Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
128
result(s) for
"Standardized terms of contract."
Sort by:
Boilerplate
Boilerplate--the fine-print terms and conditions that we become subject to when we click \"I agree\" online, rent an apartment, enter an employment contract, sign up for a cellphone carrier, or buy travel tickets--pervades all aspects of our modern lives. On a daily basis, most of us accept boilerplate provisions without realizing that should a dispute arise about a purchased good or service, the nonnegotiable boilerplate terms can deprive us of our right to jury trial and relieve providers of responsibility for harm.Boilerplateis the first comprehensive treatment of the problems posed by the increasing use of these terms, demonstrating how their use has degraded traditional notions of consent, agreement, and contract, and sacrificed core rights whose loss threatens the democratic order.
Margaret Jane Radin examines attempts to justify the use of boilerplate provisions by claiming either that recipients freely consent to them or that economic efficiency demands them, and she finds these justifications wanting. She argues, moreover, that our courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies have fallen short in their evaluation and oversight of the use of boilerplate clauses. To improve legal evaluation of boilerplate, Radin offers a new analytical framework, one that takes into account the nature of the rights affected, the quality of the recipient's consent, and the extent of the use of these terms. Radin goes on to offer possibilities for new methods of boilerplate evaluation and control, among them the bold suggestion that tort law rather than contract law provides a preferable analysis for some boilerplate schemes. She concludes by discussing positive steps that NGOs, legislators, regulators, courts, and scholars could take to bring about better practices.
eBook
From industrial to legal standardization, 1871-1914 : transnational insurance law and the great San Francisco earthquake
Around 1900, standard contracts and clauses spread throughout international industries such as transport, insurance and finance. The \"earthquake clause\", which was globally introduced by reinsurers after the 1906 San Francisco catastrophe, exemplifies this paradigmatic change of the law.
eBook
Unfair Contract Terms in European Law
The book examines Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and its implementation with a two fold aim: first, to understand the extent to which the Directive has influenced and will influence fundamental notions and principles of contract law in the domestic legal systems of the Member States; second, it examines the extent to which the domestic legal traditions of the Member States have influenced the process of drafting of the Directive and, more importantly, will affect the way that the Directive is interpreted and applied in national courts. The focus is mainly on English law (including the 2005 Unfair Terms in Contracts Bill) and on Italian law, but frequent references are made to the French and the German systems. At the same time, the book has a broader, more ‘European’ concern, in that it aims to distill from the existing Community acquis and from the history and rationale of Directive 93/13 notions and concepts that could guide its interpretation. It is well known that Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to it, and that legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in EC law and in the law of the various Member States: every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of its own objectives and rationale, and of the objectives and rationale of Community law as a whole. In this respect, this book aims to identify the contours and features of the emerging European legal tradition, and to assess the impact that this may have on the domestic traditions.
eBook
Designing Buyback Contracts for Irrational But Predictable Newsvendors
One of the main assumptions in research on designing supply contracts is that decision makers act in a way that maximizes their expected profit. A number of laboratory experiments demonstrate that this assumption does not hold. Specifically, faced with uncertain demand, decision makers place orders that systematically deviate from the expected profit maximizing levels. We have added to this body of knowledge by demonstrating that ordering decisions also systematically depend on individual contract parameters and by developing a behavioral model that captures this systematic behavior. We proceed to test our behavioral model using laboratory experiments and use the data to derive empirical model parameters. We then test our approach in out-of-sample validation experiments that confirm that, indeed, contracts designed using the behavioral model perform better than contracts designed using the standard model.
This paper was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations management.
Journal Article