite being to be omnisubjective, what’s impossible for finite beings may be possible for God. According to Zagzebski, divine omnisubjectivity is not only possible, but entailed by divine omniscience. In this paper, I argue that we should distinguish between three forms of divine omnisubjectivity: propositional omnisubjectivity (the thesis that God knows all first-person subjective propositions), perspectival omnisubjectivity (the thesis that God assumes all first-person subjective perspectives), and phenomenal omnisubjectivity (the thesis that God grasps all first-person phenomenal states). Distinguishing these forms of omnisubjectivity is important, since we should have different attitudes towards these different forms of omnisubjectivity: while propositional and perspectival omnisubjectivity are trivial or impossible (and not entailed by omniscience), phenomenal omnisubjectivity is interesting, epistemically possible, and suggested by other divine attributes.

The science of law is viewed from the outside and often from the inside, as an instruction that abounds in technicality, whose purpose is to create and implement a legislative level, to possess and govern a society, regardless of the way in which that society is governed. This study was keen to direct the flow of light towards the law’s essence, towards the philosophical core that has solidified the foundation of this science, and, ultimately, to bring out the concepts that have established the notion of law, which still subsists in contemporary times, under a vague form. This impulse comes from an aspiration to encompass this vast science and to transpose it beyond the letter of the law, through the indissoluble union between law and philosophy, in a manner that wishes to impute those persistent understandings that proclaim a strictly objective notion of law, devoid of the affective identification necessary for the performance of any act of justice.

The article concerns Linda T. Zagzebski’s book Omnisubjectivity. An Essay on God and Subjectivity (2023), in which she proposes the property of omnisubjectivity as a fundamental property of God’s being, encompassing a number of other attributes (such as love, justice, omniscience, and omnipresence) and is assumed in that fundamental relationship between the human being and the Absolute represented by prayer. In my article, I would like to illustrate Zagzebski’s concept with some examples taken from Nicholas of Cusa’s work The Vision of God. In my opinion, Cusanus’ texts not only provide a rich source of examples of the concept of omnisubjectivity, but also perfectly clarify Zagzebski’s understanding of omnisubjectivity in terms of the metaphor of light.

Omnisubjectivity, proposed as a divine attribute by Linda Zagzebski, is the view that “God grasps all the subjectivity that there is.” My article explains omnisubjectivity and endorses the claim that it should be accepted as an attribute of God. However, I criticize Zagzebski’s claims that omnisubjectivity is compatible with (1) divine timelessness and (2) a kenotic view of the incarnation. If omnisubjectivity is affirmed, those two views must be given up.

The present paper addresses a minarchist criticism of anarcho-capitalism based on the so-called paradox of deontology. The paper argues that minarchists are right in contending that minarchism does not run into a contradiction by recognizing individual rights and at the same time allowing their violations by the minimal state. However, the minarchist idea that the existence of the minimal state might be justified due to the paradox of deontology in which anarcho-capitalism is allegedly entangled is rejected. The whole discussion is conducted in the context of the exchange between Stanisław Wójtowicz’s rendition of the minarchist position as expressed in his recent paper “Libertarianism, Individual Rights, and the Paradox of Deontology: Rejoinder to Dominiak and Wysocki on Minarchism” (this issue) and Łukasz Dominiak and Igor Wysocki’s defense of anarcho-capitalism as presented in the target paper of Wójtowicz’s rejoinder, “The Anarcho-Capitalist Case against the State as a Challenge to the Minarchist Libertarians”, published also in Roczniki Filozoficzne recently.

Of the many issues that Jacek Wojtysiak addressed in his new book Między ukryciem a jawnością [Between Hiddenness and Openness] (2023), the polemic with John L. Schellenberg regarding the problem of God’s hiddenness deserves special attention. Schellenberg in an ingenious way wants to show that the very existence of atheists tests the truth of the thesis about the existence of a personal God. In response, J. Wojtysiak reverses J.L. Schellenberg’s argument, claiming that the universality of faith tests an atheist’s conviction. The aim of the article is to show that just as the proper conclusion of J.L. Schellenberg’s argument is not an atheistic thesis, J. Wojtysiak’s argument does not actually defend theism. It would rather be said about both arguments that they are arguments that support ultimism.The article consists of three parts. In the first one, I present Schellenberg’s argument from “God's hiddenness” and reconstruct J. Wojtysiak’s argument from the “great fact of faith.” In the second part, I try to show that the existence of immoral believers undermines the thesis about the universality of belief in a theistic God. In the third part, I present both arguments as supporting the ultimism thesis.

John L. Schellenberg, the author of the hiddenness argument, argues that if God existed, there would be no genuine nonbelievers. In his latest book, Jacek Wojtysiak states that a theist can reverse this reasoning and say that if God did not exist, there would be no genuine believers. He not only concludes that there are believers, it can be assumed that there are many more of them than nonbelievers. Thus, he can state the existence of the great fact of faith, against which the atheist is doubly helpless: firstly, he cannot explain it, and secondly, he is unable to present a parallel argument for atheism. In my article, I analyze the part of Wojtysiak’s book that is devoted to these issues and I come to the conclusion that an atheist is in a better position than the Polish philosopher suggests.