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Agiliss Ltd., a private limited company that is the main importer and distributor of staple foods in Mauritius, applied to the COMESA Court of Justice (CCJ) in June 2022 to contest the government of Mauritius' decision to give a subsidy to the State Trading Corporation (STC), the statutory body in charge of importing goods on the island nation's behalf. In terms of market competition, this was judged to be unfair and detrimental to other private enterprises, such as Agiliss Ltd. In March 2023, the Court of Appeals issued a significant decision that addressed several points, including the question of a stay of execution while the appeal was being decided by the court and the order for an injunction while the appeal was being reviewed. The purpose of this study is to critically evaluate the CCJ verdict and emphasise its consequences for the stay of execution and injunction in similar cases. Such a study is thought to be useful for upcoming investigations and analyses pertaining to the COMESA and its judicial body. The article also addresses the ramifications of the decision for Mauritius as a COMESA member state and for traders and business owners operating in the nation.

During its 2018–2019 term, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of executing a prisoner with dementia. In Madison v. Alabama, the Court ruled that, in certain circumstances, executing a prisoner with dementia violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Vernon Madison was sentenced to death for killing a police officer in 1985. After many years on Alabama’s death row, he had a series of strokes and was diagnosed with vascular dementia. In 2016, Madison’s lawyers unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution, arguing that, in light of his cognitive impairments, imposing the death penalty would violate the Constitution. After Alabama set a 2018 execution date, lawyers returned to the state court, arguing that the finding of competence should be reversed because Madison’s cognitive impairments had worsened. When the trial court refused to grant the stay of execution, Madison’s lawyers asked the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of the state court decision.

'Jadhav Case (India v. Pakistan)' concerned Pakistan's arrest, detention, conviction, and death sentence of Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, asserted by India to be an Indian national, who had been convicted of engaging in acts of terrorism and espionage in Pakistan. This is the third dispute over the interpretation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) to come before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In contrast to the Applicants in the previous consular rights cases, India sought relief that included the annulment of Jadhav's conviction in Pakistan, his release from custody, and his safe transfer to India. After unanimously finding it had jurisdiction, fifteen judges of the ICJ, with only Judge ad hoc Jillani dissenting, held on the merits that Pakistan had breached VCCR Article 36 by failing to inform Jadhav without delay of his rights under that provision; by failing to notify without delay the appropriate consular post of India in Pakistan of his detention; and by depriving India of its right to communicate with Jadhav, to visit him in detention, and arrange for his legal representation. In addition, the Court, with only Judge ad hoc Jillani dissenting, found that Pakistan is under an obligation to inform Jadhav of his rights without further delay and is obliged to provide Indian consular officers access to him. The Court further found that appropriate reparation required Pakistan to provide, by means of its own choosing, effective review and reconsideration of Jadhav's conviction and sentence to ensure that full weight is given to the effect of the violation of his rights. Finally, the ICJ, again with Judge ad hoc Jillani dissenting, declared that a continued stay of execution constituted an indispensable condition for the effective review and reconsideration of Jadhav's conviction and sentence.

The completion of the activity of achieving the criminal justice goals involves immediate execution of final criminal judgments and continuity in the enforcement activity. However, there are also exceptional situations, where criminal enforcement is suspended as a result of the intervention of some impediments in the execution of the sentence. The stay of execution of prison or life imprisonment sentence is precisely such a situation, as regulated by Section II, Chapter III \"Other provisions regarding execution\", Title V \"Execution of criminal judgments \" of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The stay of execution of sentence is not a removal of the penalty applied to the convict, but merely a postponement of the moment from which it should begin, making up an exception to the rule of immediate execution of the criminal judgment. In order to avoid situations of unjustified stay of execution of sentence or even removal of execution of sentence, the legislator expressly and restrictively laid down the instances and conditions in which the convicted person may obtain the stay of execution of sentence. Without claiming to be exhaustive, this study may serve as a basis for certain legal or practical clarifications in connection with the institution of stay of execution of prison or life imprisonment sentence.

