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Tefviz meselesi ictihada başvurmaksızın ilkten hüküm koyma esasına dayanan girift bir meseledir. Şer'i ahkâmın kaynaǧı ya vahiy veya vahyin ışıǧında ictihaddır. Tefvizde ise hüküm herhangi bir vahiy veya ictihada dayanmayıp, Allah tarafından daha önce verilen yetkiye dayanmaktadır. Tefvizde ilkten ve re'sen bir hüküm koyma söz konusudur. Usulcüler arasında böyle bir yetkinin imkanı tartışılmış, mesele etrafında kabul ve red şeklinde temel iki görüş ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu ihtilafın temelinde hüsün ve kubuh etrafındaki kelami tartışmaların önemli rol oynadıǧı anlaşılmaktadır. Tefvizi kabul eden usulcüler kendi içerisinde aklen cevaz verenler; hem aklen hem de fiilen mümkün görenler şeklinde ayrışmışlardır. Kabul eden usulcüler detayda da ihtilaf etmişler kimi usulcüler tefvize peygamber, miictehid/álim ve hatta ámmí bakımından cevaz verirken, kimisi sadece peygamber bakımından, kimisi hem peygamber hem de müctehidler bakımından cevazına hükmetmişlerdir. Çoǧunluǧu Mu'tezile mensubu olan usulcüler ise ne aklen ne de fiilen gerçekleşmesini mümkün görmemişlerdir. Hem aklen hem de fiilen cevaz veren ve tefvizi peygamber ve âlimlere teşmil eden usulcüler arasında Mu'tezil? âlim Müveys b. İmrân'ın adının ön plana çıktıǧı görülmektedir. İmam $afii ve Şâfif usulcüler de aynı grup içerisinde yer almış olmakla birlikte özellikle İmam Şâfit'nin görüşü noktasında net bilgiler sunulamamıştır. Hem aklen hem de fiilen gerçekleştiǧini kabul eden usulcüler görüşlerini akli ve sem? delillerle temellendirmeye çalışmışlardır Tefvize cevaz veren usulcüler ayrıca tefvizi seri hükmün kaynaklarından biri olarak kabul etmişlerdir. Tefvize cevaz vermeyen ve çoǧunluǧunu fukahâ/Hanefi metoduna mensup alimlerin oluşturduǧu usulcüler ise ser? hüküm kaynaklarının vahiy ve ictihad olduǧuna vurgu yaparak peygamber de olsa bunların dışında başka bir tesrí\" kaynaǧı bulunamayacaǧını iddia etmişler, onlar da iddiaların akli ve nakli delillerle gerekcelendirmeye çalışmışlardır. Şit usulcüler arasında tefvizi temelden reddedenler olduǧu gibi kabul ve red şeklinde sünnî usulcülerle benzer yaklaşımlar sergileyen alimler de bulunmaktadır. Bazı aşırı Sía fırkaları arasında tekvini tefviz denen bir anlayış da bulunmaktadır. Bu anlayışa göre âlemin yaratılması, idare edilmesi, öldürme, diriltme, rızık verme, âhirette ceza ve mükâfat verme gibi hususlar Allah tarafından Hz. Peygamber, Hz. Ali ve imamlara havale edilmiştir. Fakat bu anlayış mutedil Sta alimleri tarafından şiddetle reddedilerek bunu savunanların küfrüne hükmedilmiştir. Kimi usulcülerin ictihadla tefvizi birbirine karıştırdıkları veya en azından tefvizi de ictihad kapsamında gördükleri anlaşılmaktadır. Oysaki tefvizin en temel özelliklerinden biri ictihada başvurmadan hüküm vermektir. Dolayısıyla böyle bir yaklaşım isabetli gözükmemektedir.

