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Shareholders cheer for Musk’s $1 trillion pay package
Tesla shareholders approved a pay package Nov. 6 that could make its CEO Elon Musk the world’s first trillionaire.
Streaming Video
Translating Tesla's letter to shareholders
Billionaire Elon Musk said he will step back from the U.S. DOGE Service in May and focus on Tesla, his reeling electric vehicle company, which on April 22, reported a 71 percent plunge in profits compared with the first quarter of 2024.
Streaming Video
The Limits of Privilege: Joint Interest and Indirect Shareholders
Under English law, direct shareholders are considered to have a joint interest in the privileged materials of their subsidiaries. However, for reasons of policy, this same right has been denied to indirect shareholders. This distinction, and so the current law on joint interest privilege, fails to take into account the complexity of contemporary corporate structures and the dynamics of modern shareholder litigation. Given the trend of increasing shareholder litigation, it is a matter of time until the common law is found wanting and the rights of an indirect shareholder to the inspection of the privileged material of its subsidiary are limited unfairly. It is this article’s contention that indirect shareholders should be given limited rights to inspection of the privileged materials of their subsidiaries and the denial of such rights should not be waived away by the blunt instrument of policy. Instead, it proposes a new model based on a rebuttable presumption that the materials of a company are privileged against indirect shareholders unless they can demonstrate ‘good cause’ in line with well-defined criteria. It is hoped this model will provide greater legal certainty to this area and ensure a more robust foundation for so important a legal right. Law of privilege, shareholder litigation, shareholder rights, indirect shareholders, joint interest, subsidiaries, ‘good cause’
Journal Article
Experiments in financial democracy : corporate governance and financial development in Brazil, 1882-1950
\"This book is a detailed historical description of the evolution of corporate governance and stock markets in Brazil in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The analysis details the practices of corporate governance, in particular the rights that shareholders have to restrict the actions of managers, and how that shaped different approaches to corporate finance over time. The book argues that companies are not necessarily constrained by the institutional framework in which they operate. In the case of Brazil, even if the protections for investors included in national laws were relatively weak before 1940, corporate charters contained a series of provisions that protected minority shareholders against the abuses of large shareholders, managers, or other corporate insiders. These provisions ranged from limits on the number of votes a single shareholder could have to restrictions on the number of family members who could act as directors simultaneously. The investigation uses the Brazilian case to challenge some of the key findings of a recent literature that argues that legal systems (e.g., common vs. civil law) shape the extent of development of stock and bond markets in different nations. The book argues that legal systems alone cannot determine the course of stock and bond markets over time, because corporate governance practices and the size of these markets vary significantly over time, while the basic principles of legal systems are stable\"--Provided by publisher.
Book
Mediating Effect of Agency Cost on the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Value
In the absence of agency conflicts, firm management can pursue investments that maximize shareholders wealth. This paper sought to establish the mediating effect of agency costs on relationship between ownership structure and value of companies listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. The study population consisted of 64 listed firms as at 31st December 2017. Generalized least squares estimator was fitted for the analysis. The findings reveal that managerial ownership transmit a negative influence onto value of the firm through managerial discretionary expenses utilization. On the contrast, foreign ownership transmit a positive influence on the value of listed firms through efficacy in the utilization of managerial discretionary expenses. Institutional ownership enhance value directly but not indirectly via application of managerial expenses. The findings extend predictions beyond the direct link between ownership and firm value. The study support contemporary practices in corporate governance of designing costs control mechanism and setting target cost efficiency ratio to maximize shareholders value.
Journal Article
ANALIZAREA UNOR OPERAȚIUNI DIN GESTIUNEA SOCIETĂȚII
In order to protect minority shareholders, the legislator made available to them the possibility of filing a lawsuit with the object of analyzing particular company management operations. It is a procedure for carrying out an indirect management control by one or more shareholders representing, individually or together, at least 10% of the share capital, who can request the court to appoint experts in order to draw up a report which is subsequently made available to the corporate bodies for analysis and to propose appropriate measures.
Journal Article