Explore the vast range of titles available.

Prof. Pasnau's remarkable book offers an exciting integration of medieval and early modern philosophy. It begins, however, in mediis rebus and so downplays the role that a particularly Nominalist tradition plays in explaining the abandonment of substantial form rise of the mechanical philosophy. This paper attempts to sketch some of that role.

The notion of force is at the heart of Leibniz’s metaphysics. One of his central theses is that powers are to be reconceived as forces. Connectedly, he maintains that force is essential to the very account of substance. The paper contends that these claims have not been well understood due to an inadequate understanding of the notion of force itself. Against a common reading, I argue that Leibnizian force is not fundamentally dispositional, but an activity . Taking seriously this idea means reconsidering not only the nature and function of powers, but also the basic character of Leibniz’s metaphysics—including his view of substances as soul-like and as causally independent. This paves the way for a novel interpretation of the unity of physical and metaphysical forces.

The paper addresses a problem for the unification of quantum physics with the new Aristotelianism: the identification of the members of the category of substance (ousia). I outline briefly the role that substance plays in Aristotelian metaphysics, leading to the postulating of the Tiling Constraint. I then turn to the question of which entities in quantum physics can qualify as Aristotelian substances. I offer an answer: the theory of thermal substances, and I construct a fivefold case for thermal substances, based on the irreversibility of time, the definition of thermodynamic concepts, spontaneous symmetry breaking, phase transitions, and chemical form.

This paper studies Robert Boyle's account of kinds and classification. A number of commentators have argued that, for Boyle, classifications are inevitably the product of conventions. Others have challenged this reading, arguing that, according to Boyle, the corpuscular makeup of bodies gives rise to hard-edged natural kinds and classes. We argue that Boyle's position is more complicated than the available realist and conventionalist readings acknowledge. We argue that, according to Boyle, the individuation of kinds was to some degree the result of convention. At the same time, however, Boyle held that our classificatory practices are subject to constraints. We identify some of these constraints by turning to Boyle's discussion of the late scholastic debate about the plurality of forms, in particular the contributions of Jacopo Zabarella and Daniel Sennert. In this way, we clarify how Boyle strikes a balance between realist and conventionalist elements in his treatment of kinds.

The paper comprises an attempt on the part of the author to understand what hylomorphism is, both in its original Aristotelian guise, and in recent work by philosophers who defend what they call hylomorphism. Two species or strands of hylomorphism are identified and discussed. Universals, essences, and substantial and accidental forms make cameo appearances, and the implications of an Aristotelian ontology of stuffs are explored.

