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No policing tactic has been more controversial than \"stop and frisk,\" whereby police officers stop, question and frisk ordinary citizens, who they may view as potential suspects, on the streets. As Michael White and Hank Fradella show inStop and Frisk, the first authoritative history and analysis of this tactic, there is a disconnect between our everyday understanding and the historical and legal foundations for this policing strategy. First ruled constitutional in 1968, stop and frisk would go on to become a central tactic of modern day policing, particularly by the New York City Police Department. By 2011 the NYPD recorded 685,000 'stop-question-and-frisk' interactions with citizens; yet, in 2013, a landmark decision ruled that the police had over- and mis-used this tactic.Stop and Frisktells the story of how and why this happened, and offers ways that police departments can better serve their citizens. They also offer a convincing argument that stop and frisk did not contribute as greatly to the drop in New York's crime rates as many proponents, like former NYPD Police Commissioner Ray Kelly and Mayor Michael Bloomberg, have argued. While much of the book focuses on the NYPD's use of stop and frisk, examples are also shown from police departments around the country, including Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, Newark and Detroit. White and Fradella argue that not only does stop and frisk have a legal place in 21st-century policing but also that it can be judiciously used to help deter crime in a way that respects the rights and needs of citizens. They also offer insight into the history of racial injustice that has all too often been a feature of American policing's history and propose concrete strategies that every police department can follow to improve the way they police. A hard-hitting yet nuanced analysis,Stop and Friskshows how the tactic can be a just act of policing and, in turn, shows how to police in the best interest of citizens.

In some urban neighborhoods, encounters with police have become one of the primary points of contact between disadvantaged citizens and their government. Yet extant scholarship has only just begun to explore how criminal justice interventions help to shape the political lives of the urban poor. In this article, we ask: What are the consequences of the increased use of stop-and-frisks (Terry stops) in disadvantaged neighborhoods for communities' engagement with the state? Relying on a novel measure of local citizen engagement (311 calls for service) and more than one million police stops, we find that it is not concentrated police surveillance per se that matters but, rather, the character of police contact. The concentration of police stops overall is associated with higher levels of community engagement, while at the same time, a high degree of stops that feature searches or the use of force, especially when they do not result in an arrest, have a chilling effect on neighborhood-level outreach to local government. Our article marks a first step toward understanding what concentrated policing means for the democratic life and political agency of American communities.

This Essay takes seriously the relevance of law enforcement effectiveness and the role of empiricism in understanding the constitutionality of the police practices at issue in the Floyd case and urban police practices more generally; it also recasts the debate a bit. A critical but obscured issue is the mismatch between the level of analysis at which the Supreme Court articulated the relevant test for constitutional justification of a stop-and-frisk in Terry v Ohio and the scale at which police today (and historically) engage in stop-and-frisk as a practice. To put this more succinctly, while the Court in Terry authorized police intervention in an individual incident—when the police officer possesses probable cause to believe that an armed individual is involved in a crime—in reality, stop-and-frisk typically is carried out by a police force en masse as a program. Although the constitutional framework is based on a one-off investigative incident, many of those who are stopped—the majority of them young men of color—do not experience the stops as one-off incidents. They experience them as a program to police them as a group, which is, of course, the reality. That is exactly what police agencies are doing. Fourth Amendment reasonableness must take this fact into account. I make an argument here about how we should approach this issue.

Stop-and-frisk and other punitive policing practices disproportionately affect marginalized communities of color. In response to calls for reform, police departments have implemented community policing programs aimed at improving relations with racialized communities. This study examines how a police unit used courtesy and respect in its engagement with a criminalized population, gang-associated Latinos, while relying on the stop-and-frisk practice. Our study reveals contextual and situational contradictions between modern police departments’ attempts to establish legitimacy and the hegemonic practice of investigatory stops. Drawing on observations and interviews conducted during a ride-along study, we find that stop-and-frisk, simultaneously used with reform practices like courtesy policing, yield a paradoxical policing approach, “the legitimacy policing continuum.” Officers regularly articulate a goal of respectfully interacting with courtesy to build community and trust—what we term “the mano suave”—while practicing a dominant logic of crime prevention through punitive measures—what we term “the mano dura.” We argue that community and courtesy policing are drawn on strategically in interaction and ultimately intertwined with and constrained by the racial bias at the heart of punitive policing practices like stop-andfrisk.

Predictive policing is the newest innovation in the field of law enforcement. Predictive policing programs use algorithms to analyze existing crime data in an attempt to make predictions about future crimes: What crimes are likely to be committed, where crimes are likely to be committed, and a list of potential victims and offenders. Proponents of predictive policing champion the practice as an effective, proactive form of law enforcement that is free from bias due to its data-driven nature. However, as a matter of justice policy, predictive policing is just as discriminatory as traditional police practices, such as stop and frisk: Both are relatively ineffective; both have the potential to disproportionately target minorities; both are challenging forms of surveillance that create several important ethical and legal issues; and both are presented as objective, impartial, and equitable. This article has three primary goals: Highlight the potential and problematic similarities between stop and frisk and predictive policing; present the problems associated with predictive policing, including its questionable effectiveness, biased foundation, and faulty legal and ethical footing; and discuss the ways in which discriminatory criminal justice programs, such as stop and frisk and predictive policing, are presented to the public as objective, non-discriminatory policies.

