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The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) established the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) with a focus on procuring and managing medical countermeasures (MCM) designed to address chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events and attacks by weapons of mass destruction. The stockpile is a repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, vaccines, antiviral drugs, and other medical materiel organized to respond to a spectrum of public health threats. Over time, the mission of the SNS has informally evolved to address other large-scale catastrophes, such as hurricanes or outbreaks of pandemic disease, and rare acute events, such as earthquakes or terror attacks. When disaster strikes, states can request deployment of SNS assets to augment resources available to state, local, tribal, or territorial public health agencies. CDC works with federal, state, and local health officials to identify and address their specific needs and, according to the stated mission of the SNS, ensure that the right resources reach the right place at the right time. On August 28, 2017, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine convened a workshop to explore the current state of the global medical supply chain as it relates to SNS assets, and the role of communications in mitigating supply chain risks and in enhancing the resilience of MCM distribution efforts. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop.

Large catastrophic events, or rare acute events, may cause situations in which a local jurisdiction's medicines and medical supplies are not sufficient to provide care to the population it serves. In these cases of natural or engineered disasters, such as a terrorist attack, influenza pandemic, or earthquake, state or local authorities can request that the federal government provide assets from the Strategic National Stockpile to augment the state and local jurisdictions' resources. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is the nation's repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, vaccines, antiviral drugs, and other medical materiel designed to supplement and resupply state and local public health agencies in the event of an emergency. The materiel is intended to support national health security and is managed by the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response's (OPHPR's) Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS). The stated mission of the SNS is to prepare and support partners and provide the right resources at the right time to secure the nation's health. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine organized a two-day public workshop to explore opportunities to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainable methods used by the CDC's SNS to distribute medical countermeasures and other supplies during disasters and other public health emergencies, especially those which result in disruption of physical infrastructure such as the electrical grid, central roadways, bridges, and tunnels within the impacted community. Participants explored relevant distribution lessons learned from other federal agency stockpiles and the private sector as well as opportunities to develop public-private collaborations in the purchase, warehousing, management, and distribution of medical countermeasures. This report summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop.

Policy Points Reflecting on current response deficiencies, we offer a model for a national contingency supply chain cell (NCSCC) construct to manage the medical materials supply chain in support of emergencies, such as COVID‐19. We develop the following: a framework for governance and response to enable a globally independent supply chain; a flexible structure to accommodate the requirements of state and county health systems for receiving and distributing materials; and a national material “control tower” to improve transparency and real‐time access to material status and location. Context Much of the discussion about the failure of the COVID‐19 supply chain has centered on personal protective equipment (PPE) and the degree of vulnerability of care. Prior research on supply chain risks have focused on mitigating the risk of disruptions of specific purchased materials within a bounded region or on the shifting status of cross‐border export restrictions. But COVID‐19 has impacted every purchase category, region, and border. This paper is responsive to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine recommendation to study and monitor disasters and to provide governments with course of action to satisfy legislative mandates. Methods Our analysis draws on our observations of the responses to COVID‐19 in regard to acquisition and contracting problem‐solving, our review of field discussions and interactions with experts, a critique of existing proposals for managing the strategic national stockpile in the United States a mapping of the responses to national contingency planning phases, and the identification of gaps in current national healthcare response policy frameworks and proposals. Findings Current proposals call for augmenting a system that has failed to deliver the needed response to COVID‐19. These proposals do not address the key attributes for pandemic plan renewal: flexibility, traceability and transparency, persistence and responsiveness, global independence, and equitable access. We offer a commons‐based framework for achieving the opportunities and risks which are responsive to a constellation of intelligence assets working in and across focal targets of global supply chain risk. Conclusions The United States needs a “commons‐based strategy” that is not simply a stockpile repository but instead is a network of repositories, fluid inventories, and analytic monitoring governed by the experts. We need a coordinated effort, a “commons” that will direct both conventional and new suppliers to meet demands and to eliminate hoarding and other behaviors.