This paper assesses the current review system of the Supreme Court of Cyprus and identifies existing challenges facing the appeal process in the Cypriot judicial system. It is argued that review procedures are an important public function of the appellate courts and through collective deliberation, the experience of justices, the exercise of review of material already evaluated by the trial court and of more targeted arguments by the advocates, can lead to better safeguards for quality assurance in the administration of justice. The continuous effort to restrict the right to appeal is criticized.

In Civil Litigation, a stay of execution is like a pause button used by the applicant to restrain the execution of the court judgement from being carried out by the opposing party. Fundamentally, for an application for a stay to succeed, the applicant must show special circumstances to justify the grant of a stay. This article will identify and comparatively appraise the procedures to apply for a stay of execution in Malaysia and the United Kingdom. This article will also examine the principles and factors considered by the courts in Malaysia and the United Kingdom in granting a stay of execution. In light of the global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, this article will also study whether the courts consider COVID-19 as a special circumstance, warranting a stay of execution. In order to achieve these objectives, the methodology used by the researchers is pure legal research and comparative analysis. The findings of this article show that Civil Courts in both Malaysia and the United Kingdom have unqualified discretion to determine the application for a stay of execution. In addition, the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate the existence of special circumstances to justify the grant of a stay of execution in Malaysia and the United Kingdom. The courts will only grant a stay if there are special circumstances.

Juan Raul Garza, a U.S. national, was convicted by a Texas federal court for violating federal drug-trafficking laws, including one for killing in furtherance of a criminal enterprise. A jury recommended, and the court accepted, that Garza be sentenced to death. In 1995, the conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, after which Garza moved to vacate the sentence on grounds that the introduction of evidence, at the time he was sentenced, of four uncharged murders he allegedly committed in Mexico violated his constitutional rights. That motion also failed. Thereafter, on December 20, 1999, Garza filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seeking a decision that the introduction of such evidence violated his rights to life, equal protection, and due process under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration).

The E. C. Ernst court seized upon that fact, noting that such litigation costs are the exact expenses arbitration is intended to avoid.29 The Ninth Circuit adopted nearly the same interpretation as the Fifth Circuit when it found that \"the party opposing the motion to compel arbitration must have suffered prejudice\" for a waiver to be found.30 Collectively, these decisions illustrate that through 1983, the circuit courts generally favored arbitration by adopting a more stringent waiver test. In 1987, the D.C. Circuit declined to find that prejudice was the primary factor in their waiver analysis in National Foundation for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter NFCR).31 NFCR is readily distinguishable from some of the circuit courts' earlier waiver cases as the motion to compel arbitration was not made until over three years into the litigation.32 The district court had found that permitting arbitration at such a late stage would prejudice the non-moving party.33 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found no reason to overturn the district court's finding of waiver, noting that \"Edwards made a conscious decision to continue to seek judicial judgment on the merits of NFCR's arbitrable claims. \"34 The circuit court focused particularly on Edwards' exploitation of the benefits of pretrial discovery and motion practice, as these procedures were only available to it in the judicial forum.35 Intent also played a role as the court noted that Edwards freely elected to utilize the pretrial litigation process in lieu of arbitration.36 It is worth noting that while the D.C. Circuit declined to adopt prejudice as an outcomedeterminative factor, the court nonetheless included a prejudice analysis in its opinion.37 Ultimately, the court found that granting a stay pending arbitration after forcing the non-moving party to incur the costs of litigation, including defending against a motion for summary judgment, would constitute prejudice.38 The appellate court further emphasized that NFCR, the non-moving party, would be at a tactical disadvantage if arbitration was allowed because Edwards could utilize its extensive pretrial findings in arbitration that it otherwise would not have.39 NFCR represented a departure from the previous waiver jurisprudence. In St. Mary's Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Products Co. (St. Mary's), the court cited NFCR when it adopted a totality of the circumstances test.41 The Seventh Circuit previously had found that prejudice and delay were \"significant factors\" the court must consider in its waiver analysis.42 In St. Mary's, the court clarified that while district courts should consider prejudice, it does not follow that it is dispositive.43 Instead, prejudice should be weighed just as the court would weigh any other relevant factors, and waiver could be