The exponential growth of available information about routine police activities offers new opportunities to improve the fairness and effectiveness of police practices. We illustrate the point by showing how a particular kind of calculation made possible by modern, large-scale datasets—determining the likelihood that stopping and frisking a particular pedestrian will result in the discovery of contraband or other evidence of criminal activity—could be used to reduce the racially disparate impact of pedestrian searches and to increase their effectiveness. For tools of this kind to achieve their full potential in improving policing, though, the legal system will need to adapt. One important change would be to understand police tactics such as investigatory stops of pedestrians or motorists as programs, not as isolated occurrences. Beyond that, the judiciary will need to grow more comfortable with statistical proof of discriminatory policing, and the police will need to be more receptive to the assistance that algorithms can provide in reducing bias.

Regulation of Terry stops of pedestrians by police requires articulation of the reasonable and individualized bases of suspicion that motivate their actions. Nearly five decades after Terry, courts have found it difficult to articulate the boundaries or parameters of reasonable suspicion. The behavior and appearances of individuals combine with the social and spatial contexts in which police observe them to create an algebra of suspicion. Police can proceed to approach and temporarily detain a person at a threshold of suspicion that courts have been unable and perhaps unwilling to articulate. The result has been sharp tensions within Fourth Amendment doctrine as to what is reasonable, why, and in what circumstances. The jurisprudence of suspicion is no clearer today than it was in the aftermath of Terry. This issue has taken center stage in both litigation and policy debates on the constitutionality of the stop-and-frisk policing regime in New York City. Under this regime, police state the bases of suspicion using a menu of codified stop rationales with supplemental text narratives to record their descriptions of suspicious behaviors or circumstances that produced actionable suspicion. Evidence from 4.4 million stops provides an empirical basis to assess the revealed preferences of police officers as to the bases for these Terry stops. Analyses of this evidence reveal narratives of suspicion beyond the idiosyncrasies of the individual case that police use to justify their actions. First, we identify patterns of articulated suspicion. Next, we show the individual factors and social conditions that shape how those patterns are applied. We also show how patterns evolve over time and become clearer and more refined across a wide range of police stops. That refinement seems to follow the capacious interpretative room created by four decades of post-Terry Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Next, we assess the extent of constitutional compliance and examine the neighborhood and individual factors that predict noncompliance. The results suggest that the observed patterns of narratives have evolved into shared narratives or scripts of suspicion, and that these patterns are specific to suspect race and neighborhood factors. We conclude that scripts are expressions of the norms within the everyday organizational exercise of police discretion and that these scripts defeat the requirement of individualization inherent in case law governing Fourth Amendment stops.

Scholars know relatively little about how the location of a pedestrian police stop affects the racial distribution of post-stop outcomes, including the initiation of a search or a field interview. To address this gap, this research draws on a unique data set from San Jose, California, and underutilized spatial methods to examine the extent to which conflict theory explains post-stop enforcement patterns. We consider two iterations of the theory: (1) the racial threat hypothesis, which posits that Blacks and Hispanics are more aggressively policed in minority neighborhoods, and (2) the racial incongruity hypothesis, which holds that police tend to target minorities occupying concentrated White spaces. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) models indicate that Blacks and Hispanics face more aggressive post-stop enforcement than Whites but that stop location is not predictive. By contrast, geographically weighted regression (GWR) analysis shows that police are more likely to initiate searches and field interviews of Blacks and Hispanics in areas with high concentrations of White and minority residents. These findings illustrate the nuanced relationship between stop location, pedestrian race, and police behavior. Conflict theory is a valuable lens through which to view post-stop enforcement, yet evidence to support the minority threat and racial incongruity hypotheses was only visible at the micro level. This research adds to existing scholarship by demonstrating the utility of GWR in teasing out the nuanced, micro-level relationship between stop location and pedestrian race not captured in more traditional models.

Theories of rational behavior assume that actors make decisions where the benefits of their acts exceed their costs or losses. If those expected costs and benefits change over time, the behavior will change accordingly as actors learn and internalize the parameters of success and failure. In the context of proactive policing, police stops that achieve any of several goals—constitutional compliance, stops that lead to “good” arrests or summonses, stops that lead to seizures of weapons, drugs, or other contraband, or stops that produce good will and citizen cooperation—should signal to officers the features of a stop that increase its rewards or benefits. Having formed a subjective estimate of success (i.e., prior beliefs), officers should observe their outcomes in subsequent encounters and form updated probability estimates, with specific features of the event, with a positive weight on those features. Officers should also learn the features of unproductive stops and adjust accordingly. A rational actor would pursue “good” or “productive” stops and avoid “unproductive” stops by updating their knowledge of these features through experience. We analyze data on 4.9 million Terry stops in New York City from 2004–2016 to estimate the extent of updating by officers in the New York Police Department. We compare models using a frequentist analysis of officer behavior with a Bayesian analysis where subsequent events are weighted by the signals from prior events. By comparing productive and unproductive stops, the analysis estimates the weights or values—an experience effect—that officers assign to the signals of each type of stop outcome. We find evidence of updating using both analytic methods, although the “hit rates”—our measure of stop productivity including recovery of firearms or arrests for criminal behavior—remain low. Updating is independent of total officer stop activity each month, suggesting that learning may be selective and specific to certain stop features. However, hit rates decline as officer stop activity increases. Both updating and hit rates improved as stop rates declined following a series of internal memoranda and trial orders beginning in May 2012. There is also evidence of differential updating by officers conditional on a variety of features of prior and current stops, including suspect race and stop legality. Though our analysis is limited to NYPD stops, given the ubiquity of policing regimes of intensive stop and frisk encounters across the United States, the relevance of these findings reaches beyond New York City. These regimes reveal tensions between the Terry jurisprudence of reasonable suspicion and evidence on contemporary police practices across the country.