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In this study, we assess the causal impact of stakeholder orientation on innovation. To obtain exogenous variation in stakeholder orientation, we exploit the enactment of state-level constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider stakeholders’ interests when making business decisions. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that the enactment of constituency statutes leads to a significant increase in the number of patents and citations per patent. We further argue and provide evidence suggesting that stakeholder orientation sparks innovation by encouraging experimentation and enhancing employees’ innovative productivity. Finally, we find that the positive effect of stakeholder orientation on innovation is larger in consumer-focused and less eco-friendly industries. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2229 . This paper was accepted by Lee Fleming, entrepreneurship and innovation .

Evliliğin sona ermesiyle evlilik birliğindeki malvarlığı değerlerinin hakkaniyete uygun biçimde paylaştırılması gerekmektedir. Malvarlığı değerlerinin orantılı biçimde paylaştırılabilmesi için, eşlerin mal rejimi sona erdiğinde talep edebileceği birtakım alacak hakları bulunmaktadır. Eşler, tasfiye aşamasında, kural olarak evlilik süresince edindikleri “edinilmiş mallarının” yarısı üzerinde alacak hakkına sahiptir. Bu hak, artık değer hesabı yapıldıktan sonra çıkan miktarın yarısını oluşturan “katılma alacağı” olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Mal rejimi sona erdiğinde eşler “katılma alacağı” taleplerini mal rejiminin tasfiyesinden kaynaklanan davalar ile öne sürebileceklerdir. Amaç: Bu çalışmada, “katılma alacağının” talebine ilişkin zamanaşımı süresi ile ilgili öğretideki görüş ayrılıkları ve uygulamadaki son durumun incelenmesi amaçlanmıştır. Yöntem: Çalışmada “katılma alacağının” tâbi olduğu zamanaşımı süresine yönelik öğretide iki farklı görüş ayrılığına sebebiyet veren ilgili Türk Medeni Kanunu’nun 178. maddesi ve Türk Borçlar Kanunu’nun 146. maddesindeki zamanaşımı süreleri incelenerek Yargıtay uygulamasındaki son durum ile öğretideki görüş farklılıklarının gerekçeleri incelenmiştir. Bulgular: Mal rejiminin sona ermesinde “katılma alacağının” zamanaşımı süresinin Türk Borçlar Kanunu’nun 146. maddesi gereğince 10 yıl olması gerektiği yönünde ve Türk Medeni Kanunu’nun 178. maddesi gereğince 1 yıl olması gerektiği yönünde iki farklı görüş mevcut ise de Yargıtay TBK m.146 gereği 10 yıllık zamanaşımı süresini kabul etmektedir. Özgünlük: “Katılma alacağının” tabi olduğu zamanaşımı süresine yönelik görüş ayrılıkları neticesinde zamanaşımı süresi bakımından belirsizlikleri gidermek isteyen ve konu hakkında bilgi sahibi olmak isteyenler için özgün bir makaledir. With the dissolution of the marriage, the assets in the marriage union should be shared in an equitable manner. In order for the property values to be shared proportionally, the spouses have certain receivables that they can claim when the property regime ends. As a rule, spouses have the right to claim over half of their \"acquired property\" acquired during the marriage during the liquidation phase. This right is called the “participation receivable”, which constitutes half of the amount that comes out after the residual value calculation is made. When the property regime comes to an end, the spouses will be able to put forward their claims for participation with the lawsuits arising from the liquidation of the property regime. Purpose: In this study, it is aimed to examine the differences of opinion in the doctrine about the statute of limitations regarding the request for \"participation claim\" and the latest situation in practice. Method: In the study, the statute of limitations in Article 178 of the Turkish Civil Code and Article 146 of the Turkish Code of Obligations, which cause two different disagreements in the doctrine regarding the statute of limitations to which the \"participation claim\" is subject, were examined, and the latest situation in the practice of the Court of Cassation and the justification of the differences of opinion in the doctrine were examined. Findings: Although there are two different opinions that the statute of limitations for the “participation claim” at the end of the property regime should be 10 years in accordance with Article 146 of the Turkish Code of Obligations, and that it should be 1 year in accordance with Article 178 of the Turkish Civil Code, Article 146 of the Supreme Court of Appeals. accepts the 10-year statute of limitations. Originality: This is an original article for those who want to get rid of the uncertainties in terms of the statute of limitations as a result of differences of opinion regarding the statute of limitations to which the \"participation claim\" is subject, and for those who wish to have information on the subject.