Leibniz’s lifelong involvement in debating the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist is central to his philosophical development. In this paper, I will examine Leibniz’s preoccupation with the Eucharist beginning in 1668 in De Transsubstantiatione. Leibniz tries to defend the Christian mystery of the Eucharist by establishing a new metaphysics that reconciles Cartesian mechanism with the substantial forms of scholasticism. Since for the early Leibniz a body can only be called a substance, if it is united with a mind, transubstantiation, on which the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist depends, must be understood as a change with regard to a mind to which the bodies of bread and wine are substantially united: It is no longer the universal mind of God, but rather the mind of Jesus Christ united to the bread and wine. Through this new metaphysics, Leibniz thinks he can demonstrate that transubstantiation, real presence, and ubiquity are different aspects of the very same thing. He hopes to thereby resolve theological controversies among the Christian denominations regarding the doctrine of the Eucharist, which is a vital component for a matter close to Leibniz’s heart: the reunion of the churches. La préoccupation constante de Leibniz pour la doctrine eucharistique catholique a toujours été un énorme catalyseur de son développement philosophique. Dans cet essai, j’examinerai la position de Leibniz vis-à-vis de l’Eucharistie dans le cadre de son écrit précoce De Transsubstantiatione de 1668. D’une part, Leibniz y travaille sur une nouvelle métaphysique qui réconcilie le mécanisme cartésien avec les formes substantielles de la scolastique dans le but de défendre le mystère de l’Eucharistie contre des objections. Puisque le principium actionis ne peut être dans le corps, mais seulement dans l’esprit, et que le corps donc doit être un accident, la conversio substantialis dont parle la doctrine catholique de l’Eucharistie doit être comprise comme un changement concernant l’esprit qui confère l’unité substantielle aux corps des dons eucharistiques. Ce n’est plus l’esprit universel de Dieu, mais plutôt l’esprit de Jésus-Christ qui leur confère son unité substantielle après la consécration. D’autre part, Leibniz pense pouvoir montrer, par cette nouvelle métaphysique, que la transsubstantiation, la présence réelle et l’ubiquité sont de différents aspects d’une seule et même chose, dissolvant ainsi les querelles théologiques entre les confessions au sujet de la doctrine de la Cène et de l’Eucharistie. C’est ainsi qu’il s’approche d’un pas décisif du projet de la réunification des Églises. Die lebenslange Beschäftigung Leibnizens mit der katholischen Eucharistielehre stellte stets einen enormen Katalysator seiner philosophischen Entwicklung dar. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich Leibniz’ Auseinandersetzung mit der Eucharistie im Umkreis seiner frühen Schrift De Transsubstantiatione von 1668 untersuchen. Leibniz arbeitet hier einerseits an einer neuen Metaphysik, die den cartesianischen Mechanismus mit den substanziellen Formen der Scholastik versöhnt, mit dem Ziel, das christliche Geheimnis der Eucharistie gegen Anfragen zu verteidigen. Weil das principium actionis nicht in den Körpern, sondern bloß im Geist sein kann, der Körper also Akzidenz sein muss, muss die conversio substantialis, von der die katholische Lehre der Eucharistie spricht, als Wechsel hinsichtlich des den Körpern der eucharistischen Gaben ihre substanzielle Einheit verleihenden Geistes verstanden werden. Es ist nicht mehr der universelle Geist Gottes, sondern vielmehr der Geist Jesu Christi, der ihnen nach der Konsekration ihre substanzielle Einheit verleiht. Andererseits meint Leibniz durch diese neue Metaphysik zeigen zu können, dass Transsubstantiation, Realpräsenz und Ubiquität verschiedene Aspekte ein und derselben Sache sind, sich dadurch die kontroverstheologischen Streitigkeiten zwischen den Konfessionen hinsichtlich der Abendmahls- und Eucharistielehre auflösen und er somit dem Projekt der Reunion der Kirchen einen entscheidenden Schritt nähergekommen ist.

Leibniz’s lifelong involvement in debating the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist is central to his philosophical development. In this paper, I will examine Leibniz’s preoccupation with the Eucharist beginning in 1668 in De Transsubstantiatione. Leibniz tries to defend the Christian mystery of the Eucharist by establishing a new metaphysics that reconciles Cartesian mechanism with the substantial forms of scholasticism. Since for the early Leibniz a body can only be called a substance, if it is united with a mind, transubstantiation, on which the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist depends, must be understood as a change with regard to a mind to which the bodies of bread and wine are substantially united: It is no longer the universal mind of God, but rather the mind of Jesus Christ united to the bread and wine. Through this new metaphysics, Leibniz thinks he can demonstrate that transubstantiation, real presence, and ubiquity are different aspects of the very same thing. He hopes to thereby resolve theological controversies among the Christian denominations regarding the doctrine of the Eucharist, which is a vital component for a matter close to Leibniz’s heart: the reunion of the churches. La préoccupation constante de Leibniz pour la doctrine eucharistique catholique a toujours été un énorme catalyseur de son développement philosophique. Dans cet essai, j’examinerai la position de Leibniz vis-à-vis de l’Eucharistie dans le cadre de son écrit précoce De Transsubstantiatione de 1668. D’une part, Leibniz y travaille sur une nouvelle métaphysique qui réconcilie le mécanisme cartésien avec les formes substantielles de la scolastique dans le but de défendre le mystère de l’Eucharistie contre des objections. Puisque le principium actionis ne peut être dans le corps, mais seulement dans l’esprit, et que le corps donc doit être un accident, la conversio substantialis dont parle la doctrine catholique de l’Eucharistie doit être comprise comme un changement concernant l’esprit qui confère l’unité substantielle aux corps des dons eucharistiques. Ce n’est plus l’esprit universel de Dieu, mais plutôt l’esprit de Jésus-Christ qui leur confère son unité substantielle après la consécration. D’autre part, Leibniz pense pouvoir montrer, par cette nouvelle métaphysique, que la transsubstantiation, la présence réelle et l’ubiquité sont de différents aspects d’une seule et même chose, dissolvant ainsi les querelles théologiques entre les confessions au sujet de la doctrine de la Cène et de l’Eucharistie. C’est ainsi qu’il s’approche d’un pas décisif du projet de la réunification des Églises. Die lebenslange Beschäftigung Leibnizens mit der katholischen Eucharistielehre stellte stets einen enormen Katalysator seiner philosophischen Entwicklung dar. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich Leibniz’ Auseinandersetzung mit der Eucharistie im Umkreis seiner frühen Schrift De Transsubstantiatione von 1668 untersuchen. Leibniz arbeitet hier einerseits an einer neuen Metaphysik, die den cartesianischen Mechanismus mit den substanziellen Formen der Scholastik versöhnt, mit dem Ziel, das christliche Geheimnis der Eucharistie gegen Anfragen zu verteidigen. Weil das principium actionis nicht in den Körpern, sondern bloß im Geist sein kann, der Körper also Akzidenz sein muss, muss die conversio substantialis, von der die katholische Lehre der Eucharistie spricht, als Wechsel hinsichtlich des den Körpern der eucharistischen Gaben ihre substanzielle Einheit verleihenden Geistes verstanden werden. Es ist nicht mehr der universelle Geist Gottes, sondern vielmehr der Geist Jesu Christi, der ihnen nach der Konsekration ihre substanzielle Einheit verleiht. Andererseits meint Leibniz durch diese neue Metaphysik zeigen zu können, dass Transsubstantiation, Realpräsenz und Ubiquität verschiedene Aspekte ein und derselben Sache sind, sich dadurch die kontroverstheologischen Streitigkeiten zwischen den Konfessionen hinsichtlich der Abendmahls- und Eucharistielehre auflösen und er somit dem Projekt der Reunion der Kirchen einen entscheidenden Schritt nähergekommen ist.

Abstract This paper explores the scholastic context of the discussion about the unity of the composite or corporeal substance and the nature of the vinculum substantiale or substantial bond in Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses. Three prominent scholastic views are examined: Duns Scotus's antireductionist account of the composite substance as an entity irreducible to its essential parts (i.e., matter and substantial form); Ockham's parts-whole identity thesis, which entails a reductionist view of the composite substance; and Suárez's explanation of the unity of composite substance through the presence of a substantial mode of union. It is then shown that Leibniz initially combines a reductionist account of the composite substance, with the vinculum playing the role of bond among the component monads. In his last letters, he moves away from this to an antireductionist account of the composite substance, with which he now identifies the vinculum.

Kenelm Digby is now best remembered for his attempt at reconciling Aristotelianism with the new philosophies of his time. In his Two Treatises of 1644, Digby argued that, while the notion of form has no place in natural philosophy, it remains indispensable in metaphysics. This division of labor has not received much attention, but we argue that it played an important role in Digby’s thought. The notion of form is central to his account of bodily identity over time, but by removing it from the domain of natural philosophy, he avoids some of the standard criticism of forms in authors like Descartes. In the final part of this paper, we turn to Digby’s friend and follower, John Sergeant. We argue that, in Sergeant, we get an answer to the question of how the atomic parts out of which a body is built up relate to its form, which had remained open in Digby.

Dans cet aperçu, la notion de corps, qui joue un rôle majeur dans la théologie de l'Aquinate, de la création à l'eschatologie, est étudiée dans une perspective philosophique. Les différents sens que Thomas attribue au mot « corps » sont notamment caractérisés, selon qu'il se réfère aux réalités extra-mentales ou à notre manière d'en comprendre et d'en analyser la structure. S'inspirant d'Aristote et Porphyre d'un côté, d'Avicenne de l'autre, Thomas distingue ainsi non seulement entre le corps en tant qu'accident quantitatif et en tant que détermination substantielle, mais aussi entre le corps pris en tant que partie d'un être corporel et en tant que tout. Parmi d'autres aspects, la relation que le corps entretient avec la matière est précisée. In this overview, the notion of the body, which plays a major role in Aquinas' theology, from creation to eschatology, is explored from a philosophical perspective. The different meanings that Thomas attaches to the word « body » are notably characterized, depending on whether it refers to extra-mental realities or to our way of understanding and analyzing their structures. Inspired by Aristotle and Porphyry on the one hand, and by Avicenna on the other, Thomas thus distinguishes not only between the body as a quantitative accident and as a substantial determination, but also between the body taken as a part of a bodily being and as a whole. Among other matters, the body's relationship with matter is clarified.