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We produce a definition and argument for explicitly adopting value subjectivism in entrepreneurship research. While the field has progressively shifted toward subjectivism over the past decades, we remain saddled with positivist baggage in our theories’ definitions of key variables, including the concept of value. Although modern scholars readily admit that value is subjective, what is generally meant by this is that it is idiosyncratically determined. We argue that value is more appropriately defined, atop pure subjectivism, as an increase in subjective satisfaction or well-being. We develop and elaborate on this definition and explore its implications for entrepreneurship theory and policy.

One important proposal about the nature of well-being, prudential value or the personal good is that intrinsic values for a person ought to ‘resonate’ with the person for whom they are good. Indeed, virtually everyone agrees that there is something very plausible about this necessary condition on the building blocks of a good life. Given the importance of this constraint, however, it may come as something of a surprise how little reason we actually have to believe it. In this paper, I’d like to do two things: first, to illustrate just how philosophically tenuous this thesis is, despite its apparent attraction, and to correct, or at least begin to correct, this state of affairs. My argument—which I call the ‘relationship to value’ argument—focuses in part on what it means to be a valuer—specifically, the peculiar relationship valuing agents bear to objects of value.

Humans have developed science to understand the phenomena they face in their lives. As such, the development of science is inexorably linked with epistemology because it emphasizes the question of truth—the focus of epistemology. The development of science and knowledge has been influenced by specific interests, motives, needs, and historic/cultural backgrounds. To ensure that science is developed in a manner best suited for Indonesian society, such development must be rooted in extant Indonesian cultural values, such as those found in Javanese culture. This study attempts to formulate Javanese epistemology as a basis for scientific development in Indonesia. It finds, first, that knowledge is known as “kawruh” among the Javanese people; second, knowledge is not always limited to the cognitive dimension; and third, a specific criterion for truth is harmony, or “pener”. Javanese people consider “rasa” capable of bringing humans to the supreme knowledge. Although objective knowledge exists, every individual achievement of reality is different. Javanese people consider the validity or truthfulness of statements/actions rooted in their harmony with the empirical rational principle of truth and the existing order, following the adage “bener tur pener”.

Clifford Geertz, one of the most influential thinkers of our time, here discusses some of the most urgent issues facing intellectuals today. In this collection of personal and revealing essays, he explores the nature of his anthropological work in relation to a broader public, serving as the foremost spokesperson of his generation of scholars, those who came of age after World War II. His reflections are written in a style that both entertains and disconcerts, as they engage us in topics ranging from moral relativism to the relationship between cultural and psychological differences, from the diversity and tension among activist faiths to \"ethnic conflict\" in today's politics. Geertz, who once considered a career in philosophy, begins by explaining how he got swept into the revolutionary movement of symbolic anthropology. At that point, his work began to encompass not only the ethnography of groups in Southeast Asia and North Africa, but also the study of how meaning is made in all cultures--or, to use his phrase, to explore the \"frames of meaning\" in which people everywhere live out their lives. His philosophical orientation helped him to establish the role of anthropology within broader intellectual circles and led him to address the work of such leading thinkers as Charles Taylor, Thomas Kuhn, William James, and Jerome Bruner. In this volume, Geertz comments on their work as he explores questions in political philosophy, psychology, and religion that have intrigued him throughout his career but that now hold particular relevance in light of postmodernist thinking and multiculturalism.Available Lightoffers insightful discussions of concepts such as nation, identity, country, and self, with a reminder that like symbols in general, their meanings are not categorically fixed but grow and change through time and place. This book treats the reader to an analysis of the American intellectual climate by someone who did much to shape it. One can read Available Light both for its revelation of public culture in its dynamic, evolving forms and for the story it tells about the remarkable adventures of an innovator during the \"golden years\" of American academia.

This paper articulates and defends a novel hybrid account of well-being. We will call our view a Robust Hybrid. We call it robust because it grants a broad and not subservient role to both objective and subjective values. In this paper we assume, we think plausibly but without argument, that there is a significant objective component to well-being. Here we clarify what it takes for an account of well-being to have a subjective component. Roughly, we argue, it must allow that favoring attitudes that are not warranted by the lights of objective values can ground benefits. Given this understanding, we show that there is an important and unrecognized expansion in the resources available to fully objectivist views: namely that such views can help themselves to the value of warranted love of objective goods. Such a move by the objectivist can help them respond to concerns that, on their view, a person's well-being can be too alien to them. We next argue that, nonetheless, such objectivist views are still unconvincing due to their lack of a subjective component. This motivates a move from fully objective accounts to hybrid accounts. We show that many prominent hybrid theories in the literature are inadequate because they implausibly minimize the subjective component. This motivates a move to a robust hybrid view that has an expanded subjectivist component. We conclude with some remarks about the interrelation between the subjective and objective components in the hybrid account that we favor and a role for resonance in a theory of well-being other than serving as a hard constraint on any benefit.

Objectivist naturalists about life's meaning regard it as implicating no world but the natural one, and yet as deriving from more than just subjective attitudes or interests. Such naturalists must obviously deny prominent religious conceptions of meaning. But must they further deny that it can be found in religious pursuits? In this article, I defend a negative answer by arguing that, contrary to a prima facie plausible consideration in support of a positive answer, and by many objectivist naturalists’ own lights, the meaning of life can be found in pursuits predicated on false belief. Les tenants d'une approche naturaliste objectiviste sur le sens de la vie considèrent qu'il n'implique aucun autre monde que le monde naturel et que, néanmoins, il ne découle pas uniquement d'attitudes et intérêts subjectifs. Ces naturalistes doivent évidemment rejeter les conceptions du sens issues des grandes religions. Mais doivent-ils en outre nier que ce sens puisse être trouvé dans des quêtes religieuses ? Dans cet article, je défends une réponse négative en soutenant que, contrairement à une considération de prime abord plausible en faveur d'une réponse positive, et de l'aveu même de plusieurs objectivistes naturalistes, le sens de la vie peut être trouvé dans des quêtes fondées sur des croyances fausses.

Kolodny argues that none of them work. The best way to resolve the paradox is to give a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that lets all see how the argument can be invalid even with its obvious logical form. This requires rejecting the general validity of at least one classical deduction rule.

Subjectivist permissivism is a prima facie attractive view. That is, it's plausible to think that what's rational for people to believe on the basis of their evidence can vary if they have different frameworks or sets of epistemic standards. In this paper, I introduce an epistemic existentialist form of subjectivist permissivism, which I argue can better address “the arbitrariness objection” to subjectivist permissivism in general. According to the epistemic existentialist, it's not just that what's rational to believe on the basis of evidence can vary according to agents’ frameworks, understood as passive aspects of individuals’ psychologies. Rather, what's rational to believe on the basis of evidence is sensitive to agents’ choices and active commitments (as are frameworks themselves). Here I draw on Chang's work on commitment and voluntarist reasons. The epistemic existentialist maintains that what's rational for us to believe on the basis of evidence is, at least in part, up to us. It can vary not only across individuals but for a single individual, over time, as she makes differing epistemic commitments.