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In the relatively few studies of Israel's foreign policy conducted to date, much has been made of the centrality of domestic politics and national security concerns as driving forces. Why this should seem strange is a mystery, for the same could be said of almost every country: the centrality of securing the state and the degree to which domestic politics have an impact on what a state does are self-evident. Why, then, do the same characteristics appear to be more important when applied to Israel? There are at least three reasons why Israel's pursuit of its national interests abroad may seem different from that of other countries. First and foremost, Israel has since 1948, and indeed even earlier, defined itself as a state under constant threat of extinction. The Zionist struggle for legitimacy during the British Mandate was marked by periodic mini-wars with the Palestinian Arabs who sought to destroy the Zionist movement and expel those who, in their view, had dispossessed them from their land.

The accepted approach to American-Israeli relations during Eisenhower's presidency (1953-1957) holds that Eisenhower was aloof and distant toward Israel. Yet, Eisenhower's policies toward Israel during those years were nuanced and sophisticated, entwining interests and ideals. With the onset of the Cold War, Eisenhower aimed to preserve and increase American influence in the Middle East in a way that would not put Israel at risk, but would respond to concerns voiced at home about his policies toward Israel and the surrounding nations. Furthermore, the administration's approach was more continuous with Truman's than Eisenhower and Dulles let on, as evidenced by their policy of “friendly impartiality” toward Israel, attentiveness to Israel's military and economic needs, and sensitivity to the views of American Jewry.

The article examines the strategic calculations, assessments and dynamics behind Israel's decision to establish the so called “Southern Syria Region” (SSR) as an undeclared security zone on the Syrian Golan Heights with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. The article likewise considers Israel's policy vis-à-vis various rebel groups and other actors in the SSR and ultimately, what led Israel to end its intervention once the Syrian army returned to the area.

The article records my interview with Track Two Palestinian peace negotiator Hussein Agha. We discussed his own involvement in the peace process; the Oslo Accords; the Stockholm channel; the Beilin/Abu Mazen Agreement and Camp David 2000. We also discussed the qualities of the two Palestinian leaders who chose him for different assignments, Arafat and Abbas; the use of violence as a political weapon; Palestinian internal rivalries; the merits of Track Two negotiations, and the Palestinian Right of Return. The interview assesses the positive and negative lessons and implications of the peace process.

Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister (1947-64), and David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister (1948-54; 1955-63), played substantial roles in shaping two modern nation-states in post-Colonial Asia. The article is anchored by a comparative study of the two leaders who influenced nation-building through their individual political values and ideological convictions. The key question posed here is what similarities existed in the nation-building roles these figures played and how they may have contributed to the trajectories followed by their respective nations. Nehru and Ben-Gurion were both modernists in terms of their political visions of a secular, socialist-democratic and egalitarian state. Although the two men never met and remained on non-speaking terms because India had reservations about forging ties with Israel, they both represented qualities of leadership in Asia.

An examination of these relations not only through specific bilateral and multilateral concerns, but also within the respective contexts of Cold War, post-Cold War, and Middle Eastern and African politics. The article demonstrates that the region plays a complementary role to Israel's relations with Ethiopia, while the East African states have been drawn towards Israel primarily due to country-specific issues of security and economic development.

The “special relationship” between Israel and the US, according to conventional wisdom, parallels only the Anglo-American bond. During Barack Obama's presidency, however, some of the underlying foundations of the US-Israel “special relationship” were challenged and the outcome was noticeable discord and ongoing diplomatic friction between Washington and Jerusalem that continues to this day. The objective of this article is to examine the nature of these shifts during Obama's term in office and it concludes that while in each aspect there was a noticeable change that allowed Obama to exhibit a more critical position towards Israel, it was insufficient to transform the relationship from “special” to “normal”.

Israel's influential role in the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification since the agreement's inception is explored. Several factors can explain the country's successful diplomatic interaction. A combination of: low international interest and competition for expertise about the issue; Israel's unique, achievements in combatting desertification as part of its agricultural and forestry activities; and Professor Uriel Safriel's extraordinary stature in the field—contribute to its exceptional involvement. The case constitutes a “proof of concept” for Israel's potential to be effectively engaged in other UN programs. This will require greater government commitment and contribution to international initiatives, along with a willingness to authorize experts and academics to represent the country in additional global frameworks.

In the aftermath of the Six-Day War (5–10 June 1967), Britain's foreign secretary, George Brown, invested significant efforts in improving Britain's relations with Egypt as part of his strategy to restore Britain's standing in the Arab world and protect British economic and geostrategic interests in the Middle East. The unavoidable result of this policy was the worsening of relations between Britain and Israel, which blamed the British Foreign Office of adopting a deliberate pro-Arab and anti-Israel policy. The growing tension between the two countries developed into a personal confrontation between the Israeli prime minister and the British foreign secretary, who was regarded in Israel as the chief architect of the change of British policy in the region.

The linkage between foreign and humanitarian aid and voting at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has only recently received academic attention as scholars began to focus mainly on US aid and its impact on voting in favor of US resolutions promoted in both settings. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to explore the connection between aid provided by Israel and voting by recipient countries at the UNGA generally, and three specific countries—the Philippines, Chad, and Ukraine—in particular, on resolutions which are unfavorable to Israel. The article concludes with some thoughts about the use of foreign aid as a policy tool.