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Pederson reviews several books, including Aristide Briand: Le ferme conciliateur by Gerard Unger, Gustav Stresemann: Weimar's Greatest Statesman by Jonathan Wright, and The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 by Zara Steiner.

Abstract Why do some foreign ministers stay longer in office than others? Are they punished when the country loses a war? Several scholars have focused on the tenure of leaders as an important predictor of foreign policy outcomes, such as war onset, creating an interest in leadership survival. We here shift the focus to the survival of other important politicians in cabinet—foreign ministers, hypothesizing that their tenure depends on their performance in office. For example, we expect that foreign ministers stay longer in office when the country experiences an armed conflict resulting in a win or in a compromise agreement. We evaluate and find support for several of our hypotheses using an original historical dataset, which comprises all foreign ministers of the world's thirteen great powers from the early modern period to the present, covering about 1,100 foreign minister-terms of office.

What [Zara Steiner] shows in this monumental study, however, is that the postwar years gave real grounds for optimism. The Versailles settlement was far from being a Carthaginian peace. It is true that Germany had to relinquish Alsace and Lorraine as well as additional border regions containing 80 per cent of its 1913 iron ore output. It also lost colonies, foreign financial holdings and the bulk of its merchant fleet. Heavy reparations were imposed along with a still more galling assertion of Germany's 'war guilt'. Asked whether the victorious Allies had forgotten anything, Clemenceau replied: 'Yes! We have forgotten something very important. We have forgotten to ask for the Kaiser's breeches.' In the wake of Versailles other developments offered the hope of a durable world order. Naval armadas were limited. Notwithstanding the absence of America, Russia and (until 1926) Germany, the League of Nations promised to settle international disputes. Although 'self- determination' was a slippery concept, especially when preached by Woodrow Wilson and decided on the basis of inaccurate maps and unreliable statistics, more people lived under governments of their own choosing after 1919, Steiner says, than at any time earlier or later until 1989. A dtente was established with the USSR and [Lloyd George] even shamed Lord Curzon into shaking hands with the Soviet delegate, Leonid Krasin, by saying: 'Curzon! Be a gentleman.' Personalities only feature when they are concerned with policies or problems. Telling anecdotes are sparse. There are few jokes, though Steiner can't resist quoting Clemenceau's immortal response to President Wilson's Fourteen Points: God only had ten. But any reader who wants to understand the inter- War period should consult this book and any serious student of the period should buy it. For there is simply nothing to compare with it in terms of erudition or exposition. Above all, Zara Steiner ensures that we read history forwards not backwards.