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The U.S. government is facing the dual challenge of building its own interagency capacity for conducting stability operations while simultaneously building partner capacity (BPC) for stability operations. This study finds that although BPC and stability operations are receiving a good deal of attention in official strategy and planning documents, insufficient attention is being paid to the details of an integrated strategy.

Almost two years after the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013, the increasing number of asymmetric terrorist attacks targeting UN peacekeepers - in the context of a drawn-out peace process - has raised a number of questions in Mali, the sub-region, and in New York, over the relevance and adequacies of MINUSMA's mandate and capabilities. It also raises a broader issue, of whether the consent-based UN peacekeeping tool is appropriate and can be effective in carrying out stabilization mandates in such a context and what doctrine such operations should be based on. The UN is indeed under increasing pressure from host countries and some African troop-contributing countries to go on the offensive. Member States have also increasingly recognized terrorism and organized crime as a strategic threat, and while opposed to the UN directly engaging in counterterrorism (CT) operations, some may wish to see the UN playing a greater stabilization role following the January 2013 French military intervention in Mali. However, little guidance and means have been given so far to UN missions for dealing with such threats and implementing effective stabilization mandates. The High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, which recently released its report, noted that the usage of the term \"stabilization\" by the UN requires clarification. This article analyses the complex and evolving nature of threats in northern Mali and implications for MINUSMA and describes the military and political tools - including mediation - so far available within and outside the UN. The article concludes that the UN is bound to move towards stabilization when and if deployed in contexts such as Mali's if it wants to remain relevant. However, such a move should be based on an overarching UN stabilization doctrine and context-specific UN-wide stabilization strategies which are first and foremost political, and should not be confused with the reestablishment of state authority. Such a move should also be accompanied by reforms in the design of 'lighter' but more capable UN operations, and partnership with non-UN parallel fighting forces with shared stabilization objectives, but with a clear division of labor.

This edited volume provides a critical overview of the new stabilization agenda in international relations. The primary focus of so-called stability operations since 9/11 has been Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Covering the wider picture, this volume provides a comprehensive assessment of the new agenda, including the expansion of efforts in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia. By harnessing the findings of studies undertaken in Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and Sri Lanka, the volume demonstrates the impacts - intended and otherwise - of stabilization in practice. The book clarifies the debate on stabilization, focusing primarily on the policy, practice and outcomes of such operations. Rather than relying exclusively on existing military doctrine or academic writings, the volume focuses on stabilization as it is actually occurring. Drawing on the reflections of scholars and practitioners, the volume identifies the origins and historical antecedents of contemporary operations, and also examines how the practice is linked to other policy spheres - ranging from peacebuilding to statebuilding. Finally, the volume reviews eight practical cases of stabilization in disparate regions around the globe. This book will be of much interest to students of war and conflict studies, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, statebuilding, development studies and international relations in general.

Major General (Ret.) Edward B. Atkeson decries the decade-long campaign the United States has undertaken in the wake of 9/11 and offers a broad plan for global protection of American interests. He proposes shifting the military burden to friendly indigenous fighters recruited, trained, and equipped under United States leadership for operation in their native environments. Atkeson finds ample precedent for the effectiveness of similar legions of fighters. He lays out how such a program would work and shows how these legions could help the United States achieve its global objectives in a more cost-effective way.

Much activity is being aimed at revising the approach to planning and implementing Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The changes are meant to ensure a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on involving all available government assets in the effort. The authors find that some elements essential to the success of the process are not yet in place.

This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right--or wrong--to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability.

This book identifies the procedures and capabilities that the U.S. Department of Defense, other agencies of the U.S. government, U.S. allies and partners, and international organizations require in order to support the transition from counterinsurgency, when the military takes primary responsibility for security and economic operations, to stability and reconstruction, when police and civilian government agencies take the lead.

Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, represents a milestone in Army doctrine. With a focus on transforming conflict, managing violence when it does occur and maintaining stable peace, The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual (otherwise known as FM 3-07) signals a stark departure from traditional military doctrine. The Army officially acknowledges the complex continuum from conflict to peace, outlines the military's responsibility to provide stability and security, and recognizes the necessity of collaboration, coordination, and cooperation among military, state, commercial, and non-government organizations in nation-building efforts. The manual reflects a truly unique collaboration between the Army and a wide array of experts from hundreds of groups across the United States Government, the intergovernmental and non-governmental communities, America's allies around the world, and the private sector. All branches of the armed forces, U.S. agencies ranging from the State Department to Homeland Security to Health and Human Services, international agencies from the United Nations to the Red Cross to the World Bank, countries from the United Kingdom to India to South Africa, private think tanks from RAND to the United States Institute of Peace to the Center for New American Security, all took part in the shaping of this document. The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual, marks just the second time in modern history that the U.S. Army has worked with a private publisher to produce a military doctrinal document.

Defined as operations other than war, stability operations can include peacekeeping activities, population control, and counternarcotics efforts, and for the entire history of the United States military, they have been considered a dangerous distraction if not an outright drain on combat resources. Yet in 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense reversed its stance on these practices, a dramatic shift in the mission of the armed forces and their role in foreign and domestic affairs. With the elevation of stability operations, the job of the American armed forces is no longer just to win battles but to create a controlled, nonviolent space for political negotiations and accord. Yet rather than produce revolutionary outcomes, stability operations have resulted in a large-scale mission creep with harmful practical and strategic consequences. Jennifer Morrison Taw examines the military's sudden embrace of stability operations and its implications for American foreign policy and war. Through a detailed examination of deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, changes in U.S. military doctrine, adaptations in force preparation, and the political dynamics behind this new stance, Taw connects the preference for stability operations to the far-reaching, overly ambitious American preoccupation with managing international stability. She also shows how domestic politics have reduced civilian agencies' capabilities while fostering an unhealthy overreliance on the military. Introducing new concepts such as securitized instability and institutional privileging, Taw builds a framework for understanding and analyzing the expansion of the American armed forces' responsibilities in an ever-changing security landscape.

Field Manual 3-07,Stability Operations, represents a milestone in Army doctrine. With a focus on transforming conflict, managing violence when it does occur and maintaining stable peace,The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual(otherwise known as FM 3-07) signals a stark departure from traditional military doctrine. The Army officially acknowledges the complex continuum from conflict to peace, outlines the military's responsibility to provide stability and security, and recognizes the necessity of collaboration, coordination, and cooperation among military, state, commercial, and non-government organizations in nation-building efforts. The manual reflects a truly unique collaboration between the Army and a wide array of experts from hundreds of groups across the United States Government, the intergovernmental and non-governmental communities, America's allies around the world, and the private sector. All branches of the armed forces, U.S. agencies ranging from the State Department to Homeland Security to Health and Human Services, international agencies from the United Nations to the Red Cross to the World Bank, countries from the United Kingdom to India to South Africa, private think tanks from RAND to the United States Institute of Peace to the Center for New American Security, all took part in the shaping of this document. The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual,marks just the second time in modern history that the U.S. Army has worked with a private publisher to produce a military doctrinal document. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV is Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Shawn Brimley, Fellow, Center for a New American Security Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans \"It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history. It institutionalizes the hard-won lessons of the past while charting a path for tomorrow. This manual postures our military forces for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where the unflagging bravery of our Soldiers will continue to carry the banner of freedom, hope, and opportunity to the people of the world.\"-From the foreword by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas