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6,229 result(s) for "Sullivan, Jake"
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Sullivan says there’s no sign of Russian use of nuclear arms
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on Sept. 30 that the U.S. does not see any current indications that Russia may use nuclear weapons.
Jake Sullivan: ‘No reoccupation of Gaza’
On Nov. 12, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan outlined the United States’ position for its vision of the future in Gaza.
White House has ‘serious concerns’ about violence in Israel
White House press secretary Jen Psaki said on May 10 that the Biden administration was closely monitoring violence in Israel between police and Arab protesters.
The China Gambit: Geoeconomics and the US’ Turn to Informal Data Governance Initiatives
In October 2023, the US withdrew its proposals on cross-border data flows at the World Trade Organization (WTO), reversing its long-held position on binding commitments against data localization. Concurrently, it has orchestrated the creation of several informal data governance initiatives, including the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, which are all characterized by fluid commitments on data flows. This article demonstrates that the US’ turn toward informal data governance is influenced considerably by geoeconomic statecraft. Confronted with the prospect of China leveraging global data flows to undermine American interests, both in terms of national security and economic competitiveness, the US executive has sought to restrict outbound data flows. In parallel, it has developed informal, like-minded coalitions to promote norms around “trusted data flows,” that similarly restrict data collection by Chinese actors globally. Having withdrawn from formal WTO discussions on cross-border data, its informal initiatives give the US ample regulatory space to implement coercive domestic measures against Chinese actors. Informal initiatives simultaneously allow the US to develop norm-setting coalitions with states that may otherwise be wary of binding commitments on restrictive data flows. Drawing on an analysis of seven international data governance initiatives, alongside US domestic policies and official statements, we trace the US’ turn toward informality to its geoeconomic considerations. We contribute to theoretical debates on the evolution and shift in geoeconomic statecraft, particularly the shift away from formal sanctions-based regimes to informal agreements, as well as to the empirical literature on international cross-border data governance.
Biden's Troubled Foreign Policy Legacy
The United States rejoined UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, the Paris Climate Accord, and the World Health Organization. The White House hosted a Leaders' Summit on Climate Change and launched the Democracy Summit initiative as a response to the growing challenge of authoritarian states internationally. On Ukraine, and following the initial success in pushing back Russia's invading troops, Washington delayed sending weapons systems that could have made a difference on the battlefield, failed to impose broader sanctions on Russia from the start that could have added to the pressures on Moscow's war effort, openly questioned President Zelensky's decision-making, and never fully explained to Americans what was at stake - President Biden did not make an Oval Office speech specifically on Ukraine as the United States expended over $100 billion supporting the country. Dictatorships in Nicaragua and Venezuela consolidated, and a concern with rising migration across the border with Mexico obscured other important bilateral issues affecting trade and cooperation in law enforcement.
QUAD and SQUAD: From Lattice Alliances to an Asian NATO?
This article examines system‐ and unit‐level drivers that create a lattice work of Indo‐Pacific alliances and security partners. Consequently, these developments are leading to a multilateral security network that is comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It observes the emergence of an Asian‐style NATO in the Indo‐Pacific region, which is gradually replacing the Cold War‐era hub‐and‐spoke system of alliances. It argues that this type of security architecture has emerged as a result of Chinaʼs rise as a great power in the Indo‐Pacific region, with a focus on expansion in the South and East China Seas, as well as Washingtonʼs decision to engage Beijing in strategic competition. The following variables indicate the formation of this Asian‐style NATO: a changing US grand strategy vis‐à‐vis China, the creation of mini‐laterals, and US alliesʼ efforts to confront Chinaʼs expansion and aggression by strengthening their alliance with the US. In conclusion, the article argues that this Asian‐style NATO is still in its formative stages compared to the time‐tested, well‐established, and highly institutionalised Euro‐Atlantic NATO.
TIES STABILIZE WHILE NEGATIVE UNDERCURRENTS DEEPEN
US-China relations were marked by a paradox during the first trimester of 2024. On the one hand, a distinct stabilization was evident in ties. The two sides made concerted efforts to translate their leaders' 'San Francisco Vision' into reality. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in ties continued to deepen. Both sides introduced additional selective decoupling as well as cybersecurity measures in key information and communications technology and services sectors, with US actions bearing the signs of desinicization--rather than mere decoupling--of relevant supply chains. In sum, the \"new normal\" in US-China relations continued to take form, one piece at a time.
Is Diplomacy Back? Making the Case to the American People
Biden underscored the change of focus in a speech to the State Department in which his now-familiar line, \"diplomacy is back,\" has become a rallying cry for a crowd eager to resume the day-to-day operations that underpin diplomacy. Taking international relations to Main Street is not entirely new - for years, scores of foreign service officers on home leave have spoken at venues ranging from the Rotary Club to high school civics classes to connect the dots between their work overseas and the communities from which they hail. Diplomacy Makes Americans Better Off National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan made this link explicit, saying foreign policy decisions should be judged by a basic question- \"will this make life better, easier, safer for families across this country?\"[5] Economic statecraft seeks out win-win trade opportunities that encourage foreign investment. The visa to your next vacation spot is there thanks to diplomatic negotiations, which make it possible for you to enter for tourism, business, or study, just as foreign nationals enter the United States.