Research Summary: This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) improves firms' competitiveness in the market for government procurement contracts. To obtain exogenous variation in firms' social engagement, I exploit a quasi-natural experiment provided by the enactment of state-level constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider stakeholders' interests when making business decisions. Using constituency statutes as instrumental variable (IV) for CSR, I find that companies with higher CSR receive more procurement contracts. The effect is stronger for more complex contracts and in the early years of the government-company relationship, suggesting that CSR helps mitigate information asymmetries by signaling trustworthiness. Moreover, the effect is stronger in competitive industries, indicating that CSR can serve as a differentiation strategy to compete against other bidders. Managerial Summary: This study examines how companies can strategically improve their competitiveness in the market for government procurement contracts—a market of economic importance (15-20% of GDP). It shows that companies with higher social and environmental performance (CSR) receive more procurement contracts. This effect is stronger for more complex contracts, in the early years of the government-company relationship, and in more competitive industries. These findings indicate that firms' CSR can serve as a signaling and differentiation strategy that influences the purchasing decision of government agencies. Accordingly, managers operating in the business-to-government (B2G) sector could benefit from integrating social and environmental considerations into their strategic decision making.

Recent Court Decisions on Real Estate and Valuation In June 2005, Pui Ho (Ho) purchased a home in Bristow, Virginia. On appeal, Ho contended that the period of time necessary to acquire an interest in property by adverse possession begins to run when the property interest is sufficiently invaded and continues to run regardless of any intervening sale by the rightful owner to someone else. [...]the trial court erred in sustaining Rahman's plea in bar that the fifteen-year statute of limitations could not have run against him because he had not owned the property for fifteen years. Not every instance of land possession has the potential to ripen into a claim of ownership, even if that possession has persisted for fifteen or more years. Because much remained to be proven in a trial court, the court remanded the case for further proceedines.

We live in a republic of amended statutes. In each Congress, our laws are amended tens of thousands of times. Individual statutes make amendments that number in the thousands. As a result, the amended statute has become the central democratic text of our age—a remarkable development for a type of document unknown at the Founding. Yet the amended statute has been relegated to an afterthought in legal theory. This is incredible neglect for an essential source of modern law—one that anchors innumerable rights in U.S. society. This Article demonstrates that, instead, the amended statute belongs at the center of public law. To that end, it undertakes three projects with respect to the amended statute: documenting, theorizing, and interpreting. It begins with documenting. Through a study consisting of over seven hundred searches of the Statutes at Large, it identifies—for the first time—the nearly half-million amendments made to federal statutes since the Founding. In so doing, it tells the story of statutory amendments in U.S. law. It is a story of remarkable transformation: from a statutory corpus with no amendments through the 1830s to one that now undergoes over eight thousand amendments each year. Contemporary statutes, it reveals, typically are amended statutes. Next, the Article theorizes amended statutory law. Despite its neglect in current legal theory, the amended statute was transformative. It created a new idea of the “statute” in the United States—introducing a new document, and one with different traits than the traditional statute. The Article theorizes the key changes this introduced into: (1) legislation, (2) the legislative process, (3) the institution of the legislature, and (4) statutory interpretation. These changes include enabling the rise of textualism, making methodological originalism impossible in interpretation, and divorcing the drafter from the legislator. The Article chronicles these many theoretical insights. Finally, the Article asks how to interpret amended statutory law. Revisiting two recent classics of statutory interpretation, Niz-Chavez v. Garland and Van Buren v. United States, it uncovers the unknown amendatory stories behind these landmark cases. In so doing, it shows the contemporary Supreme Court’s troubling inability to locate democratic decisions beneath the amended statute. And it models a competing method of interpretation—one more appropriate for a republic of amended statutes.

Debates about statutory interpretation typically proceed on the assumption that statutes have linguistic meanings that we can identify in the same way that we identify the meaning of utterances in ordinary conversation. But that premise is false. We identify the meaning of conversational utterances largely based on inferences about what the speaker intended to communicate. With legislatures, as now is widely recognized, there is no unitary speaker with the sort of communicative intentions that speakers in ordinary conversation possess. One might expect this recognition to trigger abandonment of the model of conversational interpretation as a framework for interpreting statutes. Instead, interpreters invent legislative intentions-purportedly \"objective\" ones for textualists-or purposes. With those inventions in place, judges and theorists then carry on talking about what statutes mean, or would mean to a reasonable person, as if there were a linguistic fact of the matter even in intelligibly disputed cases. But this is a deep and systematic error. Mainstream thinking about statutory interpretation needs a major reorientation. Contrary to widespread impressions, debates about statutory interpretation are not about what statutes mean as a matter of linguistic fact, but about which grounds for the attribution of an invented meaning would best promote judicial and governmental legitimacy. Having recognized that the model of conversational interpretation cannot ground claims about statutes' meanings in disputed cases, we also need to rethink the role of legislatures and courts in a political democracy. There are limits to what legislatures can reasonably be expected to accomplish. Courts need to play the role of helpmates to the legislature, not just faithful agents. In the interpretation of statutes, linguistic intuitions should matter, but primarily for normative reasons, involving justice and fairness in the coercive application of law, and not because they reveal the legislature's linguistically clear dictates.

The surplus lines market segment has grown tremendously since the fifth edition of this book. Surplus lines carriers have been providing more coverage in hard-to-insure markets and when the insurance market becomes hard, domestic insurance prices rise. And with more catastrophic losses, such as losses caused by wildfires, hurricanes, and other weather-related events, causing a hardening market, the amount of insurance written though the surplus lines market has and will continue to increase greatly. Industries such as construction that find getting coverage to be a difficult task are also turning to the surplus lines market. The U.S. surplus lines insurance market size was valued at $52.1 billion in 2019 and is projected to reach $125.9 billion by 2027.Now in its sixth edition,Annotations to Surplus Line Statutesis the most comprehensive analysis of surplus lines statutes available. It provides lawyers with a concise, single-volume reference which covers state surplus lines statutes, their amendments and regulations promulgated for all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.This new edition will be very useful to insurance regulatory lawyers, surplus lines brokers, surplus lines insurers, state surplus lines associations, and stamping offices.Much of what was covered in the fifth edition of the book was affected or displaced by the Non-Admitted and Reinsurance Reform Act (NRRA), which was part of Dodd-Frank, and other changes to the law. Some states are attempting to assert more regulatory control over surplus lines insurers to protect consumers, even though they are not admitted in the state and even though this was not done historically.

Most criminal law defenses serve the criminal law’s goal of shielding blameless defendants from liability. Justification defenses, such as selfdefense and law enforcement authority, exculpate on the ground that the defendant’s conduct, on balance, does not violate a societal norm. Excuse defenses, such as insanity and duress, exculpate on the ground that, while the defendant may well have violated a societal norm, it was done blamelessly. That is, it is the excusing conditions, not the defendant, that is to blame. In contrast, a third group of general defenses, which have been called “non-exculpatory defenses,” bar liability in instances where the defendant may have clearly violated a societal norm with full blameworthiness yet nonetheless is exempt from criminal liability because giving the exemption advances some societal interest independent of—and in conflict with—the criminal law’s goal of imposing deserved punishment in proportion to an offender’s blameworthiness. Non-exculpatory defenses openly sacrifice doing justice in order to promote the competing non-justice interest. A wide variety of non-exculpatory defenses are commonly recognized, including, for example, statutes of limitation, executive and legislative immunities, double jeopardy, diplomatic immunity, and the doctrines of the legality principle. Each of these defenses let blameworthy offenders go free even for serious crimes because such restraint promotes or protects some non-desert societal interest. Our examination of the doctrines suggests, however, that those balances of competing interests are commonly misaligned. This occurs in some instances because societal circumstances have significantly changed since the initial formulation of the defense, without any corresponding revision of the doctrine. In other instances, there is reason to suspect that no thoughtful balancing of the competing interests ever took place, perhaps because at the time there was insufficient appreciation of the practical importance of doing justice and the societal costs of regular failures of justice. In this article, we illustrate the problem by examining the three most commonly used non-exculpatory defenses: statutes of limitation, the double jeopardy rule, and the legality principle’s rule of strict construction. We acknowledge that each of these defenses was created to promote or protect an important societal interest. But we show that in each instance the societal circumstances have changed, altering the balance of competing interests, yet the formulation of the doctrines has not been adjusted accordingly. Our larger conclusion is that non-exculpatory defenses, based as they are upon a balance of competing societal interests, rather than principles of societal harm and personal blameworthiness, require constant re-examination and adjustment in ways that justification and excuse defenses do not.

In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argued for locating interpretive authority over law separately from those institutions tasked with formulating it. Hamilton’s vision, never accurate as a description of American practice, has not been credible for a long time. To the extent enormous power is still allocated to judges, our legal institutions have been out of step with our legal theory, which has long regarded them as political actors and policymakers. More practically, every term it is clearer and clearer that the role of the Supreme Court in statutory cases (including checking administrative rulemaking and other processes) is, if anything, more menacing than its role in the rare instances when it deploys its heaviest weaponry of constitutional invalidation. Against progressive calls to reclaim the judiciary, this Article extends our proposal to disempower courts exercising lawmaking authority—to include when they are interpreting statutes alone. Indeed, the same considerations that counsel the constitutional disempowerment of courts counsel their statutory disempowerment, and the allocation or reallocation of their authority over law to politically accountable agents. The heart of our Article offers a survey of court disempowerment strategies and tools, which are comparable to, though not identical with, the disempowerment mechanisms that have been proposed in the arena of constitutional reform. Such strategies and tools are appealing in the short term; but the long term requires a fuller rethinking of our institutions of legal interpretation. Available and existing disempowerment strategies for courts are best conceived as early and partial versions of full-scale allocation of interpretive authority over law to “political” branches and openly political control. [Judges] have battered their way to supremacy with their double axes; one edge is the control over legislation by its unconstitutionality, the other is such free interpretation of statutes as suits their purposes. —Learned Hand