For over four centuries the principal source of Christian European knowledge of Islam stemmed from a project sponsored by Peter the Venerable, ninth abbot of Cluny, in 1142. This consisted of Latin translations of five Arabic works, including the first translation of the Koran in a western language. Known as the Toledan Collection, it was eventually printed in 1543 with an introduction by Martin Luther. The abbot also completed a handbook of Islam beliefs and a major analytical and polemical work, Liber contra sectam Saracenorum; annotated editions of these texts are included in this book. Originally published in 1964. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Can Islam Be French? is an anthropological examination of how Muslims are responding to the conditions of life in France. Following up on his book Why the French Don't Like Headscarves, John Bowen turns his attention away from the perspectives of French non-Muslims to focus on those of the country's Muslims themselves. Bowen asks not the usual question--how well are Muslims integrating in France?--but, rather, how do French Muslims think about Islam? In particular, Bowen examines how French Muslims are fashioning new Islamic institutions and developing new ways of reasoning and teaching. He looks at some of the quite distinct ways in which mosques have connected with broader social and political forces, how Islamic educational entrepreneurs have fashioned niches for new forms of schooling, and how major Islamic public actors have set out a specifically French approach to religious norms. All of these efforts have provoked sharp responses in France and from overseas centers of Islamic scholarship, so Bowen also looks closely at debates over how--and how far--Muslims should adapt their religious traditions to these new social conditions. He argues that the particular ways in which Muslims have settled in France, and in which France governs religions, have created incentives for Muslims to develop new, pragmatic ways of thinking about religious issues in French society.

The traditional gender binary constitutes an integral aspect of Islamic social ethics, which has a pivotal role in shaping religious obligations, legal proceedings, and interpersonal judgments within Muslim communities. Within the familial sphere, this gender binary underscores fundamental responsibilities encompassing parenthood, filial duties, and inheritance rights. Recent years have witnessed a growing challenge to the traditional concept of the gender binary within Islamic societies. This shift is driven by increasing social libertarianism that emphasizes gender fluidity and individual choice. Hence, this article aims to critically scrutinize evolving discussions and controversies about the rights of intersex and transgender individuals, particularly issues relating to sex reassignment or gender-affirming surgery, marriage, and reproduction, from the perspective of the Sunni tradition of Islam. To support the various interpretations and insights presented here, a comprehensive and rigorous analysis is carried out on various religious texts and scholarly sources to elucidate the theological and jurisprudential positions on gender issues. It is thus concluded that Shariah offers greater flexibility in the treatment of intersex individuals compared to those with gender dysphoria because the intersex condition is viewed as a physical impairment that is not the choice of the afflicted individual. By contrast, in the case of individuals with gender dysphoria, they are willfully attempting to change their recognized biological sex, that God had naturally given to them at birth. Therefore, it is recommended that such transgender individuals deserve respectful psychological and social rehabilitation with help and guidance from religious authorities, their families, and communities.

This article analyzes the role of Sunni Islam in speeches given to religious scholars by Syrian president Bashar al-Asad in 2014 and 2017. I discuss how religion was used in these speeches as a security tool to consolidate authority, legitimize the Ba'thist regime, and marginalize political dissidents. I specifically highlight the emphasis Asad placed on convincing government-recognized 'ulama to support state security measures and to the novel links he constructed between Islam and national unity.

Based on interviews with Lebanese in over 150 mixed-religion marriages and their extended family members, I argue that sect may conceal or stand in for other forms of difference, including ideas about status and hierarchy related to class and regional origin in Lebanon. Because it is the most readily available discourse for understanding social difference, parents often use sectarian rhetoric to describe their concerns about a variety of problems they see in their children's chosen partners. By listening between the lines of parental objections, I suggest that expressions of bias against people of other sects may mask concerns with other forms of social difference, in effect reducing a complex and shifting social field of multiple axes of difference into sect. Rather than assume sectarianism's a priori importance, this approach allows me to bring other discourses of difference and analytic lenses to the foreground.

The Alevis of Anatolia and the Balkans and the Alawites of Syria and southeastern Turkey are two distinct ethnoreligious communities frequently conflated in both media and scholarly literature, despite their divergent historical origins, theological differences, and varying sociocultural formations. While their shared histories of marginalization and persecution, certain theological parallels, and cognate ethnonyms contribute to this conflation, it largely stems from a broader tendency within mainstream Islamic frameworks to homogenize so-called heterodox communities without sufficient attention to their doctrinal and cultural specificities. This paper, grounded in a synthetic analysis of current scholarship, maps the key historical, theological, and sociocultural intersections and divergences between Alawite and Alevi communities. Situated within the broader framework of intra-Islamic diversity, it seeks to move beyond essentialist and homogenizing paradigms by foregrounding the distinct genealogies of each tradition, rooted, respectively, in the early pro-Alid movements of Iraq and Syria and in Anatolian Sufism. In addition, the study examines the communities’ overlapping political trajectories in the modern era, particularly their alignments with leftist and secular–nationalist currents, as well as their evolving relationship—from mutual unawareness to a recent political rapprochement—prompted by the growing existential threats posed by the rise of Sunni-Salafi Islamist movements.

‘Yan haƙiƙa are a Sufi group that has come to prominence in the second decade of the twenty-first century in northern Nigeria, with a significant following in Kano. Although members of the group perceive themselves to be bona fide followers of the path of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse (Senegalese Islamic scholar and founder of Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya), they are considered by Sunni Muslims (both Salafis and Sufis) as a heretical faction. The basic ideology of this group is that Niasse Allah ne (Niasse is God); they also apotheosize their members. Their ideology stems from the concepts of Wahadat al-Wujud (oneness of being and unity of existence) and Tarbiyya (spiritual training), which is a method used by Sufi shaykhs to guide their disciples on the mystical journey to direct experiences of the Divine Essence – a method popularized by Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya. Initially, the group operated clandestinely, but in recent years its members have attracted public attention through Mawlid Baaye (celebrating the birthday of Niasse). During the celebration, they shower praises on Niasse and rank him above the Prophet Muhammad. Their comments generate violent reactions from Salafi and Sufi communities. While Salafis consider the creed of ‘Yan haƙiƙa as typical Sufi heresy, the Sufis not only disown them but also question their ‘Muslimness’. The emergence of ‘Yan haƙiƙa has changed the contours and composition of Tijaniyya in Kano because its defining ideology of deifying Niasse and its members contradict the teaching and doctrine of the mainstream Tijaniyya. This article unpacks the place of ‘Yan haƙiƙa in the highly contested and tense religious geography of Kano, exploring how its emergence complicates the category of ‘Muslim’ within mainstream Sunni Islam.

This paper examines the Islamic source-texts and jurisprudential manuals cited in a famous Nigerian court case, that of Safiyatu Hussaini in 2000–2002. Convicted of adultery by a sharī ʿ a court following “full sharī ʿ a ” implementation and codification in northern Nigerian states, Hussaini was acquitted upon appeal. This paper argues that the legal manuals cited in the proceedings display a clear pattern, and that the citations can be grouped into rival paradigms, each reflecting a particular approach, whether consciously or unconsciously adopted, to the scope and role of human interpretation in understanding and applying sharī ʿ a . The prosecution, relying largely on core manuals from the Mālikī school of Sunni Islam, treated the Islamic legal canon as univocal and clear. The appeals team, led by non-specialists in Islamic law, deployed works of comparative fiqh , works that cut across and therefore relativized the authority of individual legal schools, offering a pluralistic view of Islamic legal rulings and procedures. The appeals judges cautiously endorsed the pluralistic paradigm over the univocal paradigm. This paradigm not only gave intellectual and legal heft to a politically charged acquittal but also offered an alternative view of what sharī ʿ a application could mean. The appeals team’s deployment of comparative fiqh manuals conveyed a sense of the law as multivocal and offering a range of possibilities. As the study and application of comparative fiqh grows within the Muslim world, revisiting the Hussaini trial offers insight into what the deployment of comparative fiqh can look like in a courtroom setting.

This article studies how the ʿUthmānī position endorsing the first three caliphs, which was embraced by the majority of the ahl al-ḥadīth in the first two centuries of Islam, came to be replaced by the four-caliph thesis. It examines variations in the narrations of different chains of transmission of Ibn ʿUmar’s tradition in relation to the geographical affiliation and movements of the transmitters active in the late eighth and early ninth centuries. The analysis suggests that Ibn ʿUmar’s tradition was present in two versions at the turn of the ninth century, circulated in Iraqi cities and non-Iraqi cities respectively. Through its investigation, this study substantiates the current narrative on early ahl al-ḥadīth attitudes toward the first four caliphs and offers more insights that help explain why the ʿUthmānī hadith narrators failed to perpetuate their ideas.