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We examine why organizations that obtain prominent certifications may at times elect not to publicize them. Drawing on the impression management literature, we argue and show that concerns about being perceived as hypocritical may cause organizations to strategically withhold their certification status. Using a longitudinal panel of corporations that were members of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, a prominent environmental certification, we show that in the face of reputational threats, organizations are less likely to publicize their certification status when the threat appears to directly contradict the claims implied by the certification. Our findings suggest that the threat of hypocrisy is amplified for firms with stronger reputations in the same domain as the certification and when audience members better understand and value the certification. Our findings delineate new boundary conditions under which firms will make prosocial claims and inspire reconsideration of long-held assumptions about the process of decoupling the implementation and communication of socially valued practices. This study also provides insights for scholars of nonmarket strategy on how corporations strategically communicate with external constituents about their sustainability initiatives.

For a period starting in 2015, Apple, Google, and Microsoft became the most valuable companies in the world. Each was marked by an external developer ecosystem. Anecdotally, at least, developers matter. Using a formal model of code spillovers, we show how a rising number of developers can invert the firm. That is, firms will choose to innovate using open external contracts in preference to closed vertical integration. The locus of value creation moves from inside the firm to outside. Distinct from physical goods, digital goods afford firms the chance to optimize spillovers. Further, firms that pursue high risk innovations with more developers can be more profitable than firms that pursue low risk innovations with fewer developers. More developers give platform firms more chances at success. Our contribution is to show why developers might cause a shift in organizational form and to provide a theory of how platform firms optimize their own intellectual property regimes in order to maximize growth. We use stylized facts from multiple platform firms to illustrate our theory and results.

This article presents, an analysis of the opinions of assurance providers regarding the quality and the limitations of sustainability reports and their recommendations to improve them using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) as a framework. The qualitative content analysis of 301 assurance statements for sustainability reports from mining and energy companies provides a comprehensive view of the main outcomes of the assurance process, including its limitations, the application of the GRI principles and suggestions for improving sustainability reports. Taking into account the perceptions of practitioners a priori well informed on the quality of sustainability reports—namely assurance providers—this paper complements the current literature on sustainability reporting and its assurance, including critical approaches that question the reliability of sustainability reports, stakeholder engagement and the accountability of reporting practices. This study contributes to the debates surrounding the quality of sustainability reports, the added value of assurance statements and the ethical issues underlying the assurance process. It also contains important practical implications for auditors, standardization organizations and stakeholders.

Suppose that a firm in charge of a business ecosystem is a firm in charge of a microeconomy. To achieve the highest growth rate, how open should that economy be? To encourage third-party developers, how long should their intellectual property interests last? We develop a sequential innovation model that addresses the trade-offs inherent in these two decisions: (i) Closing the platform increases the sponsor’s ability to charge for access, while opening the platform increases developer ability to build upon it. (ii) The longer third-party developers retain rights to their innovations, the higher the royalties they and the sponsor earn, but the sooner those developers’ rights expire, the sooner their innovations become a public good upon which other developers can build. Our model allows us to characterize the optimal levels of openness and of intellectual property (IP) duration in a platform ecosystem. We use standard Cobb–Douglas production technologies to derive our results. These findings can inform innovation strategy, choice of organizational form, IP noncompete decisions, and regulation policy. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.

Companies that source from emerging economies often face supplier responsibility risks , namely, financial and reputational burdens that the companies have to bear when their suppliers’ engagement in noncomplying labor and environmental practices becomes public. To mitigate such risks, companies can invest in screening mechanisms and design incentive schemes in sourcing contracts. Common mitigation instruments include supplier certification, process audits, and contingency payments. The interactions of these instruments are often not well understood. We first note that the effectiveness of any mitigation instrument depends on how it changes the economic trade-offs faced by a supplier in compliance to social and environmental standard, and hence we develop a model that explicitly captures such trade-offs. As a result, our model endogenizes the supplier’s noncompliance probability and connects it with various factors, including the supplier’s intrinsic ethical level that is unobservable to the buyer. We then study the buyer’s optimal contracting problem under different mitigation instruments. We find that although the process audit and contingency payment instruments can directly lower supplier responsibility risk, they, acting alone, are not as effective as the supplier certification instrument in screening suppliers with different ethical levels. Nevertheless, these instruments are all complementary to each other; when used jointly, they make supplier screening more effective and result in lower sourcing cost. These findings provide explanations for some of the observed practices used in industry to mitigate supplier responsibility risks. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management .

