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"Spieltheorie"
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The magic circle : principles of gaming & simulation
\"The purpose of this unique book is to outline the core of game science by presenting principles underlying the design and use of games and simulations\"--Page 4 of cover.
Book
The interplay of competition and cooperation
Research streams on competition and cooperation are central to the field of strategic management but have evolved independently. The emerging literature on coopetition has brought attention to the phenomenon of simultaneous competition and cooperation, yet the interplay between the two has remained under-researched. We offer a roadmap for studying this interplay, which identifies some of its antecedents and consequences, highlights debates concerning the nature of competition and cooperation and the association between the two, and directs attention to the tension between competition and cooperation and the alternative approaches for managing this tension. We discuss the broader implications of the interplay, note some intriguing open questions, offer directions for future research, and present an organizing framework for the interplay of competition and cooperation.
Journal Article
Optimal large population Tullock contests
Abstract
We consider Tullock contests where contestants can be divided into a finite set of types according to their strategy cost function. Solving such contests is intractable if the number of players is finite but large and there are nonlinearities and asymmetries present. But by approximating the finite player contest with a large population model that can be solved in closed form, we can approximate equilibrium behavior in the finite player model. We then characterize the optimal bias parameters of the large population contest and interpret them as approximations of optimal bias parameters in finite player contests. We also identify conditions under which those parameters are increasing or decreasing according to the cost parameters. The parameters are biased in favor of high-cost agents if the cost functions are strictly convex and the likelihood of success is sufficiently responsive to strategy.
Journal Article
Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation
Many information structures generate correlated rather than mutually independent signals, the news media being a prime example. This article provides experimental evidence that many people neglect the resulting double-counting problem in the updating process. In consequence, beliefs are too sensitive to the ubiquitous “telling and re-telling of stories” and exhibit excessive swings. We identify substantial and systematic heterogeneity in the presence of the bias and investigate the underlying mechanisms. The evidence points to the paramount importance of complexity in combination with people’s problems in identifying and thinking through the correlation. Even though most participants in principle have the computational skills that are necessary to develop rational beliefs, many approach the problem in a wrong way when the environment is moderately complex. Thus, experimentally nudging people’s focus towards the correlation and the underlying independent signals has large effects on beliefs.
Journal Article
Bad Greenwashing, Good Greenwashing: Corporate Social Responsibility and Information Transparency
With the growing popularity of corporate social responsibility (CSR), critics point out that firms tend to focus on salient CSR activities while slacking off on the unobservable ones, using CSR as a marketing gimmick. Firms’ emphasis on observable aspects and negligence of the unobservable aspects are often labeled as
greenwashing
. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of CSR investment, in which consumers are socially minded, but they can observe only a subset of CSR initiatives. Two types of firms are considered: those that are driven solely by profit maximization and those that are
socially responsible
, motivated not only by profit, but also by a genuine concern for the social good. Our analysis examines how information transparency affects a firm’s strategies and the social welfare, and we identify both positive and negative aspects of greenwashing. First, low transparency incentivizes a profit-driven firm to engage in greenwashing through observable investment. Greenwashing prevents consumers from making informed purchase decisions but raises overall CSR spending. Second, sufficiently high transparency eliminates greenwashing and can motivate a socially responsible firm to make extra observable investment under the threat of greenwashing on the part of a profit-driven firm. However, when transparency further increases, this extra investment diminishes. In addition, our paper studies the impacts of firms’ budget constraint and consumers’ bargaining power: Raising the budget and increasing consumers’ bargaining power can both lead to an inferior social outcome.
This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.
Journal Article
A Theory of Experimenters
This paper studies the problem of experiment design by an ambiguity-averse decision-maker who trades off subjective expected performance against robust performance guarantees. This framework accounts for real-world experimenters’ preference for randomization. It also clarifies the circumstances in which randomization is optimal: when the available sample size is large and robustness is an important concern. We apply our model to shed light on the practice of rerandomization, used to improve balance across treatment and control groups. We show that rerandomization creates a trade-off between subjective performance and robust performance guarantees. However, robust performance guarantees diminish very slowly with the number of rerandomizations. This suggests that moderate levels of rerandomization usefully expand the set of acceptable compromises between subjective performance and robustness. Targeting a fixed quantile of balance is safer than targeting an absolute balance objective.
Journal Article
The self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a competing strategy. But this information is not always accurate. To avoid ambiguity a learner may therefore decide to collect a more reliable statistics by averaging the payoff values of its opponents in the neighborhood, and makes a decision afterwards. This simple alteration of the standard microscopic protocol significantly improves the cooperation level in a population. Furthermore, the positive impact can be strengthened by increasing the role of the environment and the size of the evaluation circle. The mechanism that explains this improvement is based on a self-organizing process which reveals the detrimental consequence of defector aggregation that remains partly hidden during face-to-face comparisons. Notably, the reported phenomenon is not limited to lattice populations but remains valid also for systems described by irregular interaction networks.
Journal Article
