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"Strategic arms limitation talks"
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The Control Agenda
The Control Agenda is a sweeping account of the history
of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), their rise in the
Nixon and Ford administrations, their downfall under President
Carter, and their powerful legacies in the Reagan years and
beyond.
Matthew Ambrose pays close attention to the interplay of
diplomacy, domestic politics, and technology, and finds that the
SALT process was a key point of reference for arguments regarding
all forms of Cold War decision making. Ambrose argues elite U.S.
decision makers used SALT to better manage their restive domestic
populations and to exert greater control over the shape, structure,
and direction of their nuclear arsenals.
Ambrose also asserts that prolonged engagement with arms control
issues introduced dynamic effects into nuclear policy. Arms control
considerations came to influence most areas of defense decision
making, while the measure of stability SALT provided allowed the
examination of new and potentially dangerous nuclear doctrines.
The Control Agenda makes clear that verification and
compliance concerns by the United States prompted continuous
reassessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions; assessments
that later undergirded key U.S. policy changes toward the Soviet
Union. Through SALT's many twists and turns, accusations and
countercharges, secret backchannels and propaganda campaigns the
specter of nuclear conflict loomed large.
eBook
Competitive Arms Control
The essential history of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) during the Nixon Administration How did
Richard Nixon, a president so determined to compete for strategic
nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, become one of the most
successful arms controllers of the Cold War? Drawing on newly
opened Cold War archives, John D. Maurer argues that a central
purpose of arms control talks for American leaders was to channel
nuclear competition toward areas of American advantage and not just
international cooperation. While previous accounts of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have emphasized American cooperative
motives, Maurer highlights how Nixon, National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shaped
negotiations, balancing their own competitive interests with
proponents of cooperation while still providing a coherent
rationale to Congress. Within the arms control agreements, American
leaders intended to continue deploying new weapons, and the arms
control restrictions, as negotiated, allowed the United States to
sustain its global power, contain communism, and ultimately prevail
in the Cold War.
eBook
The Ogaden War and the Demise of Détente
The failure of détente has been a popular theme among historians of American foreign policy, with opinions divided as to where the responsibility for this failure lies. A commonality among all points of view, however, is the importance of events in the third world, particularly in the \"Arc of Crisis.\" One such event—the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia—prompted Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, to comment that détente was \"buried\" in the Ogaden. His point was that Carter's new approach to the cold war was put to the test during the Ogaden War, and there the policy's untenability was proven. The policy's failure, in turn, encouraged Soviet adventurism, which further alienated the American public from Carter's attempt to fight the cold war. Carter's policy eventually led to the withdrawal of the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Treaty and, as Brzezinski claimed, the collapse of détente. This article discusses Carter's foreign policy toward the Ogaden War, considers the accuracy of Brzezinski's claim, and reaches conclusions regarding the role of the Carter administration in the demise of détente.
Journal Article
Divided Counsels
Despite the effort that went into strategizing and negotiating arms control during the Cold War, U.S. leaders remained divided over arms control’s intent and fundamental purpose. While there was general agreement that arms control should aim to avoid war, limit destructiveness, and decrease the costs of armaments, significant differences existed on the best specific policies to achieve these objectives. In approaching arms control negotiations, two schools of thought emerged by the late 1960s, when the Nixon administration came into office and began formulating its policies to guide the upcoming Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). One school that can be labeled...
Journal Article
Nuclear arms control : background and issues
This nontechnical overview of developments in nuclear arms control describes how the United States and the Soviet Union arrived at their present positions--and where they might go from here. According to Foreign Affairs, \"This book is proof that the complexities of arms control can be successfully explained in a nontechnical, and even more importantly, nonpartisan manner. . . . It presents the key issues in a clear, thorough, and remarkably up-to-date way. . . . Strongly recommended as a primary source for classroom and public discussions.\"
eBook
Conclusion: Reflections on the Nuclear Order
The papers in this special issue examine the nuclear order that began to emerge in the 1970s after the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreements in 1972. Several general themes are discussed: the international economy and the nuclear order; strengthening the non-proliferation regime; reactions to US non-proliferation policy; the East-West arms race; the nuclear order in 1980; the international system and nuclear order. The argument is made that the changes in the international system in the 1970s had important effects on the nuclear order, creating a North-South axis alongside the existing East-West axis; provoking disagreements and disputes over the transfer of nuclear technology; and giving greater prominence to nuclear power in a period of energy crises. This is still an order of states in which transnational and international NGOs play a secondary role. There were a variety of responses to the new order: acceptance; resentment; attempts at modification; independence; evasion and circumvention. The constitution of the order was a matter of great interest to a good number of states and the focus of many debates and much political conflict.
Journal Article
“Absolutes” and “Stages” in the Making and Application of Nixon’s SALT Policy
President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger took great pride in their success to achieve agreements on the limitation of Anti Ballistic Missiles and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Missiles with the Soviet Union. For Nixon, this agreement was not only an achievement that had been denied to his predecessor, it also seemingly represented the success of his own approach over that of his predecessors. Nixon-in tandem with Kissinger-intended to link arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to the resolution of other political problems such as Vietnam, the Mideast, and Berlin. Through the employment of linkage, they hoped to make U.S. arms control policy part of Détente. However, Nixon was able to sign the \"historic agreements\" because his policy of linkage had in fact failed. It failed mainly because it was based on flawed assumptions and false premises. Thus, the historic success was possible precisely because Nixon had not actually made his arms control policy \"distinct\" from that of the Johnson Administration and its predecessors in his approach to strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union.
Journal Article
Why are some international agreements informal?
Informal agreements are the most common form of international cooperation and the least studied. Ranging from simple oral deals to detailed executive agreements, they permit states to conclude profitable bargains without the formality of treaties. They differ from treaties in more than just a procedural sense. Treaties are designed, by long-standing convention, to raise the credibility of promises by staking national reputation on their adherence. Informal agreements have a more ambiguous status and are useful for precisely that reason. They are chosen to avoid formal and visible national pledges, to avoid the political obstacles of ratification, to reach agreements quickly and quietly, and to provide flexibility for subsequent modification or even renunciation. They differ from formal agreements not because their substance is less important (the Cuban missile crisis was solved by informal agreement) but because the underlying promises are less visible and more equivocal. The prevalence of such informal devices thus reveals not only the possibilities of international cooperation but also the practical obstacles and the institutional limits to endogenous enforcement.
Journal Article