We study compatibility decisions of two competing platform owners that generate profits through both hardware sales and royalties from content sales. We consider a game-theoretic model in which two platforms offer different standalone utilities to users. We find that incentives to establish one-way compatibility—the platform owner with smaller standalone value grants access to its proprietary content application to users of the competing platform—can arise from the difference in their profit foci. As the difference in the standalone utilities increases, royalties from content sales become less important to the platform owner with greater standalone value, but more important to the other platform owner. One-way compatibility can thus increase asymmetry between the platform owners’ profit foci and, given a sufficiently large difference in the standalone utilities, yields greater profits for both platform owners. We further show that social welfare is greater under one-way compatibility than under incompatibility. We also investigate how factors such as exclusive content and hardware-only adopters affect compatibility incentives. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.

While prior ecolabel research suggests that consumers' trust of ecolabel sponsors is associated with their purchase of ecolabeled products, we know little about how third-party certification might relate to consumer purchases when trust varies. Drawing on cognitive theory and a stratified random sample of more than 1200 consumers, we assess how third-party certification relates to consumers' use of ecolabels across different program sponsors. We find that consumers' trust of government and environmental NGOs to provide credible environmental information encourages consumers' use of ecolabels sponsored by these entities, and consumers do not differentiate between certified versus uncertified ecolabels in the presence of trust. By contrast, consumers' distrust of private business to provide credible environmental information discourages their use of business associationsponsored ecolabels. However, these ecolabels may be able to overcome consumer distrust if their sponsors certify the ecolabels using third-party auditors. These findings are important to sponsors who wish develop ecolabels that are more credible to consumers, and thus encourage more widespread ecolabel use.

While a growing body of literature has examined the link between green activities and firm innovation, little attention has been paid to the underlying mechanisms through which green activities take effect. This paper leverages the context of ISO 14001 certification among Chinese listed firms to investigate how the certification of environmental management system (EMS) to ISO 14001 shapes corporate technological innovation. Drawing from the resourcebased view and the resource management perspective, we argue that EMS certification to ISO 14001 facilitates corporate technological innovation through the mediating effects of firms' internal resource management practices, namely resource utilization, resource accumulation, and resource allocation. A difference-in-differences research design, together with the propensity score matching approach and the instrumental variable technique, provides corroborating evidence for our predictions. The current research not only makes substantial contributions to the literature, but also provides important ethical implications for both policymakers and firm managers.

Despite lab-based evidence supporting the argument that double standards—by which one group is unfairly held to stricter standards than another—explain observed gender differences in evaluations, it remains unclear whether double standards also affect evaluations in organization and market contexts, where competitive pressures create a disincentive to discriminate. Using data from a field study of investment professionals sharing recommendations on an online platform, and drawing on status theory, we identify the conditions under which double standards in multistage evaluations contribute to unequal outcomes for men and women. We find that double standards disadvantaging women are most likely when evaluators face heightened search costs related to the number of candidates being compared or higher levels of uncertainty stemming from variation in the amount of pertinent information available. We rule out that systematic gender differences in the actions or characteristics of the investment professionals being evaluated are driving these results. By more carefully isolating the role of this status-based mechanism of discrimination for perpetuating gender inequality, this study identifies not only whether but also the conditions under which gender-based double standards lead to a female disadvantage, even when relevant and objective information about performance is readily available.