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An increase in credit supply driven by looser lending constraints in the mortgage market is the key force behind four empirical features of the housing boom before the Great Recession: the unprecedented rise in home prices, the surge in household debt, the stability of debt relative to house values, and the fall in mortgage rates. These facts are more difficult to reconcile with the popular view that attributes the housing boom only to looser borrowing constraints associated with lower collateral requirements, because they shift the demand for credit.

Using information on advertising and mortgages originated by subprime lenders, we study whether advertising helped consumers find cheaper mortgages. Lenders that advertise more within a region sell more expensive mortgages, measured as the excess rate of a mortgage after accounting for borrower, contract, and regional characteristics. These effects are stronger for mortgages sold to less sophisticated consumers. We exploit regional variation in mortgage advertising induced by the entry of Craigslist and other tests to demonstrate that these findings are not spurious. Analyzing advertising content reveals that initial/introductory rates are frequently advertised in a salient fashion, where reset rates are not.

A central question surrounding the current subprime crisis is whether the securitization process reduced the incentives of financial intermediaries to carefully screen borrowers. We examine this issue empirically using data on securitized subprime mortgage loan contracts in the United States. We exploit a specific rule of thumb in the lending market to generate exogenous variation in the ease of securitization and compare the composition and performance of lenders' portfolios around the ad hoc threshold. Conditional on being securitized, the portfolio with greater ease of securitization defaults by around 10%–25% more than a similar risk profile group with a lesser ease of securitization. We conduct additional analyses to rule out differential selection by market participants around the threshold and lenders employing an optimal screening cutoff unrelated to securitization as alternative explanations. The results are confined to loans where intermediaries' screening effort may be relevant and soft information about borrowers determines their creditworthiness. Our findings suggest that existing securitization practices did adversely affect the screening incentives of subprime lenders.

From 2007 to 2009 U.S. house prices plunged and mortgage defaults surged. While ostensibly consistent with widespread \"ruthless default,\" analysis of detailed mortgage and house price data indicates that borrowers do not walk away until they are deeply underwater—far deeper than traditional models predict. The evidence suggests that lender recourse is not the major driver of this result. We argue that emotional and behavioral factors play an important role in decisions to continue paying. Borrower reluctance to walk away implies that the moral hazard cost of default as a form of social insurance may be lower than suspected.

We provide the first systematic study of liquidity in the foreign exchange market. We find significant variation in liquidity across exchange rates, substantial illiquidity costs, and strong commonality in liquidity across currencies and with equity and bond markets. Analyzing the impact of liquidity risk on carry trades, we show that funding (investment) currencies offer insurance against (exposure to) liquidity risk. A liquidity risk factor has a strong impact on carry trade returns from 2007 to 2009, suggesting that liquidity risk is priced. We present evidence that liquidity spirals may trigger these findings.

The article shows that time-consistent, imperfectly targeted support to distressed institutions makes private leverage choices strategic complements. When everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but intervening, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social costs. In turn, it is profitable to adopt a risky balance sheet. These insights have important consequences, from banks choosing to correlate their risk exposures to the need for macro-prudential supervision.

Using loan-level data, we analyze the quality of subprime mortgage loans by adjusting their performance for differences in borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions. We find that the quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis and that securitizers were, to some extent, aware of it. We provide evidence that the rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the market. Problems could have been detected long before the crisis, but they were masked by high house price appreciation between 2003 and 2005.

We analyze whether midlevel managers in securitized finance were aware of a large-scale housing bubble and a looming crisis in 2004–2006 using their personal home transaction data. We find that the average person in our sample neither timed the market nor were cautious in their home transactions, and did not exhibit awareness of problems in overall housing markets. Certain groups of securitization agents were particularly aggressive in increasing their exposure to housing during this period, suggesting the need to expand the incentives-based view of the crisis to incorporate a role for beliefs.

I study the implications of two major debt-relief policies in the United States: the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) and the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP). To do so, I develop a model of housing and default that includes relevant dimensions of credit-market policy and captures rich heterogeneity in household balance sheets. The model also explains the observed cross-state variation in consumer default rates. I find that BAPCPA significantly reduced bankruptcy rates, but increased foreclosure rates when house prices fell. HARP reduced foreclosures by 1 percentage point and provided substantial welfare gains to households with high loan-to-value mortgages.

\"This paper examines the history of internal migration in the United States since the 1980s. By most measures, internal migration in the United States is at a 30-year low. The widespread decline in migration rates across a large number of subpopulations suggests that broad-based economic forces are likely responsible for the decrease. An obvious question is the extent to which the recent housing market contraction and the recession may have caused this downward trend in migration: after all, relocation activity often involves both housing market activity and changes in employment. However, we find relatively small roles for both of these cyclical factors. While we will suggest a few other possible explanations for the recent decrease in migration, the puzzle remains. Finally, we compare U.S. migration to other developed countries. Despite the steady decline in U.S. migration, the commonly held belief that Americans are more mobile than their European counterparts still appears to hold true.\" (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku). Die Untersuchung enthält quantitative Daten. Forschungsmethode: empirisch-quantitativ; empirisch; Längsschnitt. Die Untersuchung bezieht sich auf den Zeitraum 1980 bis 2010.