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The last three decades have witnessed a rapid ascendance of China as a global power. As China has become the second largest economy investing heavily around the world and is rapidly building up its military, the world's attention has shifted to the prospect that China will become a superpower and how to deal with it. This article aims to (1) re-examine the concept and definition of \"superpower\" and \"potential superpowers\" (PSPs) against the background of China's rapid rise, (2) describe China's capability of becoming a superpower and the kind of superpower China will become, (3) analyze the relationship between superpowers and PSPs, and (4) compare potential superpowers, the reasons determines the rise and fall of superpower.

In recent years, we organized a series of roundtable discussion on the topic of potential superpowers at Waseda University and Tohoku Bunka Gakuen University. The authors in this special issue mostly participated in the roundtable discussions. The content of the discussions forms the base for the theme of this special issue. Interested readers may benefit from transcription of the discussions below.

Unipolarity is arguably the most popular concept used to analyze the U.S. global position that emerged in 1991, but the concept is totally inadequate for assessing how that position has changed in the years since. A new framework that avoids unipolarity's conceptual pitfalls and provides a systematic approach to measuring how the distribution of capabilities is changing in twenty-first-century global politics demonstrates that the United States will long remain the only state with the capability to be a superpower. In addition, China is in a class by itself, one that the unipolarity concept cannot explain. To assess the speed with which China's rise might transform this into something other than a one-superpower system, analogies from past power transitions are misleading. Unlike past rising powers, China is at a much lower technological level than the leading state, and the gap separating Chinese and U.S. military capabilities is much larger than it was in the past. In addition, the very nature of power has changed: the greatly enhanced difficulty of converting economic capacity into military capacity makes the transition from a great power to a superpower much harder now than it was in the past. Still, China's rise is real and change is afoot.

In nearly every documented society, people believe that some misfortunes are caused by malicious group mates using magic or supernatural powers. Here I report cross-cultural patterns in these beliefs and propose a theory to explain them. Using the newly created Mystical Harm Survey, I show that several conceptions of malicious mystical practitioners, including sorcerers (who use learned spells), possessors of the evil eye (who transmit injury through their stares and words), and witches (who possess superpowers, pose existential threats, and engage in morally abhorrent acts), recur around the world. I argue that these beliefs develop from three cultural selective processes: a selection for intuitive magic, a selection for plausible explanations of impactful misfortune, and a selection for demonizing myths that justify mistreatment. Separately, these selective schemes produce traditions as diverse as shamanism, conspiracy theories, and campaigns against heretics—but around the world, they jointly give rise to the odious and feared witch. I use the tripartite theory to explain the forms of beliefs in mystical harm and outline 10 predictions for how shifting conditions should affect those conceptions. Societally corrosive beliefs can persist when they are intuitively appealing or they serve some believers' agendas.

Although some rebel groups work hard to foster collaborative ties with civilians, others engage in egregious abuses and war crimes. We argue that foreign state funding for rebel organizations greatly reduces incentives to “win the hearts and minds” of civilians because it diminishes the need to collect resources from the population. However, unlike other lucrative resources, foreign funding of rebel groups must be understood in principal-agent terms. Some external principals—namely, democracies and states with strong human rights lobbies—are more concerned with atrocities in the conflict zone than others. Multiple state principals also lead to abuse because no single state can effectively restrain the organization. We test these conjectures with new data on foreign support for rebel groups and data on one-sided violence against civilians. Most notably, we find strong evidence that principal characteristics help influence agent actions.

A powerful but anxious Chinese regime is now engaged in an aggressive effort to make the world safe for autocracy and to corrupt and destabilize democracies. Democracy promotion may be out of style in U.S. foreign policy, but democracy prevention is very much at the heart of Chinese strategy today.

The main objective of this study is to identify and to explore the core determinants of international leadership, such as military power, economic strength, diplomacy and technological innovation. It is important to conduct this analysis, because the dynamics of international leadership are evolving. In addition, there is a theoretical gap on this topic. Despite the existence of many works on leadership there have been few studies with a particular emphasis on the determinants of international leadership, and their role in the global landscape. The novum of this research is a focus on a leader’s (state) ability to influence other states. The analysis provides key insights into the evolving factors of international leadership in a global order. The main objective of this study is to identify and to explore the core determinants of international leadership, such as military power, economic strength, diplomacy and technological innovation. It is important to conduct this analysis, because the dynamics of international leadership are evolving. In addition, there is a theoretical gap on this topic. Despite the existence of many works on leadership there have been few studies with a particular emphasis on the determinants of international leadership, and their role in the global landscape. The novum of this research is a focus on a leader’s (state) ability to influence other states. The analysis provides key insights into the evolving factors of international leadership in a global order.

Kurtzer-Ellenbogen discusses why a two-state solution remains a core interest in the US. Analysts across the American political spectrum increasingly declare the two-state solution dead. Figures as different as Elliott Abrams, Hussein Agha, and Robert Malley agree that decades of U.S. pursuit have been misguided, though they blame different causes: Abrams faults Palestinian maximalism, while Agha and Malley argue that neither side has truly been ready to compromise and that Washington has been ineffective. None, however, consider the deeper rationale for continued American engagement or the cost of abandoning the issue. Israelis and Palestinians suffer the human consequences of their leaders' intransigence, while the United States loses soft power, undermines Middle East stability, and diverts attention from other priorities. An inconsistent U.S. policy damages long-term interests; a durable agreement would strengthen allies, enable regional cooperation, and reduce exploitation of the conflict by extremists. Given its leverage and interests, and the absence of any realistic alternative, the United States retains significant capacity to press for a two-state solution.

This paper explores how NATO has transformed from a Cold-War-type defence alliance to a multipurpose international security organization, adjusting both legal frameworks and strategic doctrine to new challenges such as cyber warfare, counterterrorism action or growing Chinese influence. NATO, in marking its 75th anniversary, is steadfast in its commitment to global security by a combination of traditional defence with new responsibilities. At the center of this shift is NATO's extension to the east (the third wave of enlargement, comprising the Baltic States as well as Finland and Sweden), which has led to a marked deterioration in relations with Russia. Nevertheless, while the expansion of NATO has been summarized as a topic of concern (history and memory in NATO enlargement 2014), the full scale consequences of this enlarged defence reality on European security and a balance power for Eastern Europe has not yet executed fully enlightened. The research aims to addresses central issues on both sides regarding NATO's possible enlargement and its likely implications for European and strategic stability with Russia, as well as important insights into the changing character of the alliance in an increasingly complex global security environment.

It is without doubt that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has increased the global threat from the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including chemical munitions. Equally, there have been multiple claims from Ukraine in October 2022 that Russia was using WMD and chemical munitions in Ukraine after white phosphorus munitions were found during a fight between Ukrainian and Russian soldiers in Donetsk, Ukraine. The current paper seeks to interrogate the existing faculty of knowledge concerning the effectiveness of international control measures on WMD. Beyond the centralisation of the critical analysis of the effectiveness of control measures, the paper at hand argues that these measures in the form of multilateral treaties have not produced the required results, especially in disarming global superpowers (the United States and Russia) and alternative nuclear pariah states like North Korea. To some extent, the ineffectiveness of the control measures has now motivated Russia to utilise some of the WMD in Ukraine. Methodologically, the paper has employed a qualitative research approach that is dependent on secondary data materials and content analysis.