globally, by 2020 the paralytic poliomyelitis disease burden decreased to over 99% of the reported cases in 1988 when resolution 41.8 was endorsed by the World Health Assembly (WHA) for global polio eradication. It is clearly understood that, if there is Wild Poliovirus (WPV) and circulating Vaccines Derived Poliovirus (cVDPV) in the world, no country is safe from polio outbreaks. All countries remain at high risk of re-importation depending on the level of the containment of the types vaccine withdrawn, the laboratory poliovirus isolates, and the population immunity induced by the vaccination program. In this regard, countries to have polio outbreak preparedness and response plans, and conducting the polio outbreak simulation exercises for these plans remain important. we conducted a cross-section qualitative study to review to 8 countries conducted polio outbreak simulation exercises in the East and Southern Africa from 2016 to 2018. The findings were categorized into 5 outbreak response thematic areas analyzed qualitatively and summarized them on their strengths and weaknesses. we found out that, most countries have the overall technical capacities and expertise to deal with outbreaks to a certain extent. Nevertheless, we noted that the national polio outbreak preparedness and response plans were not comprehensive enough to provide proper guidance in responding to outbreaks. The guidelines were inadequately aligned with the WHO POSOPs, and IHR 2005. Additionally, most participants who participated in the simulation exercises were less familiar with their preparedness and response plans, the WHO POSOPs, and therefore reported to be sensitized. we also realized that, in all countries where the polio simulation exercise conducted, their national polio outbreak preparedness and response plan was revised to be improved in line with the WHO POSOPs and IHR 2005. we, therefore, recommend the polio outbreak simulation exercises to be done in every country with an interval of 3-5 years.

Objective: The Cities Readiness Initiative is a federally funded program designed to assist 72 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in preparing to dispense life-saving medical countermeasures within 48 hours of a public health emergency. Beginning in 2008, the 72 MSAs were required to conduct 3 drills related to the distribution and dispensing of emergency medical countermeasures. The report describes the results of the first year of pilot data for medical countermeasure drills conducted by the MSAs. Methods: The MSAs were provided templates with key metrics for 5 functional elements critical for a successful dispensing campaign: personnel call down, site activation, facility setup, pick-list generation, and dispensing throughput. Drill submissions were compiled into single data sets for each of the 5 drills. Analyses were conducted to determine whether the measures were comparable across business and non-business hours. Descriptive statistics were computed for each of the key metrics identified in the 5 drills. Results: Most drills were conducted on Mondays and Wednesdays during business hours (8:00 am-5:00 pm). The median completion time for the personnel call-down drill was 1 hour during business hours (n = 287) and 55 minutes during non-business hours (n = 136). Site-activation drills were completed in a median of 30 minutes during business hours and 5 minutes during non-business hours. Facility setup drills were completed more rapidly during business hours (75 minutes) compared with non-business hours (96 minutes). During business hours, pick lists were generated in a median of 3 minutes compared with 5 minutes during non-business hours. Aggregate results from the dispensing throughput drills demonstrated that the median observed throughput during business hours (60 people/h) was higher than that during non-business hours (43 people/h). Conclusion: The results of the analyses from this pilot sample of drill submissions provide a baseline for the determination of a national standard in operational capabilities for local jurisdictions to achieve in their planning efforts for a mass dispensing campaign during an emergency. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2012;6:357–362)

This article presents the outcomes of a full-scale training exercise utilizing a drive-thru clinic model for dispensing of Strategic National Stockpile medication. The Hawaii Department of Health developed a clinic design for vehicles based on previous exercises and research on sample throughput rates. The streamlined model selected includes a triage area near the entrance and consecutive stations for the public to register, have an evaluation for drug contradictions, and receive the medication. During the 2-hour exercise held in April 2005, a total of 622 patients were processed in their vehicles for an overall rate of 5.2 persons per minute. Although patient services were reduced in comparison to current walk-in clinic models, the public was able to receive prophylactic medication in a timely manner with a high rate of accuracy and minimal human-to-human contact. These results demonstrate that local health departments, particularly in rural areas, can provide essential medications, vaccinations, or rations through a drive-thru clinic, thus limiting morbidity and mortality during a public health emergency.

Since just before World War II, the DoD has relied largely on the National Defense Stockpile to deal with threats to the supply of materials essential for national defense. In its recommendations, the report said that the Department of Defense should establish a new system for managing the supply of strategic materials, and the federal government should enhance its systems for gathering data and information on materials necessary for national defense. Since the NRC report was published, the DoD has begun to respond to and act on these recommendations.